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Summary 
 
 My research arises from a critique of the tendency within terrorism debates to equate 
the terrorist act with the production of spectacular images. Chapter 1 uses the work of Luce 
Irigaray to critique this trend in terrorism discourses, arguing that such a characterisation relies 
on a repression of the very materiality that terrorist action exploits. Moreover, placing the 
concept of terror in an Irigarayan framework reveals that the concept of terrorism is bound up 
with concepts of masculinity. In developing this critical approach, I build on the thinking of 
both Irigaray and Gayatri Spivak in turning to literary representations of terrorism to find a 
means of articulating a new understanding of the concept of terrorism and its place within our 
culture. 
 Chapter 2 brings together the figure of the woman terrorist in terrorism studies, 
Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter(1979), and Doris Lessing’s The Good Terrorist (1985) in 
order to critique the portrayal of the feminine in terrorism discourses. Chapter 3 then moves 
on to ask how the global reach of terrorism discourses after September 11th, 2001, has 
impacted on our understanding of masculinity and femininity, looking at the relationship 
between the body and subjectivity in Ian McEwan’s Saturday (2006). Finally, Chapter 4 
examines how Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007) figures the body as a site of resistance to such 
global narratives of terror, as he explores the possibility of an embodied ethics opening up a 
suspension of photographic and filmic modes of perception. 
 By setting up a dialogue between terrorism studies and literary fiction, I reintroduce 
the body to our conceptualisation of terrorism. In doing so, I show how literature can open up 
new ethical horizons in an otherwise closed rhetoric. 
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Introduction 
 
In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, anxieties about terrorism came to shape 
global politics in a manner they had hitherto failed to do. In the days, weeks, and years after al-
Qaeda’s attacks on the United States of America (U.S.) on September 11th, 2001, discourses 
about terrorism gained an unprecedented purchase on domestic and international policies 
across the world. Within the U.S. and countries like the United Kingdom (U.K.), we saw radical 
recalibrations of civil liberties. The Bush administration instituted the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT) in October 2001, while Tony Blair’s government brought in the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2005, an act that allowed the Home Secretary to issue Control 
Orders designed to limit an individual’s freedom even if there was not sufficient evidence to 
charge him or her with terrorist offenses. On an international scale, the U.S. and its largely 
Western allies pursued wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of counter-terrorism, 
ultimately rejecting the authority of the United Nations in favour of asserting their right to 
unilateral action by citing the need to protect themselves from future terrorist atrocity. Yet if 
the rights of the U.S. and its allies were paramount, the suspension of the Geneva Conventions 
within these theatres of war suggested that the spectre of terrorism facilitated a convenient 
forgetting of the rights of those who were not Western, be they terrorist or not. As the Bush 
administration used a series of legal sleights-of-hand to construct their enclave in Cuba’s 
Guantanamo Bay as a space external to U.S. and international law and countries across Europe 
co-operated with extraordinary rendition, it seemed that the logic of counter-terrorism led the 
West to rethink their notions of human rights. Rather than a call for universal equality and 
recognition, counter-terrorism facilitated the installation of a hierarchy of freedom, prescribing 
a little less for “us” and absolutely none for “them”, distinctions made according to the whims 
of the powers that be.  
 Behind the policies and the political rhetoric that continue to shape the global and 
domestic spheres even as later administrations attempt to rescind some of the changes made 
by their predecessors,1 there lies a wealth of research into terrorism and counter-terrorist 
strategies. Thus, while critical engagement with the politicians and policies they espouse is 
vital for placing counter-terrorist actions under scrutiny, this thesis suggests that it is similarly 
                                                          
1
 In the U.S., Barak Obama has struggled to dismantle Guantanamo Bay since the beginning of his 
presidency in 2005, while David Cameron’s Home Secretary Theresa May reworked the Control Order 
legislation to install a new, less restrictive order, but still one that allows increased surveillance of the 
individual under the order.  
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important to place the research and advice that inform these policies under the critical lens. 
For while administrations can change, the same is not necessarily true of the material and 
expertise that politicians turn to when formulating their response to terrorism. We need to ask 
what is at work in the discourses around terrorism that allows such a bullish assertion of 
unilateral authority and the radical negation of the rights of others if we are to instigate lasting 
change in counter-terrorist policy, a change that does not rely on the tides of political interest. 
 In order to answer this question, this thesis locates terrorism discourses within a 
cultural context, figuring them as expressing a set of culturally-constructed concepts that rely 
on a specific set of a priori epistemological assumptions. Moreover, given that terrorism is 
widely understood as a form of ‘symbolic’ action, in Chapter 1, I suggest that a psychoanalytic 
approach allows us to unearth both these assumptions and the manner in which they were 
installed. Specifically, I argue that the psychoanalytically-informed philosophy of Luce Irigaray 
gives us a means of understanding why violent action is read as producing symbolic effects. 
Moreover, I go on to suggest that her modelling of the relationship between culture and the 
material world opens up the prospect that terrorism discourses are shaped by an investment 
in reinstalling a particular kind of subjectivity in the wake of terrorist violence; that of the 
phallic masculine that Western cultural traditions have taken as the norm. While I suggest this 
investment manifests itself throughout terrorism studies, it is in the figuring of the mass 
audience presumed to be terrorised by the media’s reporting of terrorist atrocity that the 
presumption of a phallic norm becomes particularly apparent. As I shall demonstrate,  such 
figurings rely on the disavowal of difference and the material body that Irigaray locates at the 
heart of the cultural symbolic which installs the phallic masculine as the normative subject. I 
then take up Irigaray and Gayatri Spivak’s claim that different manifestations of our cultural 
symbolic are capable of interacting with each other in a critical way, by placing the research 
that makes up the emerging academic discipline of ‘Terrorism Studies’ alongside philosophical 
attempts to rethink counter-terrorism in an ethical way. In doing so, I suggest that attempts by 
Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida are limited in their ethical 
capacity insofar as they share terrorism discourses’ conceptual ground, similarly forgetting the 
body and difference in their efforts to rethink terrorism. 
 If the philosophical sphere is limited in its ability to critique terrorism discourses, I 
suggest that literary fiction’s particular relationship to the symbolic conventions that shape our 
culture mean it is in literary representations of terrorism that we may find a way of 
reformulating our understanding of terrorism. Arguing that terrorism discourses take the 
phallic masculine to be the universal subject suggests that the global influence such discourses 
have attained has very specific consequences for women across the world. First, critiquing the 
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way in which recent terrorism studies figure the feminine, I then turn to two novels written 
prior to September 11th, 2001, Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter (1979) and Doris Lessing’s 
The Good Terrorist (1985). In comparing the way in which Gordimer and Lessing represent the 
woman activist or terrorist with the modelling of the female terrorist in studies produced in 
the last decade, I throw into relief the extent to which terrorism discourses rely on a 
conservative notion of femininity. Moreover, I suggest that in doing so, terrorism discourses 
not only threaten to covertly install these notions at a legislative level as counter-terrorism 
becomes paramount, but that it is only through relying on such conservative ideals that the 
epistemology of terrorism can presume to “know” the terrorist Other and thus articulate 
counter-terrorist policy. 
 Having demonstrated that in their pre-September 11th fiction, Gordimer and Lessing 
specifically figure the body as a site that resists the epistemological appropriation that 
facilitates the narratives of terrorism discourses, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I turn to two 
post-September 11th novels, Ian McEwan’s Saturday (2006) and Don DeLillo’s Falling Man 
(2007). Both McEwan and DeLillo explicitly turn to the body as a means of articulating an 
ethical response to the September 11th attacks, but in reading these texts alongside terrorism 
discourses, it becomes apparent they do so to very different effect. I argue that McEwan’s use 
of neuroscience to provide us with a universal model of subjectivity in fact replicates the 
forgetting of our materiality that facilitates terrorism discourses, leading him to agree with 
these discourses as he re-inscribes conservative notions of sexuality and concludes the best 
means of countering terrorist atrocity is a more confident assertion of the West’s moral 
authority. In stark contrast, DeLillo once again suggests that the body is a site of resistance, 
this time recognising the specificity of embodied experience in order to complicate the 
epistemological figuring of the mass audience of terror that supports the very concept of 
terrorism. Thus, while Saturday works anxiously to draw a dividing line between the terrorist 
Other and the phallic masculine, DeLillo suggests that our cultural investment in the image 
means we are always already inextricably connected to this Other. 
 Therefore, this thesis adopts a different approach to critiques that situate literary 
representations of terrorism in terms of the author’s politics or the ideology figured as 
motivating terrorist violence, such as Houen’s Terrorism and Modern Literature and Scanlan’s 
Plotting Terror: Novelist and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction.2 Rather, in analysing terrorism 
discourses as cultural products and placing them in dialogue with other cultural discourses 
                                                          
2
 Alex Houen, Terrorism and Modern Literature from Joseph Conrad to Ciaran Carson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Margaret Scanlan, Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary 
Fiction (Charlottesville, VA.; London: University Press of Virginia, 2001). 
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such literature and philosophy, I hope to expose the ways in which our understanding of 
terrorism is shaped by our investment in a particular set of cultural norms. I also hope to 
demonstrate the truth of Spivak’s assertion that the Humanities has a specific role to play in 
the formulating an ethical approach in a world in which particular discourses gain global 
influence. It is this claim and its consequences that we shall now explore.  
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Chapter 1: An Irigarayan Intervention in the Rhetoric of Terrorism 
 
As both a linguistic analyst and a practising psychoanalyst, Luce Irigaray’s critical gesture is to 
always ask how a particular discourse is able to work. From her earliest analysis of the 
language of dementia and schizophrenic patients, through her influential and infamous 
critique of philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses in Speculum Of the Other Woman, to 
her present interventions concerning politics and pedagogy, Irigaray asks the same questions 
of each discursive convention. What assumptions are necessary to allow this discourse to 
unfold? What has necessarily been put aside, forgotten, repressed, to facilitate the logic of this 
linguistic practice? Her psychoanalytic concern with the unsaid, the excess that permits a 
discourse to take place, is the foundational gesture of her philosophy. For in unveiling what 
constitutes the silent substratum of a discursive logic, we bring into view what – or who – has 
been exploited in order to sustain that discourse. Such an unveiling opens up the possibility of 
an ethical transformation, as becoming aware of what is silenced and forgotten by our 
language gives us the means to rethink our utterances. For Irigaray, the psychoanalytic gesture 
is the start of an ethical relation to the other. To ask what is at stake in the metaphysics, the 
logic, and the construction of any language is to reveal both who the normative subject is 
presumed to be, and also what forms of subjectivity have been appropriated, forgotten, and 
marked as excess to establish this normativity. Only by recognising how the subject producing 
the discourse makes use of others can we begin to refigure our language and our thinking in an 
ethical way, in a manner that strives to no longer exploit or appropriate otherness. Irigaray 
claims that, in understanding terrorism, it is first necessary to ask ‘How is our own culture 
terrorist? How does our culture provoke terrorism?’3 Instead of remaining within the terms 
put forward by terrorism’s targets and terrorists themselves, we need to look at how the 
structures that underpin our cultures and our subjectivities bring about the possibility of 
terrorism. To accept, as others have done, that the contemporary moment is ‘a time of terror’4 
is to allow the cycle of terror-counterterror to continue. As we shall see, for Irigaray, remaining 
within cultural traditions perpetuates terror. To break the cycle, we need to recognise that 
‘[v]iolence is the exhibition of an internal violence – we are living in a time of exhibition.’5 
 What is the source of this internal violence and how might it translate into what is 
described as terrorist activity? Throughout her oeuvre, Irigaray has employed psychoanalytic 
and linguistic analyses to unearth the foundations of traditional Western metaphysics and the 
                                                          
3
 Luce Irigaray, ‘Luce Irigaray International Seminar’ (University of Bristol, June 14, 2011). 
4
 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jűrgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
5
 Irigaray, ‘Luce Irigaray International Seminar’. 
6 
 
cultures grounded in them. Across philosophical, linguistic, psychoanalytic, and political 
practices, to mention but a few, Irigaray consistently demonstrates that cultures following a 
Western tradition are constituted through a fundamental disavowal of humanity’s embodied 
nature. For Irigaray, such cultures rest on an absolute severance of the living body from the 
symbolic structures that shape our societies and our subjectivity. This repression of the body, 
this refusal to recognise ourselves as embodied subjects, is the violent act that is internal to 
our culture and thus inscribes violence into the very roots of our societies. As Irigaray puts it, 
‘The cut between the body, the lived, the sensible, and culture is inherently terrorist, because 
it means we forget life.’6 This is a radical claim and seems counter-intuitive to the popular 
understanding of terrorism. After all, a terrorist act is widely regarded as an attack on a system 
or culture that comes from outside, inflicted by people who locate themselves as somehow 
external to the systems they target. Yet even a brief perusal of the discourses produced by 
European, American, and Israeli sources regarding terrorism suggests Irigaray is making an 
astute point. Something resembling this disconnect between the body, the material world, and 
culture manifests itself in the widespread reading of terrorism as a form of symbolic action. 
Although the explanations of how terrorism is symbolic, and what is meant by 
‘symbolic’, vary greatly throughout the discourse on terrorism, there is little doubt that it is 
deemed an appropriate means for interpreting terrorist action. The U.S. Army Manual adopts a 
layman’s definition of ‘symbolic’: ‘the greater the symbolic value of the target, the more 
publicity the attack brings to the terrorists and the more fear it generates,’7 referring to 
cultural, political or historical meanings attached to the target. Terrorism academics such as 
Hoffman and Whittaker argue that terrorism is ‘specifically designed to have far-reaching 
psychological effects beyond the immediate victim or object of the terrorist attack,’8 and that 
it holds ‘symbolic appeal’ as it ‘projects images, communicates messages and creates myths 
that transcend historical circumstances and motivate future generations.’9 Anthropologists 
Zulaika and Douglass discuss the way in which terrorism is read as making one person or target 
symbolise an entire class of people, before positing that a Freudian approach suggests this kind 
of thinking by both the terrorists and their targets ‘is reminiscent of the inability of so-called 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 
7
 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, The Basics: Combatting Terrorism, 2003, 
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5671&mode=thr
ead&order=0&thold=0. 
8
 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998), 15; cited in David J. Whittaker, ed., The 
Terrorism Reader (London: Routledge, 2007), 9. 
9
 Whittaker, Terrorism Reader, 13. 
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primary-process or unconscious thinking to discriminate between “some” and “all” . . .’10 Žižek 
places the symbolic nature of terrorism in a full-blown psychoanalytic framework with a view 
to analysing the roots of its symbolism and the impact such actions have on a culture’s 
symbolic economy, as defined in Lacanian terms.  
This small sample is representative of the wider trend in terrorism discourses, as we 
shall see. From this brief overview, it is clear that within terrorism discourses, terrorism attacks 
the symbolic, is symbolic, and has effects within the symbolic. Be it at the level of policy-
making, terrorism studies, media representation, or philosophical critique, there is an 
underlying assumption in discussions of terrorism that material physical action can translate 
into symbolic effect. Yet the mechanisms that permit such a transition between physical and 
symbolic are for the most part left unexamined. Instead, it is taken as a given that physical 
events will have symbolic consequences for an entire community, society, culture. Given that 
terrorism is universally read as deliberately exploiting both the potential for symbolic action 
and the impact such action has on the target, it seems curious that so little attention is paid to 
how physical violence becomes symbolic, or how a target is invested with symbolic 
importance. Most curious of all is that lack of investigation into how a physical attack in a 
specific location becomes symbolically significant for an entire populous. What is the nature of 
this powerful connection between material action and the symbolic that terrorism makes such 
effective use of? 
 The relative silence around this question is in keeping with Irigaray’s description of the 
cut between body and culture, the living world and our symbolic structures. In the rapid 
transition terrorism discourses make between physical action and symbolic implications, they 
‘forget’ to provide an account of how the physical relates to the symbolic. Instead, the 
physicality of terrorism is swiftly relocated into the symbolic, interpreted at a cultural level 
that renders the actual violence that took place as almost incidental. This in itself is indicative 
of a severance between body and culture and is a form of symbolic violence as we shall 
explore later. Yet is this failure to connect body and culture really ‘terrorist’? Can it really be 
seen as evidence that the seeds of terrorist violence can be found within a culture rather than 
in the margins it emerges from in the popular imagination? 
Looking at specific instances of this symbolic interpretation of terrorism and the 
consequences of such an approach can shed some light on the validity of Irigaray’s claim. The 
attacks on the U.S. on September 11th, 2001, provide a compelling example. Across the 
political and cultural spectrum, there seems little doubt that these attacks were in some form 
                                                          
10
 Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1996), 134. 
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symbolic. Osama bin Laden claimed that the ‘targets were America’s icons of military and 
economic power,’11 and served as part of an Islamic jihad against America and its allies. By 
reading the Pentagon and World Trade Center buildings as symbols of American power, then 
associating the attacks on these symbols with Islamic jihad, the perpetrators’ actions were 
imbued with a symbolic purpose: this was not just murder, it was killing in God’s name. On the 
other hand, interpretations of the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers were inflected 
with the symbolic attributes accorded to the once looming buildings. People read the collapse 
as symbolising an attack on monolithic global capitalism, the inevitable downfall of the modern 
world’s Babylonian overreaching, or the castration of a bloated, pampered imperial master. 
The official interpretation of what the attacks symbolised was swift to emerge, as George W 
Bush declared at a news conference ‘You’re either with us or against us in the fight against 
terror.’12 For Bush, the attacks primarily symbolised an attack on ‘us’ by ‘them’, and thus, as 
bin Laden also argued, September 11th represented something like Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations.’13 It represented a moment in which the world had to decide if they represented 
‘us’ or ‘them’ in no uncertain terms. By framing the attacks in these terms, Bush asserted his 
nation’s mastery over the epistemology of global violence. In short, unless one wanted to 
make an enemy of the world’s largest military power, one accepted that there was a correct 
way to understand and read the symbolic significance of such violence, and that was the way 
sanctioned by the United States. Perhaps most significantly, it was not simply the military and 
economic might of the U.S. that shored up Bush’s demand for epistemological mastery. In the 
aftermath of the attacks, the need to express sympathy and empathy for those who had 
perished and suffered in the horrific violence unleashed on that nation was at least as 
powerful in securing Bush’s legitimacy, certainly at the levels below the national and 
international arenas. In other words, the deaths of thousands became emblematic of the need 
to support a nation in mourning. As Bush drew his line in the sand, this emotional collateral 
underwrote the United States’ controlling stake in the post-September 11th narrative of global 
terrorism. 
 Nearly 3000 people died on that day in 2001, including citizens from 93 countries and 
the 19 hijackers.14 The victims not only had different nationalities, they were men and women 
of all ages, from a vast array of backgrounds. They were cleaners and waiters, bankers and 
                                                          
11
 Quoted in Hamid Mir, ‘“Muslims Have the Right to Attack America”’, The Guardian (London, 
November 11, 2001), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/nov/11/terrorism.afghanistan1. 
12
 http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/ 
13
 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? (Washington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute, 1992). 
14
 National September 11 Memorial & Museum, ‘FAQs About 9/11’, 9/11 Memorial, April 25, 2012, 
http://www.911memorial.org/faq-about-911. 
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lawyers. They were married and single, they were gay and straight. Their politics, their 
religious beliefs, their personal tenets were as diverse as their own individual histories. As 
individuals, their lives could be taken to represent a vast array of contrasting and conflicting 
stances. Yet in the move to proclaim the symbolic significance of their deaths, it is precisely the 
specificity of the victims’ individual lives that were – and are – brushed over. For Bush and bin 
Laden, these myriad individuals become symbolic of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In the rush to gain 
mastery over the symbolic meaning of the attacks, Bush and his allies mirrored the gesture 
that facilitated the terrorists’ actions, reductively interpreting the loss of this medley of lives as 
representing one thing – an attack on ‘us’. The forgetting of the victims’ lives, the disregard for 
the physical existence of the victims, allowed the significance of their deaths to be abstracted 
from their identities. In a very real sense, Bush and others colonised the symbolic significance 
of the attacks, overwriting the meaning of each individual death with a grand nationalist 
narrative. As thinkers such as Achille Mbembe and others have recently argued15, this colonial 
gesture is in itself a form of terrorism and, indeed, Irigaray argues such appropriation is 
emblematic of the terrorism inherent in a culture. But does such a gesture, in fact, provoke 
terrorism as it is commonly understood? Perhaps recent history speaks for itself. Bush’s 
rhetoric provided the rationale for invading Afghanistan, and later Iraq, actions which have 
precipitated an increase in terrorist activity both on a local and international scale. The logic of 
terror-counterterror has demonstrably led to a perpetuation of violence as well as a 
curtailment of civil liberties in the very countries that are attempting to prevent terrorist 
attacks that target those very freedoms. Something is failing in the logic of counterterrorism, 
and Irigaray’s analysis of western cultural practices suggests that this failure arises from the 
cut our culture makes between the body, the living flesh, and its symbolic structures. By 
maintaining such an absolute split, we mimic the terroristic gesture of colonising the individual 
life with a meaning that is useful to our own cause; we also appropriate the victim in the name 
of our own symbolic ends. 
 Such an appropriation thus facilitates what Zulaika and Douglass describe as ‘the 
rhetorical circularity’ that characterises much of terrorism discourses: 
Once something that is called “terrorism” – no matter how loosely it is defined – 
becomes established in the public mind, “counterterrorism” is seemingly the only 
prudent course of action . . . our concern is whether the promotion of terrorism itself 
as a quintessential threat is necessary and useful . . . what is lacking is a serious 
investigation of the extent to which the discourse itself might be partly responsible for 
[terrorism]. 16 
                                                          
15
 See Elleke Boehmer and Stephen Morton, eds., Terror and the Postcolonia, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010). 
16
 Zulaika and Douglass, Terror and Taboo, ix–x. 
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While Irigaray has spoken about terrorism in response to the work of participants at the Luce 
Irigaray International Seminar 2011, she has not investigated the rhetoric around terrorism 
directly. However, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has detected the appropriative gesture in the 
rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ that shaped the response of the U.S. and its allies to the 
September 11th attacks. Her analysis of the form and consequences of this gesture gives us a 
means of articulating what an Irigarayan investigation of terrorism discourses can look like, 
providing us with some key terms for thinking about the terrorism inherent in our own culture. 
In her collected ruminations on the responses to the attacks from the United States and 
Europe, ‘Terror: a Speech After 9-11’, Spivak argues that the logic of a war on terrorism is ‘a 
cruel caricature of what in us can respond.’17 It is caricature because it is a ludicrous imitation 
of what it is to respond, a crude interpretation that is in fact based on the very prohibition of 
response. For Spivak, the colonising of the symbolic space of the attacks amounted to a 
presumption of the right to be the epistemological master of the global discourse on terrorist 
violence. Spivak suggests that in formulating a ‘response’ to the attacks, the U.S. and Europe 
mistook ‘training in political science and law alone’18 as enough of a grounding for their moral 
stance, a mistake that inevitability left their right to control over the legislative and moral 
ground unexamined. By assuming the right a priori to examine and judge the actions of others, 
Bush and his allies not only reduced the possibility of responding to the attacks to a ‘tit-for-tat 
approach’19 emblematic of terror-counterterror, they failed to place their own terms under 
moral scrutiny and thus pursued a course which reduced the ‘work of the ethical state to the 
moral will alone.’20 In other words, the unexamined authority of the moral masters forecloses 
the possibility of response, as the masters can remain within a pre-established set of terms, 
ensuring that they remain unaltered by the call of the other whatever form that call takes. 
Spivak reads this inability or reluctance to examine one’s right to act as moral arbiter in 
Kantian terms, linking the secular state’s tendency to equate moral fitness with adherence to 
the letter of the law to secularism’s lack of a transcendental obligation. Prising open this 
equation within a secular framework becomes crucial for formulating a response, a gesture 
that takes us beyond the circuit of terror-counterterror. 
 For Spivak, this is necessarily an imaginative task as it entails recognising the limits of 
one’s established epistemology. As Spivak puts it, ‘response not only supposes and produces a 
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constructed subject of response, it also constructs its object.’21 To understand the limits of 
one’s own ability to act as moral arbiter, one must be able to recognise to what extent the 
other to which you respond is your own construct, or ‘the Other of the same’ to use an 
Irigarayan phrase.22 Such self-critique involves the recognition that the other has their own 
terms, a logic and a rationale appropriate to them, rather than always reducing the other to 
the terms of one’s own logic. It is a process of realising that what is irrational in one system of 
thought is not necessarily so in another, and of being able to imagine beyond the confines of 
one’s own terms in order to conceive, no matter in how limited a sense, of what a term, an 
action, an ideal, may mean in a radically other system. For Spivak, epistemology necessarily 
works against this imaginative process, by implying that the other can be known and 
understood in terms appropriate to the subject seeking to know the other. Unearthing what is 
at work in such epistemologies, as Irigaray asks us to do, becomes a specifically ethical 
intervention in Spivak’s terms: 
I understand the ethical . . .to be an interruption of the epistemological, which is the 
attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge. Epistemological constructs 
belong to the domain of the law, which seeks to know the other, in his or her case, as 
completely as possible, in order to punish or acquit rationally, reason being defined by 
the limits set by the law itself. The ethical interrupts this imperfectly, to listen to the 
other as if it were a self, neither to punish nor to acquit.23 
 
If epistemology entails the hegemonic construction of the other in terms that are not 
the other’s own, the ethical then becomes that which interrupts the logic of the 
epistemological in order that the other can speak, can be heard in its own terms. This 
interruption cannot take the form of a pre-established claim on behalf of the other: to truly 
interrupt an epistemological narrative, the intervention must be ‘imperfect’, unexpected, 
problematic, in that it is not anticipated or deemed appropriate to existing convention. To be 
otherwise is to simply stake a claim for a form of anterior alterity, overwriting the other once 
again. Similarly, the ethical precedes the possibility of response, for without an interruption of 
the epistemological, it is not possible to respond to the other. Instead, the subject remains 
within its own terms and so responds to the other which it has constructed, its epistemological 
object. The subject remains shouting in the palace of its own discourse, presuming the other to 
be at the gates, whilst the other remains, unheard, unseen, unanswered in their own realm.  
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 The substitution of the other for the epistemologically-constructed Other24 has a very 
real impact on our ability to study terrorism and produce informed counter-terrorist policy. For 
Professor Andrew Silke, one of the U.K.’s foremost terrorism experts, the September 11th 
attacks were testament to the failure of terrorism studies as a science. Silke is not alone when 
he argues that 'Good science is fundamentally all about prediction. Good science allows 
reliable prediction.’25 For Silke, the fact there was only one scholarly article published on al-
Qaeda in the 1990s demonstrates a failure of research as well as a failure of governmental 
intelligence.26 Silke traces the relative paucity of robust research on terrorism to various 
sources, be it the tendency of terrorism studies to concentrate on hostage-taking situations, 
the constraints put on scientific method when carrying out studies in hostile real-world 
contexts, or the relative neglect of terrorism as an object of study until recent years, which 
consigned ‘the science of terror . . . [to] the cracks and crevices which lie between the large 
academic disciplines.’27 These are all aspects of the rhetoric of terror that we shall return to in 
greater depth. But for now, in light of Spivak’s analysis, can we not speculate that the 
inadequacy of the science of terror is a direct consequence of a refusal to engage with the 
terrorist as other? Are both the failures to predict terrorist behaviour and to prevent it through 
counter-terrorist action an indication that in talking about terrorism, we are in fact still talking 
to ourselves, about ourselves? It is the terrorist constructed by our own epistemologies that 
we study and respond to with counter-terrorist violence. Thus, until we find a means to move 
beyond such an epistemological impasse, the terrorist will continue to elude us and remain 
impervious to actions we label ‘responses’. It seems without an ethical interruption on behalf 
of the other, all counter-terrorism will be is a caricature of its intent. 
 Spivak’s claim is a radical one. In essence, she is asking that we enact an ethical 
suspension of our epistemological frameworks in the name of an other who is overtly hostile. 
In placing the onus on those who presume themselves to be the epistemological masters of 
terrorism, Spivak is echoing Irigaray’s insistence that it is first necessary to ask how our own 
culture is terrorist. Spivak posits that the disciplines that make up the Humanities are uniquely 
suited to enacting such an ethical intervention, thanks to the potential for the cultivation of 
the imagination within their practices. For Spivak, the Humanities as a discipline ‘teaches us to 
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learn from the singular and the unverifiable,’28 placing it in the position to intervene and 
reflect on epistemological hegemonies that work to preclude the other and the possibility of 
response. It is because these disciplines can throw an unimagined spanner in the works of an 
epistemological machine that they must take up and insist upon their role as the essential 
training for an ethical approach that can move us beyond the damaging rhetoric of ‘us’ and 
‘them’. The strength of the Humanities lies in the ability to ethically intervene in such thinking 
by proceeding imaginatively, imperfectly, to think their way out of the epistemological box 
that surrounds a discourse. 
 Not least in the Humanities’ imaginative arsenal is the potential for self-reflective 
critique, a critical approach that recognises that it is not simply an object, or an other-as-
object, that is constructed by a discourse, but also the subject presumed to be the master of 
that discourse. As Spivak’s formulation of the relationship between subject and object in 
response suggests, at the root of any epistemological approach lies an a priori subject, 
assumptions about which are inscribed into the epistemological framework with varying 
degrees of subtlety. An ethical intervention is one in which this presumed subject is boycotted 
in favour of the other, in order to disrupt ‘the idea that knowledge is an end in itself, or that 
there is a straight line from knowing to doing politics as human rights’.29 Instead of aligning 
oneself with the epistemological master, the subject disrupts the epistemic flow in order that 
the other can be ‘imagined as a self’, can be heard in its own terms, whatever the cost to the 
subject’s own sense of self. Then, and only then, can there be a possibility of response, for the 
other is heard, rather than spoken about, for, or over. To be open to response is inevitably to 
take an incalculable risk with one’s own sense of self, as one lays oneself bare to the call of the 
other. Yet without this risk, as Spivak suggests, there is no such thing as response: 
[T]o respond means to resonate with the other, contemplate the possibility of 
complicity – wrenching consciousness-raising, which is based on “knowing things,” 
however superficially, from its complacency. Response pre-figures change.30 
 
We shall return to the relationship between response and figuration as we look at Don 
DeLillo’s Falling Man. For now, I wish to remain with Spivak’s thinking a moment longer in 
order to explore the methodological implications of her assertions. 
 Having argued that epistemological practices foreclose the possibility of meaningful 
response and interaction with the supposed object of study, Spivak dedicates much of ‘Terror: 
A Speech After 9-11’ to demonstrating the various ways the type of practices used in the 
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Humanities problematise and disrupt the epistemological object of the Islamic terrorist as 
constructed by the West’s post-September 11th rhetoric. She does so not simply by bringing 
this rhetoric into contact with dissenting or non-Western voices, but by placing it alongside 
other forms of discourse. She refers to anthropological studies, journalism, psychoanalytic 
references, philosophical thought on the sublime, and at least three literary works in her 
attempts to shift the epistemological paradigm.31 Spivak delineates the blindspots of the 
dominant epistemology by bringing it into proximity with other discursive forms, suggesting 
that these ‘alternative’ discourses have a different epistemic framework or at least have a 
different relation to the prevailing model. It is because each discourse occupies a different 
position in relation to master discourse that they are able to shed light on how that discourse 
unfolds. The contrasts between the dominant and alternative voices expose the ways in which 
louder voice fails to recognise the specificity of the other. Thus, even different discursive 
practices within our own culture can facilitate an ethical interruption on behalf of the other. 
This has particular significance for Irigaray’s demand for cultural self-reflection, as we shall see. 
Spivak enacts her critique in order to extract the other from the West’s construction of 
the Other. Irigaray’s appeal for us to examine our own culture requires us to turn our focus 
elsewhere. Instead of demonstrating an epistemology’s limits by rethinking the object, 
Irigaray’s question is addressed to the subject producing the epistemology, the presumed 
master of the discourse. In order to further elucidate the mechanisms at work, we need to ask 
what presumptions are made in order to allow that master to speak. What normative notions 
of subjectivity are installed to allow an epistemology to talk about the other? Who is being 
rendered as ‘us’ when we refer to ‘them’? What is being legitimated when the object under 
examination is labelled as ‘terrorist’? These questions become all the more pertinent when a 
particular power or constellation of powers have claimed authority over the global episteme of 
terrorism. As we shall see, ‘terrorism’ is a malleable term, able to apply itself to anything the 
dominant system regards as an illegitimate threat, and thus to label an object as terrorist is to 
mute it twice over; once by marking it out-of-bounds as terrorist, and secondly by overwriting 
the other as the object of one’s own construction. Therefore, the terrorist other is as long-lived 
and varied as the systems of power that designate them as such, meaning the potential 
damage the power-that-be can do in pursuit of the terrorist other is similarly sustained and 
unexpected. In asking what lies behind the need to render certain acts as terrorist, we can 
begin to shift the epistemological framework from within, rather than constantly relying on the 
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persistence of others to alert us to its limits. More than this, in answering these questions, we 
become aware of how our own methods for understanding the world impact on our own 
culture; we shed light on the disfiguring effects on our own identity brought about by our 
failure to respond to the other. 
Irigaray’s call, then, complements Spivak’s critical gesture.32 Placing terrorism 
discourses in an Irigarayan framework allows us to analyse them as a cultural product, in order 
to unmask the mechanisms that permit the discourse to unfold. In doing so, we discover not 
only how we make use of the other, but why. Exposing the deep-seated need to appropriate 
the other gives us the means to rethink our epistemological practices in an ethical way, in a 
manner that opens us up to the possibility of response. Furthermore, as I shall demonstrate, 
Irigaray’s description of the connection between our current symbolic conventions and the 
physical world not only explains, but predicts the forms and failings of terrorism discourses, as 
well as anticipates the persistence of their present approach despite of its overt contradictions 
and deficiencies. One of the strongest claims for the appropriateness of an Irigarayan ethics to 
address the task laid down by Spivak is the absolute insistence in Irigaray’s thought that to 
work with the abstract alone is to neglect the other, to risk doing violence to the other, as well 
as to forget ourselves. Attempting to dislodge the current epistemological regime around 
terrorism is unavoidably perilous, as its borders are necessarily shaped by atrocity, and thus 
trying to open up, alter or interrupt the current structure risks trampling over the countless 
individuals who have been murdered, injured or in some other way damaged by such 
incidents. Irigaray’s insistence that an ethical culture can only emerge from a recognition of 
sexuate difference, in which the abstract is never severed from our bodily identity, helps us 
articulate a critique of terrorism discourses that makes every effort not to forget, make use of, 
or disrespect the suffering of others. Indeed, it perhaps gives us the opportunity to prevent the 
epistemological machine making use of the largely silent victims of terrorist violence, in 
challenging its claim to speak for them. Thus, in reading terrorism discourses through Irigaray’s 
specific understanding of the relation between the symbolic and the body, we attempt to 
counteract Bush’s colonising gesture.  
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 The Cut Between Culture and Life 
 
Discourses about terrorism permeate countless spheres – the public, the political, the 
media, the economic, the fictional and entertainment, the academic. As a phenomenon 
assumed to be able to affect anyone, anywhere, terrorism is a topic about which everyone is 
entitled to a say. However, there is a hierarchy amongst the myriad voices staking claim to 
expertise. The terrorism expert is central to political, media and, through these, popular 
discourses about terrorism. Although, as we shall see, the terrorism expert can come in many 
guises, the primary task required of this expert is to define what ‘terrorism’ actually is, in order 
that he or she can aid the wider political and public spheres in formulating an appropriate and 
justifiable response. So who are the terrorism experts? Broadly speaking, it is possible to 
discern two distinct strands in the discourses of terrorism expertise. On the one hand, we have 
authors, writers and academics whose work has an overt epistemological agenda, based on 
the premise that it is possible to know the terrorist and thus thwart their actions. Until recent 
decades, this type of work has been carried out in an informal, if remarkably consistent, 
manner, although it is now rapidly coalescing into the recognisable academic discipline of 
‘Terrorism Studies.’ The second form of expertise is the comparatively esoteric philosophical 
analysis of terrorism. As Spivak’s intervention illustrates, the philosophical engagement with 
terrorism frequently eschews the epistemological and instead concerns itself with the ethical 
perspective, the symbolic consequences, the form a response to terror could, and should, take. 
There is currently remarkably little dialogue between the two strands, arguably leaving both 
sides worse off – the careful ethics of the philosophical approaches rarely make it to the ears 
that matter, while the infinitely more influential terrorism studies experts lack an ethical 
subtlety that could prove invaluable in changing the terrain of terrorism policies. Despite this 
lack of interaction and the contrasting concerns, the shared frame of reference inevitably 
means that these strands of expertise overlap. As we examine the trends within the 
epistemological and philosophical approaches to terrorism through Irigaray’s 
psychoanalytically-informed theory, these overlaps become more than coincidences resulting 
from a shared topic. They are indicative of a common cultural practice, instances where both 
approaches enact the same forgetting in order to let their discourse unfold. Such coincidences, 
then, alert us to the blind-spots in our understanding of terrorism and mark the spaces in 
which the possibility of an ethical intervention has been foreclosed. In order to detect such 
moments and to understand why they emerge at particular points, we first need to examine 
what Irigaray means when she argues that there is a cut between the symbolic and the body, 
between culture and the material world. 
17 
 
As I have already suggested, Luce Irigaray’s philosophy and politics are fundamentally 
grounded in psychoanalytic thought. To forget this, or to be inattentive to the continued 
influence of psychoanalytic practice on Irigaray’s work, is to miss the subtleties and 
significance of her claims. Hence, although much has been written about Irigaray’s earliest 
work, it is necessary to briefly revisit it here in order to fully appreciate the nuances and 
consequences of what Irigaray reads as the split between life and culture.  
Irigaray argues that our culture rests on a fundamental disavowal of our maternal, 
material origins and as such, relies on a fundamental cut between our bodies and our culture. 
This disavowal is a specific consequence of the fact that our symbolic follows a phallic 
morphology. Thus, Irigaray concurs with Freud and Lacan in so far as she argues that in its 
current manifestation, the law of the father and the primacy of the phallus are paramount in 
our culture. Indeed, Lacan’s modelling of the relationship between the imaginary, the symbolic 
and the real are crucial for Irigaray’s analysis and philosophy, as shall become apparent. But 
Irigaray’s thought diverges from that of both men in her refusal to let the movement of 
psychoanalysis cease with the espousal of the Oedipal complex and the recognition of the 
phallus as the foundational signifier of our symbolic order. Her fundamental critical gesture, 
then, is to place the discourse of psychoanalysis under a psychoanalytic lens. Why is it, she 
asks, that Freud can talk of penis envy, but does not allow for the possibility of breast envy, or 
more poignantly, womb envy? For as Irigaray puts it, ‘one might be able to interpret the fact of 
being deprived of a womb as the most intolerable deprivation of man, since his contribution to 
gestation – his function with regard to the origin of reproduction – is hence asserted as less 
than evident, as open to doubt.’33 Similarly, she wonders what is at work as Lacan accords the 
feminine and female sexuality the status of lack, and argues that women do not exist, not least 
of all because ‘her sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see.’34 
Irigaray demonstrates that the metaphysics of lack, atrophy, passivity, and absence are 
assigned to women and female sexuality at the points where Freud and Lacan’s models of 
sexuality are unable to account for feminine subjectivity. Freud and Lacan both assume that 
models which work for male sexuality serve as a universal norm, and as a result, they read the 
inadequacies of their analysis when faced with female sexuality as symptomatic of women’s 
nature. It is in this respect that psychoanalysis articulates a revelatory truth for Irigaray. In 
allocating female sexuality the status of lack, absence, darkness, Freud and Lacan inadvertently 
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articulate the truth about the current status of women and the feminine in the Western 
cultural tradition: 
Psychoanalytic discourse on female sexuality is the discourse of truth. A discourse that 
tells the truth about the logic of truth: namely, that the feminine occurs only within 
models and laws devised by male subjects. Which implies that there are not really two 
sexes, but only one. A single practice and representation of the sexual. With its history, 
its requirements, reverses, lacks, negative(s) . . . of which the female sex is the 
mainstay.35 
 
Freud and Lacan’s modelling of sexuality and subjectivity thus make manifest the assumptions 
that support a phallically-constituted culture: that there is only one sex, one subject, and that 
is the masculine one. In other words, a phallic economy is grounded in the disavowal of the 
possibility of sexual difference. 
 In repeatedly allotting women and the feminine the status of a negative pole to a 
masculine positive, Freud and Lacan are in fact remaining within the terms provided by the 
very tradition they are analysing. By consistently understanding woman as man’s Other, and 
thus reading the feminine as the binary opposite of the masculine, both psychoanalysts reduce 
the feminine to the ‘non-masculine.’ For Irigaray, this is symptomatic of both men’s inability to 
recognise that their own investment in the culture they are describing impacts on their 
analysis. For designating woman as the dark continent does not shed any light on why and 
when that darkness fell across her, while identifying woman as lacking the phallus does not 
explain why there is not an imaginary ideal that could be considered as originating from her 
morphology. Irigaray indicts both men for their willingness to down analytic tools once they 
have sufficiently accounted for the current shape of things: 
[A]s a result of using psychoanalysis (his psychoanalysis) only to scrutinize the history 
of his subject and his subjects, without interpreting the historical determinants of the 
constitution of the “subject” as same, [Freud] was restoring, yet again, the newly 
pressed down/repressed earth, upon which he stands erect, which for him, following 
tradition though in more explicit fashion, will be the body/sex of the mother/nature.36 
 
Although Irigaray is explicitly referring to Freud here, her critique implicates Lacan too. Thanks 
to their embeddedness in the culture they are describing, neither man scrutinises what allows 
them to designate the feminine as the negative term of a masculine subjectivity. In failing to 
analyse their own discourses, neither psychoanalyst recognises that their thinking rests on a 
fundamental appropriation of the feminine. The failure to interrogate the mechanisms that 
allow the Oedipal complex and primacy of the phallus mean that Freud and Lacan’s theories, at 
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best, are descriptions of a Western tradition and at worst, make psychoanalysis a discourse 
that renders the current shape of things as somehow ‘natural’. By ceasing their psychoanalysis 
before they have asked how the father and the phallus came to earn their primacy, Freud and 
Lacan re-inscribe the very forgetting of sexual difference that underpins the culture they are 
analysing. Hence, their psychoanalytic models of sexuality and subjectivity are based on a 
cessation of the psychoanalytic gesture.  
 It is important to note that it is the cessation that Irigaray is indicting, not 
psychoanalysis itself. Indeed, Irigaray reads the birth of psychoanalysis as the moment in which 
we had the chance to explore why it is that the culture and society we live in has taken its 
historical and contemporary forms and in doing so, bring about fundamental changes at all 
levels of our individual and cultural consciousness. This transformative potential makes 
psychoanalysis the cornerstone of all Irigaray’s philosophical and political thought. For 
although Irigaray critiques Lacan’s inability to see how his investment in a phallic culture 
impacts on his psychoanalytic approach, his concepts of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the 
real, and the complex relations between the three are the basis for the philosophical and 
ethical potential Irigaray sees in psychoanalysis. Thus, as Whitford illustrates, Irigaray shares 
Lacan’s understanding of the symbolic as ‘the order of discourse and meaning, the order into 
which all human beings have to insert themselves and which therefore precedes and exceeds 
individual subjectivity; it is what enables the subject to break out of the imaginary mother-
child unity and become a social being.’37Crucially, Irigaray also accepts Lacan’s reading of the 
imaginary as that which both underlies and is shaped by the symbolic or, as Whitford puts it, 
the ‘imaginary is an effect of the symbolic; it is the symbolic which structures the imaginary, so 
there is a sense in which the imaginary does not exist until it is symbolized’.38 This complex 
relationship and the manner in which this relation constitutes both our individual subjectivity 
and our culture as a whole contains the ethical potential of psychoanalytic thought for Irigaray. 
Again, Whitford helps summarise this deeply complex relation: 
The question of the relation between symbolic/imaginary and subjectivity/identity can 
be formulated in this way: (1) subjectivity is a structure, or a position of enunciation. It 
is not identity; (2) but that structure would be empty without the imaginary: 
representations are what flesh it out. So the symbolic is structure (form) which is given 
content by the imaginary, and the imaginary pours itself into the available structures 
to form representations. Subjectivity, then, belongs to the symbolic, but it is empty 
without the imaginary; identity is imaginary, but it takes a symbolic (representational) 
form.39 
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By becoming conscious of the mechanisms and assumptions that underpin our symbolic, 
Irigaray suggests that we can then bring about conscious changes in that symbolic in order to 
facilitate a meaningful, ethical change in the imaginary that subtends our culture and our 
identities. In repeating the pre-established assumption that there can be only one symbolic 
order, that all subjects can be explained in terms of a single, universal model, Freud and Lacan 
overwrite psychoanalysis’s potential to bring about change and instead reify the existing order. 
 For Irigaray then, ‘[s]exual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the 
issue, of our age.’40 Uncovering the ways in which psychoanalysis reveals the disavowal of 
sexual difference that structures our symbolic culture is more than just an analytic critique: it is 
the initial gesture necessary for us to bring about an ethical culture that does not appropriate 
the other(s). Irigaray’s first move is to ask what Freud and Lacan have not: what has taken 
place to install the phallus and the father as the constitutive laws of our symbolic order? For 
psychoanalysis would suggest it is not enough to accept that this primacy is somehow natural. 
Indeed, Lacan himself stresses that in talking about the phallus, he is referring to an imaginary 
ideal, not a physical penis, as Grosz explains: 
For Lacan, the phallus is not an organ or a symbol, but a signifier. The phallus is 
emblematic of language itself, a term which circulates and has value only within a 
system of other terms. The phallus is the term that divides the sexes into two 
oppositional categories; it is also the term governing relations between them. As a 
signifier, the phallus cannot be owned or possessed by anyone. No-one can 
appropriate a linguistic term, which functions only by virtue of the entire structure of 
language.41 
  
Lacan argues that it is a mistake to locate the primacy of the phallus in the biology of the male 
body. According to Lacanian analysis, ‘[I]t is not the anatomy of the male body which seeks its 
own image in dominant discourse . . . men do not form discourse in their own image(s); rather, 
phallocentric discourses form male sexuality in their image(s).’42 The primacy of the phallus can 
in no way be accounted for in terms of man’s natural biological dominance; rather, it is 
because men have mistakenly identified their genitals with the phallus that male subjectivity 
has adapted to fit the demands of a phallic economy. Recognising that there is no innate, 
biological connection between the phallus and the male body is crucial for Irigaray’s analysis of 
the disavowal of sexual difference. As Grosz neatly summarises, Irigaray builds on this Lacanian 
understanding that: 
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This isomorphism, this correspondence of form or shape between phallocentric 
representational systems and phallic male sexuality . . . is not a product of nature, 
anatomy, a male ‘essence’ or a neutral, transparent, reflective or ‘objective’ language. 
[Irigaray’s] concepts of the body and corporeality refer only to a body that is 
structured, inscribed, constituted and given meaning socially and historically – a body 
that exists as such only through its socio-linguistic construction. She renders the 
concept of a ‘pure’ or ‘natural’ body meaningless. Power relations and systems of 
representation . . . actively constitute the body’s very sensations, pleasures – the 
phenomenology of the body experience.43 
 
Irigaray’s critique of the disavowal of sexual difference in the symbolic and her efforts to 
develop an ethics based on a cultivation of this repressed difference, are fundamentally 
informed by this Lacanian understanding of the connection between the body and the 
symbolic. Just as Lacan roots his analysis in the flesh-and-blood body only in so far as the penis 
serves as an object that the gaze internalises as the image-ideal in the imaginary, so too 
Irigaray’s references to the body are never simply invoking a concept of the natural, 
anatomical body. The body in Irigaray’s work is neither purely physical, nor entirely figurative. 
Rather, our experience of our materiality is inextricably bound up with our symbolic: as 
subjects ‘[w]e are . . . woven of bodies and words, beings and Beings’.44 However, Irigaray 
differs from Lacan when she argues that rethinking our materiality can transform the symbolic. 
Specifically, she posits that recognising that there are at least two sexes, two different 
anatomies physically present in the world can bring about a change in our culture. Thus, 
Irigaray argues that her critical gesture differs from those who have gone before her, ‘because 
I start from reality, from a universal reality: sexual difference.’45  
 Why is it that a phallically-constituted symbolic order rests on a fundamental 
repression of sexual difference? And what are the consequences of such a disavowal? Irigaray 
answers these questions by returning to Greek myth to rethink Freud’s use of the Oedipal 
story. For example, she reads The Oresteia and the figure of Antigone as emblematic of a stage 
in the development of our culture’s imaginary. In her essay ‘Body against Body: In Relation to 
the Mother’,46 Irigaray reads The Oresteia story as unfolding before the Oedipal myth. For her, 
Orestes sets up the a priori conditions necessary for Freud’s claim that of the figure of Oedipus 
illustrates male sexual development and the little boy’s submission to the law of the father. 
The Oresteia, Irigaray suggests, describes how the father was granted his power in the first 
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place. The myth recounts Agamemnon’s return to his palace on Argos after the siege of Troy. 
Upon his return, Agamemnon’s wife Clytemnestra murders him, motivated by revenge, 
jealousy, and fear. Inspired by the god Apollo, the couple’s son Orestes plots with his sister, 
Electra, to murder Clytemnestra and thus avenge their father’s death. After killing their 
mother, both siblings are driven mad as the Furies hound them for their violation of the 
maternal bond. However, when the Furies place Orestes on trial for his actions, Athena 
intervenes on his behalf, casting the decisive vote in favour of forgiving him. Athena absolves 
Orestes of his crime, and allows him to claim the seat of power that was once shared by 
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. The Furies are also ‘persuaded by Athena to give up their 
cause of fighting for the mother’s right and become instead the Kindly Ones who will protect 
Athens and support Orestes’ new reign.’47 Electra, in Irigaray’s reading, remains mad and 
powerless. 
 The Oresteia myth, for Irigaray, thus illustrates what has taken place in order that the 
patriarchal rule can be established: 
Orestes kills his mother because the empire of the God-Father, who has seized 
and taken for his own the ancient powers . . . of the earth-mother, demands it. He kills 
his mother and is driven mad, as is his sister Electra. 
Electra, the daughter will remain mad, The matricidal son, on the other hand, 
must be saved from madness so that he can found the patriarchal order. . .  
Thus the murder of the mother is rewarded by letting the son go scot free, by 
burying the madness of women – and burying women in madness – and by introducing 
the image of the virgin goddess [Athena], born of the Father, obedient to his laws at 
the expense of the mother.48 
 
The patriarchal law that Freud’s use of the Oedipal myth takes as a given is therefore founded 
by a commandeering of power by one sex, where two sexes used to reign. Orestes installs the 
power of patriarchy through the murder of his mother and the usurping of maternal authority 
in the guise of the motherless goddess Athena, while Electra’s madness secures the forgetting 
of female genealogy. The law of the father is written in the blood of the murdered mother, and 
achieved by silencing the feminine. Hence, Irigaray asserts that our entire social order 
originates from the perpetration and forgetting of matricide: ‘The substratum is the woman 
who reproduces social order, who is made this order’s infrastructure: the whole of our 
western culture is based upon the murder of the mother’.49 Thus, as Freud envisages 
civilisation emerging from the primal horde after the father’s brutal death at the hands of his 
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sons in Totem and Taboo,50 Irigaray asks if Freud is not ‘forgetting the woman who has been 
torn between son and father, among sons’,51 in order to bestow the dreaded father with his 
power in the first place. In assuming that the father-son relation serves as the foundational law 
of civilisation, Freud continues to replicate our cultural forgetting, for he does not recognise 
that fathers and sons could not exist at all without the maternal body. For Irigaray, Freud’s 
account of the Oedipal relation between child and mother is therefore ‘part of a postoedipal 
phantasy projected backward onto the Oedipus phase’, a phantasy which re-enacts this 
foundational matricide as ‘the mother is cut up in stages,’ divided into a milk-giving breast, a 
faeces-receiving object, a constitutive gaze.52 Blinded to the possibility of sexual difference 
thanks to his own investment in a phallocratic culture, Freud continues to disavow the 
subject’s origins in the maternal body, using the mother’s body to sustain the phallic-
masculine economy once again. 
 But why would patriarchal law or a phallic symbolic demand the disavowal of sexual 
difference? Why would such a symbolic require a matricidal gesture? In using The Oresteia to 
think back to a phantasmatic pre-phallocentric state in which two sexes exist, rule in tandem, 
and create life together, Irigaray locates the necessity of the repression of difference as 
emanating from phallically-constructed ideals. As the ideal of the tumescent penis, the phallus 
above all privileges the singular, the discrete, the individual, the complete. The reality of sexual 
difference – that there are at least two sexes present in this world – poses a threat to this 
phallic phantasy of completed singularity. Moreover, not only does the fact that each subject is 
physically created thanks to this difference render phallic ideals of oneness insecure, it 
implicates the phallus in the production of ‘otherness’, in the creation of a ‘different’ sex, a 
generation of difference that calls into question the unity and singularity of that which creates 
it. Most importantly, our origins in the maternal body challenge the phallic phantasy of 
singularity. Not only does the umbilical connection to the mother suggest that such singularity 
is impossible for us as human subjects, this very connection provides us with a sensation of 
completeness in utero that the phallus can never achieve: 
During that time in her womb, then, haven of skin, of membranes, of water – a 
complete world, in fact, in which and through he receives all he wants, with no need 
for work or clothing – air, warmth, food, blood, life, potentially even the risk of death, 
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come to him via a hollow thread. Everything comes that route, without being called 
upon.53 
 
The womb is the first world we inhabit, while our umbilical connection to our mother’s body is 
the original formative relation, the nourishing interaction between two bodies, mediated by 
the placenta, that allows us to grow into subjects. The mother’s body is that which brings ‘us 
whole into the world,’54 allows us to develop into individual subjects who can then enter the 
outside world. The memory or nostalgia for this maternal relation haunts the phallic, 
representing a completeness it can never replicate, as well as demonstrating that such 
completeness stems from a relation ‘between two’ rather than self-sufficient unity. Finally, the 
maternal body frustrates the visibility that underwrites the phallus’ very existence as an ideal. 
As the Lacanian modelling of the mirror-stage illustrates, it is the visibility of the penis that 
establishes the phallus as an imaginary ideal, and as such, vision and the visible become its 
primary sensorial mode. Hence, as Irigaray puts it, ‘[b]ecause the power of semen isn’t 
immediately obvious in procreation, it’s relayed by the linguistic code, the logos. Which want 
to become the all-embracing truth.’55 The maternal body conceals procreation from the gaze 
of the phallic eye, generating an anxiety that must be assuaged for the phallic to uphold its 
integrity. 
 Haunted by a nostalgia for in uterine completeness, rendered blind by the maternal 
body’s physicality, and threatened by the presence of difference, the phallus resorts to 
matricide to maintain its own ideals. As emblematic of the initial moment in which a culture of 
difference was overturned in favour of a patriarchal order, Irigaray argues that The Oresteia 
enables us to rethink the status psychoanalysis accords to the phallus as relying on a similar 
coup: 
The genital drive is theoretically that drive by which the phallic penis captures the 
mother’s power to give birth, nourish, inhabit, center. Doesn’t the phallic erection 
occur at the place where the umbilical cord once was? The phallus becomes the 
organiser of the world through the man-father at the very place where the umbilical 
cord, that primal link to the mother, once gave birth to man and woman.56 
 
Just as Orestes’ matricide brings about the beginnings of a new, singular, masculine reign, so 
too the phallus eschews the original umbilical relation to the mother and claims for itself the 
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primary constitutional relation. The phallic economy prohibits any acknowledgement of our 
first experiences within the maternal world to ensure the coherence of its symbolic: 
The ban upon returning, regressing to the womb, as well as to the language and 
dreams shared with the mother, this is indeed the point, the line, the surface upon 
which the “subject” will continue to stand, to advance, to unfold his discourse, even to 
make it whirl.57 
 
At the very point where feminine sexual difference becomes essential for the continuation of 
life, where the recognition of female specificity seems unavoidable, the phallic economy shuts 
down that possibility, anointing itself with the power of creation that properly belongs to the 
womb and the placental relation, to become the master of its own origins. As a consequence, 
in a phallic economy, ‘[t]he womb is never thought of as the primal place in which we become 
body,’58 as Irigaray demonstrates in her extensive analysis of European philosophical 
traditions. Instead, the maternal role in the creation of the subject is reduced to that of a 
workman-like womb, as it ‘reproduces’ matter to be moulded into subjects by a phallic 
symbolic: 
[B]y man’s “active” role in intercourse and by the fact that he will mark the product of 
copulation with his own name. . . woman, whose intervention in the work of 
engendering the child can hardly be questioned, becomes the anonymous worker, the 
machine in the service of a master-proprietor who will put his trademark upon the 
finished product. . . . the desire that men [sic] here displays [is] to determine for 
himself what is constituted by “origin,” and thereby eternally and ever to reproduce 
him (as) self . . .59 
 
As Irigaray’s use of the term ‘matricide’ suggests, it is in the phallus’s appropriation of the 
umbilical relation to the mother in order to secure its own logic that we find the terroristic 
gesture that lies at the heart of our culture. 
 Irigaray argues that the phallus is so dependent on the repression of the maternal for 
its authority that its symbolic never breaks off its original umbilical relation to the mother, as 
the phallus continues to rely on the maternal body for its grounding and nourishment. This 
continued attachment means that a phallic symbolic must not only prohibit any 
acknowledgement of its origins in the flesh and blood of the mother, it has to foreclose the 
possibility of a feminine symbolic altogether. For if the feminine could speak, could cultivate a 
symbolic that followed the morphology of a female body, it could potentially speak of this 
initial relation. A feminine symbolic would arguably reclaim the umbilical relation as its own 
and recall the significance of the uterus in the creation of subjectivity. Thus, to make sure that 
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‘the body that gives life never enters into language’,60 a phallic symbolic must work to deny the 
possibility of a symbolic based on a female morphology before it is even thought. As such, 
from the beginnings of a phallic culture: 
The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of 
the proper meaning . . . supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of at 
least two (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility of 
distinguishing what is touching from what is touched.61 
 
Not only would a feminine symbolic speak of something that is beyond the phallic binary of 
‘one’ and ‘not-one’, testifying to a difference that cannot be reduced to the logic of a phallic 
symbolic, it would also remind us of what Irigaray describes as our culture’s ‘debt’ to the 
maternal. 
 The recognition that a symbolic based on a feminine morphology is denied in a 
phallocentric culture forms the basis of what are widely characterised as Irigaray’s feminist 
interventions. Without a symbolic appropriate to their bodies, Irigaray posits, women are left 
in a state of ‘dereliction’, unable to cultivate a system of expression in their own terms. It is in 
this sense that women are absent in phallic economy. We shall return to the implications of 
this position in due course but for now, as we move into a discussion of how Irigaray’s critique 
of a phallic economy impacts on our understanding of terrorism, it is important to examine 
how the repression of the maternal and the silencing of the feminine shape our culture’s 
relation to the material world. For Irigaray, this relation is inextricably bound up with the 
status of women: 
Subjectivity denied to woman: indisputably this provides the financial backing for 
every irreducible constitution as an object: of representation, of discourse, of desire. 
Once imagine that woman imagines and the object loses its fixed, obsessional 
character. As a bench mark that is ultimately more crucial than the subject, for he can 
sustain himself only by bouncing back off some objectiveness, some objective. If there 
is no more “earth” to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and always 
desire (for one’s own) then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the 
“subject”?62 
 
Irigaray’s association of the feminine with ‘earth’ here, and elsewhere, with ‘nature’ and 
‘ground’ is not a mere regurgitation of stereotypes. Rather, it is a description of the position 
the feminine and women are allotted without the possibility of their own symbolic. Unable to 
generate a culture appropriate to themselves, women are left in a state of immanence, 
trapped in the material world, undifferentiated from nature. This involuntary immanence is 
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precisely that which allows the phallic-masculine to elevate itself above nature, distancing 
itself from its material roots and striving for a transcendence that fits phallic-informed values 
of hierarchy. In disavowing its beginnings in the womb, the phallic subject has alienated itself 
from the material world and therefore must look to the transcendental for its origins, using 
language to carve out a ‘home’ in the world. In this sense, Irigaray argues that by continuing to 
use the feminine as its material grounding, the phallus not only silences the feminine, but cuts 
the masculine from its own materiality. The masculine has, in effect, lost touch with its own 
body, its own specificity, and reduced its sexuality to coincide with the monolithic phallus. As 
Gallop highlights, ‘phallomorphic logic determines a certain unitary perception of male 
genitalia’63, as even the testicles are excluded in the image of the phallus. For Irigaray, then, 
the masculine body is muted in a phallic overwriting of difference: 
So long as men claim to say everything and define everything, how can anyone know 
what the language of the male sex might be? So long as the logic of discourse is 
modelled on sexual indifference, on the submission of one sex to the other, how can 
anything be known about the “masculine”?64 
 
 A phallic economy, then, does not simply forget the maternal body: its appropriation of the 
umbilical relation engenders a forgetting of materiality altogether. 
 The disavowal of sexual difference that underwrites a phallic symbolic thus renders the 
material world subordinate to its own order. In forgetting our own bodies, we simultaneously 
fail to acknowledge the material world of which they are part. As such, Irigaray argues 
[T]he world is designated as inanimate abstractions integral to the subject’s world. 
Reality appears as an always already cultural reality, linked to the individual and 
collective history of the masculine subject. It’s always a matter of secondary nature, 
cut off from its corporeal roots, its cosmic environment, its relation to life.65 
 
By making use of the maternal body to secure its economy, the phallus ultimately configures 
our relation to the material world in a similar vein: the world becomes useful to us, secondary 
to our ideals and there to support our culture rather than shape it. For Irigaray, this amounts 
to an absolute cut between life and culture, a division that is inherently terroristic as it allows 
us to use each other and the world by respecting cultural ideals rather than life itself: 
In a way, all of our Western patriarchal system amounts to this: killing without openly 
committing murder; that is to say, little by little depriving us of the surroundings that 
allow us to live, by polluting, annihilating the equilibrium of the environment, 
destroying the plant and animal worlds, and finally humanity itself.66 
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This is the terrorism Irigaray locates as innate to a phallically-constituted culture. The material 
world and all the lives in it are figured as ‘useful’ to the symbolic; life and physicality become 
pliant, subordinate, and secondary to culture’s abstract values, permitting an unceasing 
appropriation of life in the name of those ideals. In a very real sense, denying sexual difference 
leads to a culture reliant on the violent disavowal of life. 
  
Reading Terrorism with Irigaray 
 The symbolic order’s fundamental denial of our material-maternal origins is the 
violence that Irigaray identifies as lying at the root of Western cultural traditions. Yet if this 
violence is inherent in the particular formation of a symbolic order, a phallically-informed 
tradition, how are we to interpret her claim that we are living in a time of exhibition, a 
moment in which this symbolic violence is being openly expressed? Does this mean that 
terrorist violence is rooted in this cut between culture and life? This seems counterintuitive, as 
terrorism is generally understood as attacking an established order, as coming from a point 
beyond the system. Similarly, Irigaray has focused her critique of a phallic tradition on Western 
thought and philosophy and has never asserted that it applies directly to other patriarchal 
cultures. Hence, we cannot simply assume that violence conducted in the name of Islamic 
fundamentalism, for instance, can be characterised as such an expression. Exhibition, then, 
does not necessarily refer to the symbolic’s violent subordination of life translating directly 
into physical terrorist violence. Rather, we need to look to how this cut between the material 
and the symbolic manifests itself in our own contemporary moment in order to comprehend 
how this expression of innate violence impacts on our lives and translates into a perpetuation 
of lethal aggression. 
 Can we not read the concept of terrorism itself as such a manifestation? Physical 
violence is not alien to our culture, and we have legal frameworks that are deemed sufficient 
to address the abuses that take place every day within our society. But when faced with 
violence that is labelled as ‘terrorist’, these same frameworks are adjusted, altered, 
suspended; they are somehow inadequate to the task. Similarly, why is it that certain acts of 
violence are read as terrorist, while others are defined as ‘war’ or ‘murder’? These questions 
are frequently dealt with in terrorism discourses, but always in terms of a legitimacy accorded 
by existing political or moral systems. It is only in rare instances, in works such as Zulaika and 
Douglass’s Terror and Taboo: the Fables, Follies and Faces of Terrorism, that the need to 
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categorise something as “terrorist” comes under scrutiny.67 But this widespread acceptance 
that established legal institutions are unable to respond to violence rendered as terrorist 
should alert us to the fact that when we invoke this term, we do so because we wish to make 
such violence excessive, to place it beyond the bounds of our cultural system. While illegal 
behaviour is accommodated within the system by the very act of recognising it as illegal, 
terrorism becomes ‘excessively’ illegal, a murder worse than murder. As Sinclair asserts, there 
is system-wide understanding that ‘[t]error is murder on the cheap.’68 
 But what is it that stirs this desire to mark terrorist aggression as excessive, as 
somehow “illegitimate” illegitimate violence? The answer lies in the recognition that terrorism 
has symbolic effects. Gearty tells us that the ‘genuine political terrorist differs from the 
criminal because of his or her motive. The purpose is not personal gain, but political 
advantage.’69 Martin distinguishes terrorism from murder, as its roots in extremist thought 
mean it becomes ‘a radical expression of one’s political values.’70 Even as Clutterbuck asserts 
that terrorism should be dealt with as a criminal offence, he identifies it as exceptional 
murder, ‘killing without due process of law in order to terrorise the rest of the population into 
complying with the wishes of the killer.’71 What makes terrorist violence exceptional, 
excessive, then, is the perception that the perpetrators want to bring about a change in the 
symbolic structures that shape our societies. If Irigaray tells us that our current symbolic 
tradition rests on a fundamental disavowal of our maternal-material beginnings, and violence 
is delineated as terrorist when it has symbolic aspirations, can we not surmise that the actions 
and behaviours that our culture label as “terrorist” are those which deliberately confront the 
symbolic order with the repressed materiality that subtends it? Could terrorism be that which 
threatens a symbolic culture and its subjects by invoking the flesh and blood that they have 
forgotten to allow their symbolic to unfold? 
 The concept of terrorism emerges at the point at which is it desirable to place physical 
violence beyond the remit of the established legal framework, precisely because it is 
recognised as violence designed to destabilise the prevailing symbolic structure. In essence, 
the aggressive action we identify as terrorist within our culture is presumed to work because 
the symbolic is inextricably connected to the material world. But the disavowal of this 
connection is so central to our social and subjective constitution that we must situate acts 
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which make explicit use of this umbilical attachment as exterior to the systems that shape and 
govern us. Legal recognition of actions that deliberately use the physical world to engender 
symbolic consequences would risk bringing the umbilical relation into the very institutional 
frameworks that enforce the symbolic’s will. The concept of terrorist action thus becomes a 
means of maintaining the symbolic’s integrity, conserving its legitimacy even as it is brutally 
confronted with the reality of the materiality that subtends its logic. Invoking the idea of 
terrorism serves to render us blind once again to the fleshy underbelly of our culture, pushing 
the connection between the symbolic and the material to the margins, and leaving us instead 
with an awareness that terrorist action has symbolic intent and effects, but unable to speak of 
how one translates into the other. I argue, therefore, that Irigaray’s modelling of the umbilical 
relation of the symbolic to the maternal-material opens up the prospect that it is the concept 
of terrorism itself that we need to understand as the manifestation of the violence internal to 
our own culture. It is in the very idea of terrorism that our symbolic economy exhibits the 
aggression at its core. 
  An Irigarayan approach means that we need to be conscious of terrorism as a cultural 
construct, as a phenomenon that emerges at a particular point in our own thinking. For 
although the symbolic attempts to disavow our maternal-material origins, it can never rid us of 
our flesh and overcome the materiality of the world around us. The material remains an ever 
present threat, poised to make its presence known, to erupt unexpectedly and disrupt the 
coherence of the symbolic, as Irigaray makes apparent as she describes the immanence of the 
feminine: 
If the earth turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of the 
subject might thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and penetration. 
For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over? And in?72 
 
This means moving past the commonplace recognition that terrorism is always fundamentally 
a matter of ‘perspective’, of realising that ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter’73 and that each political system will define terrorism in accordance with its own 
legislative norms. Instead, an Irigarayan reading insists that we locate the concept itself within 
our cultural matrices and understand it as laden with cultural meaning beyond the political and 
sociological significance that society overtly accords it. Hence, we need to understand the 
concept of terrorism and the discourses that surround it as forming a cultural response to a 
particular formation of violence. 
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Refiguring terrorism as a concept that comes into play when the symbolic is 
confronted by its fleshy roots suggests that terrorism discourses are in a paradoxical position, 
as the logic and language of the symbolic attempts to deal with the resurgence of its material 
origins, a resurgence that was brought about specifically to damage or destroy that order. Yet, 
if there is a fundamental link between the symbolic and the material as Irigaray suggests, 
surely such a violent and explosive encounter with the material will leave its scars within the 
symbolic, scars that no amount of assertion can entirely conceal? As the study of such 
encounters, perhaps nowhere will these scars be revealed as readily as in terrorism studies. 
Operating under the rubric of social science, these texts have the task of studying, explaining, 
and defining a violent phenomenon that threatens to undermine the very symbolic system 
which facilitates their existence. Read in this light, terrorism studies is a discursive practice that 
has to simultaneously apply its analysis to an object of study and assert the validity of the 
system which is producing the study. To put it another way, these texts work to reduce the 
threatening moment of a re-emergent materiality to symbolic terms, re-inscribing the 
authority of the symbolic and re-enacting the repression of the material once again. Therefore, 
in exploring the ways in which terrorism studies bears the hallmarks of a symbolic struggle 
against a resurgent material, we can begin to unearth the cultural assumptions that ground the 
concept of terrorism itself.  
Moreover, unveiling the silent substratum that supports this discipline allows us to 
assess the extent to which the alternative discourses present within our culture are able to 
enact an ethical interruption of the dominant epistemology of terrorism. Irigaray echoes the 
implicit assumption that different discourses occupy contrasting positions within a culture that 
underlies Spivak’s methodology. Indeed, the ethical potential Irigaray perceives in 
psychoanalysis relies on the recognition that symbolic terms are inflected with meanings 
specific to a subject’s own relation to the world and culture. If discourses prevalent in a culture 
adhere to phallic ideals, the same is not necessarily true of those that do not claim centre 
stage. As we have seen, Irigaray asserts that changes in the symbolic can bring about deep-
rooted change, and as such: 
The beginnings – the real foundations? – of a culture are poetic, or at least artistic . . . 
Whether we really are at the dawn of a new culture, or rather in an important cultural 
transition, art has a role to play in seeing us through this time. For Hegel, war is useful 
at such points. I prefer to have recourse to art as a way of initiating possible 
beginnings, having before interpreted myths from the past.74  
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The poetic, the artistic, play with the strings that tie the signifier to signified and in doing, 
loosen the symbolic’s umbilical attachment to the world in a way the creates the possibility of 
finding an alternative foundation for our culture. Just as the myths of Ancient Greece allowed 
Irigaray to open up the ethical possibilities hidden in Freud and Lacan’s psychoanalysis, 
perhaps it is in the more poetic discourses on terrorism that we will find the beginnings of an 
ethical response? Can our philosophical and literary figurings of terrorism enact an ethical 
interruption thanks to their willingness to play with the stability of the signifier? Before we can 
answer this question, we must first map out the muted terrain that supports the concept of 
terrorism, so that we can detect where the dominant and the alterative share common 
ground. Only then can we ascertain whether or not we are capable of formulating an ethical 
response to such violence in our current cultural tradition.  
The Taxonomy of Terrorism 
 The discipline which is currently formalising itself as ‘Terrorism Studies’ within the 
academy has its roots in decades of literature on terrorism, literature that varies greatly in 
terms of the quality of the writing, the intellectual contribution, and most significantly, in the 
rigour of the research. Though the surge in concern with terrorism over the past two decades 
has brought about an increase in funding for academic research into terrorist behaviour and 
counter-terrorist strategies from both governmental and industry sources, particularly since 
2001,75 Terrorism Studies is nonetheless grounded in the vast body of material that precedes 
these moves towards academic formalisation. The kinds of texts and studies that are now 
recognised as constituting Terrorism Studies began to appear with increasing regularity from 
the early 1960s onwards. Prior to this, in English at least, much of the writing on terrorism was 
either produced by official sources (government departments, intelligence agencies, etc.) or by 
those advocating the use of violence in the name of a cause.76 This changed when the present-
day model of Terrorism Studies began to emerge, as amateur analysts through to academics 
from a variety of disciplines began to produce studies of terrorist activity. This apparent 
openness to all levels of qualification continues today, with the work of influential academics 
such as Professor Walter Laqueur and Professor Paul Wilkinson, whose careers have been built 
on their analysis of terrorism, appearing alongside one-off contributions from writers such as 
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Andrew Sinclair and Michael Kronenwetter.77 Despite this broad sweep of contributors and the 
comparatively recent beginnings of an established discipline, the works that make up 
Terrorism Studies display a remarkable level of consistency, so much so that they form a 
recognisable discursive practice. That this practice pre-dates the formal discipline immediately 
suggests that it is specifically a form of cultural expression, a discourse shaped by unarticulated 
cultural boundaries and imperatives, as opposed to a discourse moulded by the 
methodological demands of a science. Yet, from the outset, terrorism studies have modelled 
themselves as social science studies. Whether they take the form of a straightforward history 
of terrorism, or combine a mixture of historical background and data analysis, the language 
and style adopted by these texts invokes the authority of a social scientific approach, albeit 
with varying degrees of success and legitimacy, as we shall see. 
 From the earliest studies of terrorism, such as Laqueur’s Terrorism,78 to present-day 
investigations such as Jackson et al.’s Terrorism: A Critical Introduction,79 it is convention for 
each such work, be it amateur or academic, to dedicate an introductory paragraph or chapter 
to acknowledging and outlining the problems involved in defining what terrorism is, before 
embarking on a paper- or book-length attempt to do just that. Similarly, the analytical 
categories used for constructing these definitions and conducting the investigations are 
consistent across time and authorial background. Typically, these studies include an attempt to 
distinguish State or guerrilla violence from terrorist activity, detailed discussions of the type of 
violence used and the professed aims of those perpetrating the violence, the socio-economic 
context surrounding the perpetrators, the psychology and psychological make-up of the 
terrorist, and the role the media plays in disseminating the terrorist’s message.80 Finally, each 
investigation invariably concludes with a speculative chapter in which they address future 
forms of terrorism, and potential programmes for effective counter-terrorism. 
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 Essentially, these texts are concerned with the mechanics of terrorism, both with the 
events themselves and with the workings of the terrorist mind, forming what Zulaika and 
Douglass have described as a ‘taxonomy’ of terrorism.81 This taxonomy is now so firmly 
entrenched that very few question its appropriateness for shaping the epistemological 
approach of the newly-minted discipline of Terrorism Studies, or its suitability as a framework 
for broader discourses, including global policy-making regarding terrorism. As Terrorism 
Studies solidifies into a set of modules, bibliographies and canonical texts, textbooks such as 
Martin’s Essentials of Terrorism demonstrate how pervasive this taxonomy is, providing 
students with maps of terrorist ‘habitats’, graphs illustrating the frequency of different types 
of terror attack, tables comparing motivation with style of violence, and photographs of both 
the terrorist and the consequences of their actions.82 Texts such as this graphically illustrate 
the appropriateness of Zulaika and Douglass’s choice of the term ‘taxonomy’, as it carries 
specific biological connotations. For all Martin’s conventional acknowledgement of the 
difficulties of defining terror, the combination of illustrations, geographical information and 
presentation of data leave little room for doubt about the object of study: the terrorist animal. 
The taxonomy of terrorism thus works to construct a distinct epistemological object. 
 Yet for all the plausibility of these textbooks, guides, histories and studies, there is no 
escaping the fact that terrorism studies are unable to define their remit. Silke and White both 
draw a telling parallel with attempts to legally define pornography, with the approach in both 
cases being ‘while I might not be able to define it for you, I still know it when I see it.’83 Such an 
approach lays bare the epistemological assumption that supports terrorism discourses as a 
whole: that it is possible to know what terrorism is by seeing it. Terrorism studies rely 
absolutely on this presumption, always working to establish what they know about the 
terrorist object, despite being unable to identify it as a discrete entity until it has appeared 
before them. This inability to define squarely the scope of one’s study is not inherently 
problematic. Many disciplines would struggle to produce such a definition, and indeed it is the 
nature of good research that its scope is not unduly restrained. It becomes problematic for 
terrorism studies, however, precisely because it has grounded its epistemological framework 
in the terrorist object itself.  
The taxonomy of terrorism studies thus operates in a similar manner to Hayden 
White’s narrative histories. White argues that historical narratives achieve their authority by 
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creating a sense that the narrative is ‘found’ within the events being narrated, rather than 
being constructed by the historian.84 The historian effaces their agency as an interpreter of 
historical fact in favour of generating the impression that the facts themselves are producing 
the narrative. In doing so, the historian’s narrative achieves an authoritative sense of ‘fullness,’ 
a sense that all the relevant data has been consulted and included, and that the narrative that 
emerges accurately describes the causal links between factors.85 Arising out of the ‘mechanics’ 
of terrorism, the current epistemology of terrorism appears to have been ‘found’, to be innate 
to terrorism itself, and thus studies informed by such a methodology appear to be addressing 
the subject comprehensively and authoritatively. 
 This is not to argue that such categories should be dismissed as inherently unhelpful or 
misguided. Rather, it is to draw attention to the epistemological loop that underwrites the 
approach of terrorism studies. The taxonomy of terrorism is simultaneously grounded in the 
terrorist object, and used to define that object. This rhetorical circuit should alert us to the fact 
that our understanding of terrorism is deeply embedded in cultural assumptions, rather than 
in scientific observation. Yet arguably it is because this circuit is cloaked in the language of 
scientific investigation that we fail to detect its problematic nature. Tellingly, one of the rare 
occasions that Irigaray explicitly refers to terrorism occurs as she contemplates presenting her 
analysis of the linguistic practices of scientific disciplines to a room full of scientists: 
Anxiety in the face of an absolute power that hovers in the air, in the face of 
judgement by an imperceptible but ever present authority, in the face of a tribunal 
without judge, lawyer or defendant! The judicial system is in place nonetheless. There 
is a truth to which one must submit without appeal, against which one can 
unintentionally and unknowingly transgress. This high court is in session against your 
will. No one is responsible for this terror, or this terrorism. Nevertheless, they are in 
operation. In this very classroom or conference hall. For me, in any case.86 
 
The parallels Irigaray draws here are unmistakable. References to an anonymous, absolute 
power, a tribunal devoid of legal representatives, a truth against which there is no appeal, and 
yet which is easily transgressed, all deliberately recall the Revolutionary Tribunal, the legal 
instrument that facilitated the Reign of Terror in the bloodiest days of the French Revolution. 
Thus, in this striking passage, Irigaray associates scientific logic with the historical moment that 
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gave birth to the term ‘terrorism’.87 But why would she draw such an extreme parallel? For 
Irigaray, contemporary scientific methodologies and discourses are the epitome of phallic 
symbolic thought: 
Scientists now claim to be standing before the world: naming it, establishing its laws, 
axiomaticizing it. They manipulate nature, use it, exploit it, but forget that they are 
also in it, that they are still physical, and not simply confronting phenomena whose 
physical nature they sometimes fail to recognize.88 
 
Science, as it is presently constituted by our culture, deliberately enacts an appropriation of 
the material world to secure its abstract logic, replicating the foundational gesture of our 
symbolic. To locate oneself in a scientific discipline, then, is to assume this position of 
epistemological authority, to position oneself before the world in order to describe it. The 
hermetic seal between object and epistemology that supports terrorism studies logic and 
claims to authority thus may not be representative of scientific praxis, but it does replicate the 
scientific gesture: applying a name and an epistemology in order to shape the world. 
 To a certain degree, cultural assumptions about the objectivity of the scientist also 
work to maintain the prestige of terrorism discourses in spite of this epistemological loop. We 
accord the scientist the ability to stand both outside of culture and their own bodies. The 
notion of objectivity ‘shelters [science and scientists] from all instability, all moods, all feelings 
and effective fluctuations, all intuitions not readily programmed in the name of science, all 
interference from their desires, notably sexual ones, that could affect discoveries’.89 
Objectivity works to mask the human presence of the scientist within their discourses, by 
forgetting their bodily existence. However, this is not the case for all scientific approaches, as 
Irigaray acknowledges: 
In the language of science there is no I, no you, no we. The subjective is prohibited, 
except in the more or less secondary sciences, the human sciences, and we cannot 
seem to decide whether they are indeed sciences, or substitutes for science, or 
literature, or poetry? . . . Or even whether are they true or false, able to be proved or 
disproved, formalizable or always ambiguous because expressed in natural languages, 
too empirical or too metaphysical, dependent on the axiomatization of the so-called 
exact sciences or resistant to such formalization, etc?90 
 
Terrorism studies resemble social science in so far as their methodology does not demand the 
absolute disavowal of the subjective presence. One does not have to go far to find the 
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subjective making itself felt in such investigations. Kronenwetter opens his guide by informing 
his readers that ‘One thing we know for sure: terrorism is wrong . . . The difficulty is not finding 
a way to define what terrorism is; it is finding a way to define what is isn’t. At least, by 
implication. We must be careful to leave our own actions out of it.’91 Burleigh goes one stage 
further, defining the limits of his research through his own ability to recollect the facts: ‘[w]e 
could venture back to the medieval Assassins of Syria or the early modern British Gunpowder 
Plot, but my knowledge of both has faded with age and I do not regard either as especially 
helpful in understanding contemporary terrorism.’92 The subjective presence of the author 
reaches its height as research asks if ‘terrorists’ methods are inherently evil?’93 For 
contributors to the field such as Ledeen, the answer is clear: 
We think all people everywhere are fundamentally the same and, having turned the 
study of history into a hymn to the wonders of multiculturalism, we are reluctant to 
accept Machiavelli’s dictum that man is more inclined to do evil than to do good. 
Throughout this generation of political correctness, it has been singularly bad form for 
anyone in America to suggest that there are some truly evil people, and even some 
thoroughly evil regimes, whose fear and hatred of us are so intractable that “live and 
let live” (our mind set) will not do. It has to be “kill or be killed.”’94 
 
Such overt personal and political expressions should serve to undermine the claims of 
terrorism studies to scientific integrity, and yet this is not the case. Terrorism research is not 
read as being akin to literary or poetic discourses, despite the its patently subjective nature. 
Rather, it is insistent on its authority as a scientific discourse.  
 In their anthropological analysis of terrorism discourses, Zulaika and Douglass argue 
that scientific validity of this subjective approach is rooted in the concept of terrorism itself. By 
tracing the terrorist’s genealogy back through figures such as the witch and the savage, Zulaika 
and Douglass demonstrate that just like its predecessors, the figure of the terrorist carries with 
it a set of taboos which inevitably shape the discourses around it. Blending a Freudian 
understanding of how taboo operates within a culture with the work of anthropologists such 
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as Michael Taussig, Mary Douglass, Bruce Lincoln and in particular, Franz Steiner, their critique 
characterises the terrorist as the latest in an ancient family of excluded figures, figures which 
serve as a repository for the ‘shortcomings, contradictions, and arbitrariness’ of particular 
social structures, that then carry these potentially destructive elements to a point outside of 
those structures.95 They draw parallels between terrorism discourses and attempts by 
anthropologists in the early twentieth century to read cultures through totemism, as well as 
the Inquisition’s Europe-wide witch-hunt in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the 
first instance, anthropologists made concerted efforts to apply the epistemological model of 
totemism to cultures, regardless of the evidence their observations set before them.96 In the 
second instance, Zulaika and Douglass show that the ontology of witchcraft relied almost 
entirely on the epistemological models developed by the Inquisitors themselves.97 Terrorism 
discourses mirror these historical examples in that they perform a conceptual reification, what 
Zulaika and Douglass describe as ‘an enabling fiction – the monster is there, but what are its 
features?’98  
This immediately suggests that terrorism studies are in fact researching a form of 
literary figure, as Zulaika and Douglass locate the terrorist’s current prominence as our 
monstrous Other in its inherent ambiguity. The terrorist is seen as strategically embracing 
ambiguity, rejecting predictability, military convention, morality, and normativity, making it 
impossible to have a readymade definition of what constitutes terrorist behaviour.99 The adage 
that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ captures this figure’s perpetual 
ambivalence. According to Zulaika and Douglass the terrorist is thus a ‘formless’ figure, 
dangerous precisely because of its lack of form. Terrorism discourses, therefore, are striving 
for fullness in an attempt to keep a threatening formlessness as bay. This means that 
‘[p]ersonally, politically, and morally, terrorism is the utterly untouchable . . . contact with, 
empathy for, or understanding of the terrorist is contaminating and proscribed.’100 In other 
words, the methodology of terrorism studies is shaped by the recognition that the terrorist is a 
tabooed figure, meaning that it becomes imperative for researchers to establish a clear divide 
between themselves and its contaminating presence. The result is that any attempts to locate 
oneself in the context from which the terrorist emerged, or self-reflexive critique are in effect: 
forbidden to the terrorism expert. There must be no common ground between 
terrorist Unreason and political Reason. There can be no ambiguity, no problem, no 
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possibility of alternative plots for the same events. Realist discourse is masked as 
moral imperative. Ironic and skeptical [sic] perspectives must be ruled out.101 
 
Terrorism studies, therefore, do not require a reflexive-critical approach, in which the author 
assesses the impact that their own investment in a particular socio-political system will have 
on their research. Instead, it insists that the author should conduct their analysis from the 
subjective position, to the point where their own agenda can legitimately set the boundaries 
for the study.  
 Figuring the terrorist as a threatening formlessness thus secures the scientific integrity 
of terrorism studies. By eschewing the physical terrorist and installing this amorphous object in 
their place, terrorism studies replicate the gesture that makes the material world available for 
the phallic symbolic and thus follow the logic of science according to Irigaray: 
All the world is, in a way, transformed in a gathering of objects that the master has to 
perceive – that is, to see – in an appropriate way, and to arrange into a parallel world 
thanks to his language, his linguistic logic, his logos.102 
 
But the formlessness accorded the terrorist means that the terrorism expert cannot simply 
stand back from the discourse in arranging the world to suit their logic. For effacing one’s own 
presence within the text is to risk coinciding with the terrorist, as objectivity bestows a 
formlessness on the author that resonates with the terrorist’s own, suggesting the possibility 
of empathy. The disembodied objective observer, the phallically-constituted scientific ideal, 
becomes a threat in the face of the terrorist’s exploitation of the material. Hence the terrorism 
expert must make their presence felt by adopting a subjective position within the text. This 
brings their prose into a perilous proximity with the poetic, as opposed to the scientific, as the 
author’s presence threatens to imply his words come from an immanent rather than all-seeing 
position. 
 It is little wonder then that many of the anxieties expressed about the definition of 
terrorism mirror concerns about the nature of language. As quoted above, Kronenwetter 
argues that the challenge lies in identifying where terrorism is not an applicable term, implying 
it has a potentially limitless range. Gearty is disturbed by the concept’s ‘promiscuous desire to 
please’, by the ability of the word ‘terrorism’ to absorb an endless spectrum of connotations 
that means the idea originally communicated by the words has largely disappeared.’103 For 
Gearty, this representational flexibility leaves the concept ‘vulnerable to being packaged off on 
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. . . ethical tangents,’104 in such a way that the ‘integrity’ of both the word itself and the 
discourses it spawns ‘is persistently under threat.105 White warns us that ‘confusion arises 
when people intertwine the terms terror and terrorism . . . If you think that anything that 
creates terror is terrorism, the scope of potential definitions becomes limitless.’106 It is not just 
the terrorist who possesses a threatening formlessness that requires an epistemology to give it 
form: the very term ‘terrorism’ is overshadowed by an ambiguity that must be dismissed, 
attributed to an abuse of language. The phallic symbolic cherishes its umbilical connection to 
the material, its ability to connect the abstract signifier to a concrete signified, to categorise 
and name, to make each word mean one discrete thing. If ‘terrorism’ is the concept and 
systems of signs through which the symbolic reasserts itself in the wake of a bloody encounter 
with the material, it becomes vital that the relationship between signifier and signified is not 
explicitly compromised in these discourses. To permit ambiguity to persist around the word 
‘terrorism’ itself is to do more than let a formlessness that exposes the chaos beyond our 
system of understanding to enter into our consciousness.107 It is rather to expose the 
symbolic’s fallibility in the face of our materiality. The figure of the “terrorist” and the word 
“terrorism” are therefore treated in startlingly similar ways. In the same breath, the terrorism 
expert can argue that although there is ‘no clear psychopathy is found among terrorists,’ still 
‘there is a nearly universal element in them that can be described as the "true believer."’108 
Similarly, while studies acknowledge there are various applications for the word, there is at its 
core a ‘pure’ terrorism.109 This is a discourse, then, which continually rejects the possibility of 
ambiguity, asserting the legitimacy of the symbolic by connecting the signifier to a definitive 
object and condemning equivocation, indeterminateness, and uncertainty as, at best, a misuse 
of language or, at worst, a gesture of sympathy towards the terrorist other.  
Hence, the terrorism expert must insist on the realist nature of the discourse, on the 
strength of the tie between signifier and signified. There can be no ambiguity about linguistic 
meaning, for ambiguity coincides with the terrorist Other in threatening the authority of the 
symbolic order over the material. Moreover, it is the contrast between realist and literary 
concepts of language that enables terrorism studies to operate as a discipline. For if poetic and 
literary languages loosen the threads that connect the symbolic to an object, a realist stances 
insists on its umbilical attachment to a definite object. This insistence is what allows the realist 
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to argue that an object can be known, can be understood in its entirety. The terrorism 
researcher thus works to pin down the literary figure of the terrorist into a definite object, 
asserting the authority of the symbolic over this threatening formlessness. The presence of the 
author within the terrorism study becomes vital, acting as a guarantor of the realist connection 
between language and the world as they insist on the specific meaning of their prose. Unlike 
the scientist, the terrorism researcher does not need to disguise their presence to claim 
mastery over matter. Rather, thanks to the formlessness of the object under their lens, 
terrorism studies assume an almost hyper-phallic authority, in which making a statement is 
enough to make it true. As terrorism studies use the presence of the author to distinguish its 
language from poetic notions that infiltrate other social sciences, it not only insists on the 
authority of the symbolic over the world, it simultaneously proclaims its authors as 
appropriate masters of such a world-shaping logos. 
 Terrorism studies therefore adopt a discursive mode that consistently works to 
maintain the symbolic’s claim on the world, in its repeated insistence that signifiers can and do 
accurately refer to a specific aspect of that world. In essence, it works against the poetic and 
literary modes that Irigaray associates with other social sciences. Could this lie behind what 
Silke describes as this discipline’s failure as a science? This faith in the signifier’s ability to 
correspond to a definite signified suggests that these texts place a premium on the abstract, as 
they take it as read that a word or a concept represents something present in the world. This 
engenders a very particular investigative methodology, an approach that Silke argues is deeply 
flawed: 
[S]urprisingly little research work of scientific merit has been conducted on the 
perpetrators of terrorist violence . . . Very few published attempts have been made to 
systematically study terrorists outside of a prison setting or to study in a systematic 
manner the actual activities carried out as part of the terrorist campaigns.110 
 
Coming from the fields of psychology and criminology, for Silke it is the assertions that 
terrorism studies literature make about the psychological make-up of terrorists which provide 
the most damning manifestation of the problematic nature of the discourse and its practices. 
For Silke, claims that ‘endless studies of terrorist psychology reveal . . . they are morally insane, 
without being clinically psychotic,’ or that terrorists are marked out by aberrant behaviour 
such as ‘lifelong impotence’, ‘psychopathic’ tendencies or homosexual paedophilia111 fly in the 
face of 30 years of psychological research. Rather, Silke argues ‘all that psychologists can safely 
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say of terrorists is that their outstanding characteristic is their normality.’112 Even though 
evidence-based research has concluded terrorists are not ‘mentally or psychology [sic] 
abnormal’ and has instead frequently discovered that ‘terrorists are actually psychologically 
much healthier and far more stable than other violent criminals,'113 this is accepted or 
acknowledged only in a small minority of terrorism studies. Instead, Silke posits that in the vast 
majority of terrorism studies, ‘the quality of the research tends to become poorer the closer 
one moves to the actual terrorists and their activities.'114 Already, Silke’s analysis suggests that 
the material presence of the terrorist causes noticeable distortions in the scientific analysis of 
terrorism.  
Yet in a move that is reminiscent of psychoanalysis’s consigning of women to the dark 
continent, the discursive trend in terrorism studies is to classify the paucity of its analysis as an 
inherent characteristic of the object under examination. Professor Walter Reich provides us 
with an excellent example of such a gesture as he lists the potential limitations a researcher 
may encounter when studying the psychology of the terrorist. ‘Inaccessibility to direct research 
on terrorist’ is given relatively low priority, coming sixth on the list. More than this, Reich 
argues that the value of direct contact with the subject being studied is dubious, as it is in the 
terrorist’s nature only to participate in a study if they feel the researcher may be converted to 
their cause ‘even if they are languishing in prison with nothing else to do,’ for the terrorist 
feels their actions will be diminished by a psychological explanation.115 Reich, like many others 
in the field, leaves us with a psychological profile of the terrorist built on the prohibition of 
contact with the terrorist because of their psychological profile. Not only does this pattern of 
analysis mimic the epistemological loop that establishes the coherence of terrorism studies, it 
is emblematic of the discourse’s preference for the abstract, a preference that produces a 
psychology grounded in the absence of the subject, whose absence that psychology reads as 
the subject’s inherent characteristic. 
 This lack of adherence to the methodological standards of established psychological 
investigation dismays Silke, not least because it allows the anecdotal or ‘common sense’ 
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explanation precedence over careful analysis. This in itself has very real consequences for 
counter-terrorist policy.116 But this reluctance to pursue rigorous engagement with the object 
under scrutiny characterises terrorism studies as a whole, not simply the psychological 
research. Many of the graphs, tables, and statistics used present discreet data alongside one 
another to infer a causal link, without providing direct evidence for such a connection. For 
example, Table 1 places information about the ethnicity, sex, and age, of suicide bombers 
alongside a record of who they have lost in a particular conflict. 
 
Table 1 Source: Richard Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New 
York: Random House, 2005), 212. 
 
The implication is that the terrorist’s actions need to be read in terms of this information, 
although neither the table, nor the surrounding analysis provide us with evidence as to why 
these analytical categories are appropriate. More than this, such presentation of information 
does nothing to address the evidence it has excluded – in this instance, where are the suicide 
bombers who have not lost a loved one? Similarly, Table 2 demonstrates the evidence 
struggles  against the epistemological framework used to present the data: 
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Table 2 Source: Pape, Dying to Win, 15. 
 
Although nearly half of the groups listed have a secular element, or are of unknown religious 
background, the data is still presented in such a way as to suggest religion is a primary 
epistemological tool for interpreting terrorist action. Presentation is thus crucial in creating a 
veneer of analytical rigour, but this rapidly peels away on close inspection. How does the 
inclusion of diagrams of bullets (Figure 1) and guns (Figure 2) aid the scientific understanding 
of terrorism in way that allows us to predict and prevent terrorist atrocity? 
 
Figure 1 Source: Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World, 30. 
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Figure 2 Source: Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World, 32. 
 
Much as the presentation of data infers causal connections between discrete types of data 
without substantiating them with sustained analysis, so the inclusion of diagrams like Figures 1 
and 2 in terrorism texts imply that they are revealing  something about the nature of 
terrorism, when in actuality, such figures tell us little more than what they actually show. In 
both cases, tables and diagrams act as substitutes for actual critical engagement with the 
available data. At points, resorting to visual aids exposes these attempts to solicit the authority 
of scientific or statistical analysis as so much window-dressing. The argument illustrated in 
Figure 3, for example, perhaps did not merit a diagram. 
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Figure 3 Source: Tamara Makarenko, ‘Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: Tracing 
the Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia’ in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: 
Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (Armonk, New York; 
London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 174. 
 
Such graphic representation of data, however, can work to mask the superficial nature of the 
evidence and data analysis it is based on, particularly if it seems to support ‘common-sense’ or 
culturally-constructed observations about terrorism. Figure 4, for instance, would seem to 
encapsulate the factors that contribute to suicide terrorism.  
 
Figure 4 Source: Pape, Dying to Win, 22. 
 
Yet this analysis is not based on direct interaction with the terrorists, with their societies, or 
with the groups that recruited them. The visual aid seduces us into turning a blind eye to this 
lack of evidence-based analysis and scientific precision. 
 These are just a few examples of the superficial data analysis that permeates terrorism 
studies. Silke characterises it as a discipline in which ‘researchers and writers [ . . .] have 
developed an enormous tolerance for poor research methods.’117 Indeed, Zulaika and Douglass 
note that the lack of analytic rigour extends beyond a reluctance to engage with the evidence. 
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Much of the data used can in fact be traced to other studies which, in turn, rely on other 
studies, rather than data drawn from direct observation.118 As such, the checks and balances of 
peer review are circumvented and, if research is latterly discredited, it is only after it has 
thoroughly infiltrated the field, quietly influencing and informing countless other studies that 
have recycled the data.119 The lack of adherence to scientific mores means that publication 
rather than peer review or accuracy ensures a study’s ‘findings [will] become part of the 
scientific discourse and recur throughout the terrorism literature.’120 This recurrence is made 
even more likely, as both amateur and academic writers frequently make minimal use of 
references, masking their sources and regurgitating previous research as established fact.121 
The widespread acceptance that the author sets, rather than meets, the research standards in 
terrorism studies produces a discipline that Silke, one of its leading figures, despairs of: ‘while 
the volume of what has been written is both massive and growing, the quality of the content 
leaves much to be desired. So much is dross, repetitive and ill-informed.’122 
At its most pronounced, authority accorded to the word of the terrorism writer 
produces texts in which overt political slants inform the interpretation of data, be it in 
Sinclair’s unabashed pro-Bush stance, Burleigh’s clear leaning to the right, or Herman and 
O’Sullivan’s aggressive Leftist polemic, The Terrorism Industry.123 But while readers can 
compensate for overt political bias, the experts’ assumption of epistemological mastery leads 
to erroneous or unsupported conclusions being accepted as fact, and to a failure to predict or 
prevent terrorist activity. For instance, Burleigh informs us that bombing of Harrods 
department store in London took place on 18th December, 1984, when in fact it took place on 
17th December 1983.124 One suspects we would find more such errors on closer examination. 
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Similarly, Clutterbuck predicts the rise of the micro-lite or vertical take-off craft will bring 
about an end to terrorism, as this form of transport would make it ‘almost impossible for 
terrorists to pick out their targets.’125 Taken in isolation, these are one-off mistakes, or 
potentially amusing predictions. Yet the cover of the first edition of Burleigh’s book boasts a 
recommendation from the then soon-to-be-Prime Minister David Cameron, demonstrating the 
potential influence such texts have. Clutterbuck, too, was an influential expert and his 
argument that greater governmental surveillance of the civilian population is vital for counter-
terrorism is reiterated by other experts such as Paul Wilkinson.126 Yet the same interpretation 
of evidence facilitates Clutterbuck’s demands for biometric monitoring of the population as his 
arguments for the micro-lite.127 This surely suggests that all such recommendations are based 
on, at best, misguided interpretations of the available data. 
 As noted previously, Silke attributes the flawed science of terrorism studies as 
resulting from its chequered past, as a discursive practice that emerged in the cracks between 
other disciplines. But this does not account for why this current form continues to maintain its 
influence and remain largely unchallenged despite these overt flaws. Silke suggests that this 
troubled genealogy works to secure the authority of terrorism studies, as it has engendered a: 
latent hostility to studies which do attempt to produce quantitative data which is then 
subjected to rigorous analysis. Sadly, this situation has encouraged the field to 
stagnate with little overall progress being made in the past decade in terms of our 
understanding of terrorism.128 
 
But Silke stops short of asking what nurtured this hostility towards thorough analysis in the 
first place. Zulaika and Douglass account for the adversarial attitude by identifying the terrorist 
as a modern-day manifestation of civilisation’s tabooed monster. Yet can we not take this 
further, when we recognise that the terrorist becomes such a figure thanks to the forgetting of 
material presence? This forgetting manifests itself in the methodologies of terrorism studies, 
methodologies that require only the lightest engagement with the facts and figures, with the 
terrorists themselves, producing psychological studies of absent subjects, anthropological 
research without contact with people, scientific classification and prediction based on a 
prohibition of analysis.  
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Terrorism studies, then, is a highly abstract discourse, where the epistemological 
framework is maintained at the expense of genuine inquiry. Already we can see the parallels 
between this discursive gesture and the symbolic’s subjugation of the material. But it is not 
just Irigaray who posits that such thinking can be understood as terroristic. Martha Crenshaw, 
one of the world’s leading terrorism academics, argues that: 
The beliefs of terrorists are characterised by abstraction, impersonality, and 
impracticality. They may be complex to the point of abstruseness or naively simple. 
The provision of moral justification for violence is an integral component, The world is 
divided between good, represented by the terrorist organisation, and a much stronger 
and pervasive evil, usually embodied in governmental authority and the social class 
identified as supporting the state. The terrorists see themselves as elites of superior 
consciousness and perceptiveness, acting alone through necessary and appropriate 
violence, with eventual victory guaranteed by the forces of history.129 
 
In its reduction of the perpetrators of violence to a unified figure of the terrorist, its 
prohibition on identification with such a figure, and its refusal to interact with the evidence, 
the discursive practice of terrorism studies resembles the thought processes associated with 
the very object they aim to understand. They divide the world between good and evil, the 
morally correct and the corrupt, and in doing so, implicate the cultures, societies, and 
countries from which such figures emerge in the violence of individuals. Finally, the authors 
that produce this discourse rarely question their fitness or ability to describe the mechanisms 
of terrorism and to recommend solutions. It seems that the epistemological framework of 
terrorism echoes the very thinking that it argues produces terrorism. It is little wonder, then, 
that such an epistemology formulates counter-terrorism as the only viable response. 
The Substratum of Terrorism Discourses 
 It is here that the overlaps between the discourses on terrorism come to the fore. If 
the terrorism studies that inform the political and public spheres are understood as endorsing 
counter-terrorism as a result of their particular epistemological and methodological approach, 
other discussions of terrorism are more than just alternative understandings: they become the 
spaces in which we have the potential to think and articulate a different response to terrorism. 
This means that we must pay particular attention to resonances between the terms provided 
by terrorism studies and the political rhetoric they inform, and attempts to critique or think 
beyond those terms, for any such common ground should alert us to the fact that both critique 
and criticised are potentially rendering the same thing excessive in order to allow their 
discussion to unfurl. Such instances of coalescence are signposts showing where shared 
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assumptions are closing down potential avenues of thought. Zulaika and Douglass’s insightful 
‘metaterrorism’ analysis is an illuminating example. In their description of the taboos 
permeating terrorism discourses, they share Irigaray’s sense that something is necessarily 
repressed to allow a discourse to unfold. As we have seen, they argue that the terrorist is the 
latest figuring of a formlessness that our culture deems threatening. But as the title of their 
work suggests, Zulaika and Douglass rely on Freud’s Totem and Taboo for their understanding 
of how taboos are constructed and how they operate within a culture. In this work, Freud 
surmises that in its earliest stages, our society mirrored Darwin’s primal horde, with ‘a violent 
and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow 
up.’130 This situation continues until the exiled brothers come together and overthrow the 
despotic father, who they then devour. Having destroyed their father and gained access to the 
forbidden females, two taboos thus emerge, taboos that Freud identifies as the beginnings of 
‘human morality.’131 The first is the prohibition protecting the ‘totem’ animal, which serves as 
a means for making amends for the brutal murder of the primordial father, who in death has 
now become a powerful figure yet again, thanks to the ambivalent feelings of his murderous 
sons. Secondly, in order to maintain the brotherly bond and ensure each brother has some 
access to females, they must ‘institute the law against incest, by which they all alike renounced 
the women who they desired and who had been their chief motive for despatching their 
father.’132 Taboo, then, is from the beginning, both about monitoring and mediating 
relationships between men and enshrining their access to the ‘horde’ of women. 
 Zulaika and Douglass hence frame their analysis with the very text that Irigaray 
critiques through her use of The Oresteia. As we have seen, Irigaray stresses that women and 
the feminine have already been reduced to the status of a treasure trove, a possession, an 
object within the system of masculine relations by the time the murder of the primordial 
father takes place. In other words, the maternal-material body is forgotten prior to the 
emergence of taboo. The forgetting of the body is crucial for Zulaika and Douglass’s 
proposition that it is ‘terrorism’s play with radical formlessness that empowers it as the 
modern world’s enchanted discourse.’133 The ambiguous nature of terrorism is not only a 
threat to our symbolic stability, it is ‘an enormously efficacious stimulant of the collective 
imagination, since it clearly garners and holds media attention all out of proportion to the 
course of actual events.’134 According to Zulaika and Douglass, this is because the imagination 
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is also characterised by an ‘inconstancy of form’, and this congruence between stimulant and 
imagination induces a ‘collective enchantment.’ 135 This connection between a formless 
imagination and collective enchantment is an interesting contrast with Spivak’s formulation of 
the imagination as crucial for ethical thought. Whereas Spivak is arguing that imagination 
presents us with the possibility of difference, Zulaika and Douglass locate the power accorded 
to terrorism as being rooted in the imagination’s capacity to foreclose independent thought. 
 Here, the incisive and compelling critique in Terror and Taboo replicates the 
presumptions of the discourses it deconstructs. Terrorism studies accept universally that ‘one 
of the aims of terrorist organisations is to convince sceptical audiences to see the world in 
their terms.’136 Indeed, in most cases, this is terrorism’s defining trait: ‘Violence is 
unequivocally terrorist . . . when the purpose behind the violence is to communicate a 
message to a wider audience.’ 137 Yet, just as in Zulaika and Douglass’s text, this wider 
audience remains a shadowy, formless presence across the discourse. While psychological 
studies of the impact of terrorism on an audience argue that ‘exposure rates to traumatic 
events far exceed prevalence rates for psychopathology, suggesting a differential response 
pattern across victims,'138 such research suffers the same fate as psychological investigations of 
terrorists, as it is ignored in the vast majority of terrorism research. The focus falls instead on 
the complexities of the relationship between the terrorist and media, as studies assess the 
extent to which the two ‘appear to be locked in a relationship of considerable mutual 
benefit.’139 Again, although work such as Laqueur’s Voices of Terror testify to the fact that 
anxieties about the communication of fear to the masses for political ends pre-dates both the 
term ‘terrorism’ and the mass media of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, terrorism 
studies consistently read the current configuration between the two as unique.140 The lack of 
historical perspective in the bulk of terrorism research means that interrogations of the 
relationship between terror and the media revolve around whether terrorists are ‘deliberately 
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organizing their actions for the key news values of drama, violence and unexpected,’141 or if 
the media are ‘vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation by ruthless terrorist organizations,’ 
who perpetuate atrocities with ‘the object of seducing or trapping the media into giving the 
terrorists huge publicity.’142 In not recognising that the communication of fear to the masses 
was possible before the appearance of modern-day mass media, terrorism studies assert that 
terrorists use the media as ‘an instrument to disseminate the messages of threat and 
intimidation,’143 without ever pursuing an in-depth analysis of how those messages are 
received. The media becomes the primary focus of terrorism studies, not the audience 
presumed to be terrorised.  
 Yet the presence of an audience is central to the very concept of terrorist violence, as 
Whittaker illustrates in his definition: 
Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the 
immediate victim or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and 
thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’144 
 
The research assumes it is a desire to manipulate the emotions of a target audience that lies at 
the heart of terrorist action, but this audience is rarely placed under scrutiny in terrorism 
studies. Instead, the research tends to share the terrorist’s assumption that there is such an 
audience waiting to absorb their message. Thus, although Whittaker argues terrorism is 
designed to have psychological effects, the psychology of the audience is rarely considered in 
such research. Instead, the overarching assumption is that the audience of terrorism 
‘regardless of their social class, politics or religious faith. . . all bleed and grieve in the same 
way.’145 As the fascination with the modern media’s connection to terrorism suggests, the 
audience of terrorism is characterised as sharing a universal humanity that transcends all 
historical, social, cultural contexts. Indeed, Kronenwetter suggests that terrorist violence arises 
out of a ‘refusal to acknowledge a shared humanity with those they perceive as the enemy,’146 
a refusal, in essence, to remain part of the crowd. When Zulaika and Douglass argue that ‘[t]o 
the extent that it terrifies the public, terrorism achieves its goal,’147 they therefore reduce the 
target audience of terrorism into the amorphous notion of the ‘public’ that underpins the 
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analysis of terrorism studies: ‘[t]error is defeat by cowardice for the crowd.’148 Although 
personal accounts of the experience of terrorism such as Susan Hirsch’s In the Moment of 
Greatest Calamity149 are increasingly considered part of the canon of Terrorism Studies, once 
terrorism research moves beyond the sphere of the direct victims of violence, the very people 
terrorism is presumed to be addressing are left unexamined, swallowed up in notions of 
public, audience, and the masses. Thus, while Sprang’s study of the impact of the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing on people in cities across the U.S. demonstrates that factors such as 
physical and temporal proximity, memory, gender, age, and general psychological health are 
all significant in an individual’s perception of events, she is a minority voice. Faced with 
terrorist atrocity, it seems the audience as is formless as the terrorist, becoming a 
homogenous mass to such a degree that ‘[w]e are all the victims of a successful terrorist 
attack.’150 
 This nebulous audience arguably permeates critiques that do attempt to think about 
the transmission of terror and the symbolic consequences of such communication. Baudrillard, 
for example, argues that September 11th, 2001, tolled the death knell for the West’s 
relationship to the real. In contrast to interpretations of the attacks as a wake-up call, or as 
representative of the real world crashing into the fantasy-riddled world of late twentieth-
century America, Baudrillard claims: 
An excess of violence is not enough to open on to reality. For reality is a principle, and 
it is this principle that is lost. Reality and fiction are inextricable, and the fascination 
with the attack is primarily a fascination with the image.151 
 
In Baudrillard’s eyes, the spectacular collapse of the World Trade Center brought about the 
image’s final conquest of reality. Throughout his oeuvre, Baudrillard reiterates the claim that 
the image itself ‘is violent because what happens there is the murder of the Real, the 
vanishing point of Reality.’152 In much the same way as the symbolic overwrites the material in 
favour of its abstraction, so Baudrillard argues that the image ‘makes the real substance 
disappear.’153 The cultural fascination with and proliferation of images had already 
impoverished our engagement with reality, as images pre-figure our interaction with the 
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world. In essence, Baudrillard asserts that images of the ‘real’ produce a ‘forced consensus 
and interaction’154 with the world, while the realisation of fantasy through virtual technologies 
means that we even have pre-established modes for understanding the unimaginable. Such is 
the power of the image in our culture that it limits our capacity to respond to the world in a 
way that has not already been established. Images, then, have a ‘neutralizing power’155 as 
they shut down our imaginative capabilities and our connection to the real. For Baudrillard, 
the images of Manhattan that Tuesday morning finally severed our culture’s tenuous 
connection to the real, as ‘it is the radicality of the spectacle, the brutality of the spectacle, 
which alone is original and irreducible. The spectacle of terrorism forces the terrorism of 
spectacle upon us.’156 The image of terror, in other words, becomes that which shapes our 
reality, deposing reality itself. We had entered an eternal house of mirrors. 
 Slavoj Žižek echoes Baudrillard’s thought as he claims that ‘the question we should 
have asked ourselves as we stared at the TV screens on September 11 is simply: Where have 
we already seen the same thing over and over again?’157 Drawing parallels between the 
second plane hitting the World Trade Center and a scene from Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963), in 
which ‘a single bird . . . unexpectedly enters the frame above right, and hits [Melanie] on the 
head’,158 Žižek goes on to compare a variety of films and the responses to the attacks across 
political and cultural spheres. For Žižek, such comparisons demonstrate that the attacks on 
Manhattan already existed in the cultural imagination prior to their unfolding. Recognising this 
means: 
[w]e should therefore invert the standard reading according to which the WTC 
explosions were the intrusion of the Real which shattered our illusionary Sphere: quite 
the reverse – it was before the WTC collapse that we lived in our reality, perceiving 
Third World horrors as something which was [sic] not actually part of our social reality, 
as something which existed (for us) as a spectral apparition on the (TV) screen – and 
what happened on September 11 was that this fantasmatic screen apparition entered 
our reality. It is not that reality entered our image: the image entered and shattered 
our reality.159 
 
Hence, while for Baudrillard, the images of the attacks sealed the illusionary sphere, Žižek 
argues they were cultural fantasies made brutally real. As such, Žižek controversially claims 
that ‘America got what it fantasized about.’160 According to Žižek, this realisation of cultural 
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fantasy exposed the West’s ‘passion for the real’ as yet another layer of phantasmatic 
obfuscation. In his analysis, while the West characterises the image as the means through 
which we can confront reality, be it through news or documentary footage, reality TV, or gritty 
cinema, this ‘ruthless pursuit of the Real behind appearances was the ultimate stratagem to 
avoid confronting the Real.’161 Like Baudrillard, Žižek locates the image or the representation of 
reality as working to blind us to the Real.  
 Both Baudrillard and Žižek therefore enact the kind of critical gesture that Irigaray calls 
for, by looking to the ways in which our own culture is bound up with the terroristic violence 
visited upon it. Similarly, both locate the point of collusion as being in the privileging of the 
abstract over the material. Baudrillard’s analysis is arguably borne out by the formation of 
terrorism studies, as well as wider terrorism discourses. Can we not read the repetitive nature 
of terrorism research as coincident with the privileged position the media is accorded in such 
studies, suggesting that there is a genuine sense in which media representations dictate or 
limit the capacity to think about terrorism? Similarly, the cyclical nature of terrorism-counter-
terrorism policies, a discursive cycle littered with clichés and action-movie rhetoric, implies we 
are continually moving along pre-established lines, rather than spontaneously responding to a 
specific set of circumstances.  
Žižek’s diagnosis of terrorism and the responses to it as culturally-constituted 
symptoms also echoes the Irigarayan analysis we have pursued so far. Yet as Baudrillard 
mourns the death of the principle called “reality”, he assumes no one else will be at the 
funeral. Such is the power he accords to the image that ‘people are no more victims of the 
image: they transform themselves into images – they exist only as screens, or in a superficial 
dimension.’162 Once again, the audience is an amorphous mass, undone by the enthralling 
power of the image. Indeed, while elsewhere Baudrillard makes specific reference to cinematic 
and televisual images, by the time we reach The Spirit of Terrorism and ‘The Violence of the 
Image,’ the images themselves have coalesced into a formless image, an image that presses in 
on the spectator and carries them away from reality by the very force of its presence. There is 
no sense in which one can pause in front of Baudrillard’s terroristic image, no sense of the 
image in context. His image bombards us, surrounds us, leaves us overwhelmed and unable to 
see the real at its fringes. The formlessness of the audience combines with the formless image 
to overwrite the distinctions between different forms of image, and with it, the possibility that 
different forms invoke different kinds of ‘looking.’ Whether consciously or not, Baudrillard has 
arguably taken the cinematic experience of the image as the universal model of looking. The 
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sensation of immersion in the image, the blocking out of extraneous context, the silent, 
disembodied observer who gives themselves over to the procession of images placed before 
them, all echo classic models of cinematic experience.163 As such, Baudrillard’s rearticulates 
the blithe acceptance in terrorism studies and discourses that the media’s dissemination of 
information about an atrocity is enough to convey terror to audiences en masse. This common 
ground unsurprisingly means Baudrillard has little to offer in terms of disrupting the existing 
epistemology of terror. Indeed, his overriding message seems to be that it is too late to 
instigate meaningful change. 
 The real/Real is far more tenacious in Žižek’s formulation. In his Lacanian-Hegelian 
approach, Žižek repeatedly asserts that the real cannot be lost, but is instead unavoidable, the 
sticky underside of our culture.164 For Žižek, after Lacan, there is no possibility of an encounter 
with the real. It will always remain beyond the reach of culture and consciousness, and indeed, 
both are constituted by the real’s inaccessibility.165 Rather than emerging from the material 
world, radical change instead comes from unveiling the fantasies that structure our ideologies. 
By recognising that our perception of reality is structured by fantasy, we can create new 
fictions from scratch. But like Baudrillard, Žižek’s approach requires reducing a culture, an 
audience, to a formless monolithic presence. This assumption manifests itself, for example, as 
he reads Hollywood’s productions as being representative of America’s fantasies. Moreover, 
bringing about change in such a formulation relies on asserting, first, that one has uncovered 
the fundamental truth concealed in a particular symptom, and secondly, that one can alter or 
produce a fantasy in a manner that is appropriate to everyone. In this sense, then, Žižek’s 
critical gesture relies on a fundamental forgetting of his psychoanalytic roots, for there is no 
recognition that an individual’s psyche will inflect their relation to cultural fantasy. Instead, 
Žižek seems to be interpreting the relation as purely top-down when it comes to bringing 
about cultural change.166 As Žižek moves through cultural symptoms, analysing what they 
really mean, he relies on the a priori presumption that the masses merge into a homogenous 
entity, devoid of individual characteristics and fantasy. Thus, as he concludes that the ‘true 
aim’ of the war on terrorism is a ‘shattering of our liberal-democratic consensus,’167 he comes 
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perilously close to reproducing the opening gambit of that war. By installing himself as the 
master able to diagnose the truth behind the symptom168, Žižek mirrors Bush’s assumption of 
epistemological mastery, colonising the symbolic with an authoritative interpretation.  
 The premise that supports both terrorism studies and these metaterrorism critiques is 
that it is possible for individual psyches to merge into a mass consciousness in such a way as to 
overpower the individual’s specificity. In essence, these discourses rest on an unarticulated 
notion of group psychology. Terrorism studies, in particular, rely on a model of the target 
audience as the kind of ‘obedient herd’ that Freud rethinks in ‘Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego.’169 Freud concurs with McDougall in so far as he accepts that: 
Before members of a random crowd of people can constitute something like a group, 
in the psychological sense, a condition has to be fulfilled: these individuals must have 
something in common with one another, a common interest in an object, a similar 
emotional bias in some situation of other, and . . . ‘some degree of reciprocal 
influence’ . . . The higher the degree of ‘this mental homogeneity’, the more readily do 
the individuals form a psychological group, and the more striking are the 
manifestations of a group mind.170 
 
By taking this common object or situation to be a universal humanity or a ubiquitous 
investment in culture, terrorism discourses homogenise not just an isolated group, but an 
entire population. Thus, as Freud argues that group psychology emerges as each individual’s 
ego ideal is replaced by an object which facilitates an ‘identification with other individuals . . . 
made possible by their having the same relation to the object,’171 such discourses presume 
that the audience of terrorism has an undifferentiated relation to the world. As we have seen, 
Irigaray’s analysis of the status of the feminine and women in relation to the symbolic order 
problematises this assumption: how can women be said to have the same relation to the world 
of objects when they are forced to speak in a phallically-informed tongue? Indeed, Irigaray’s 
studies of the linguistic habits of European men and women, boy and girls, have shown how 
the different relations the sexes have to the world manifest themselves in speech: 
women seek to communicate, especially to hold dialogue, but they address above all 
to him or them-him . . . men, for their part, take interest in the concrete object if it is 
theirs (my car, my watch, my pipe, etc.) or in the abstract object if it is defined by men 
and belongs to a community of men to express their psychological states, their 
genealogical or familial problems; men avoid staying and talking as two, especially two 
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who are different, and they would rather remain in a scarcely differentiated group of 
their own gender.172 
 
Freud’s reading of the libidinal structures of the group mind endorse Irigaray’s last statement, 
for he argues that ‘[i]t seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group 
ties.’ 173 Returning once again to the primordial horde, Freud posits that because it was love of 
women that inspired the prehistoric sons to murder their all-powerful father, heterosexual 
desire can have no place in the libidinal compulsions that form a group psychology.174Instead, 
it is a desire for the same, for the undifferentiated that brings a group together, to such an 
extent that: 
Even where groups are formed which are composed of both men and women the 
distinction between the sexes plays no part. There is scarcely any sense in asking 
whether the libido which keeps groups together is of a homosexual or of a 
heterosexual nature, for it is not differentiated according to the sexes, and particularly 
shows a complete disregard for the aims of the genital organization of the libido.175 
 
When it comes to group psychology, then, sexual difference is overwritten to such an extent 
that Freud accords the non-masculine the same desires and drives as the masculine. 
 Freud’s analysis of group psychology thus makes explicit the premise that subtends the 
concept of the audience in terrorism discourses: the audience exists as a homogenised, 
sexually-indistinct mass. More specifically, the target audience of terrorism is ‘hom(m)o-
sexual’176 in the Irigarayan sense, as individuals are understood as being the ‘same’ and are 
brought together through this equivalence, an equivalence that accords both men and women 
a masculine status in Freud’s formulation. This is not simply a disavowal of sexual difference. In 
Freud’s figuring of group psychology, we see women achieving the same kind of identification 
as men. A group consciousness thus transcends the limits of sexual identity, as the non-
masculine slips the bounds of her natural passivity, darkness, mystery, and identifies with the 
group mind. This suggests that such conceptualisations of mass consciousness are 
underpinned by a form of Cartesian split, construing the mind and the body as distinct entities. 
For Irigaray, understanding the human body as ‘containing’ the spirit or consciousness is a 
direct result of the repression of the maternal role in the formation of the subject. By 
forgetting that the womb is the first world we inhabit, a world that constitutes both our initial 
physicality and consciousness, we transform the mother’s body into ‘a container for the child’, 
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or ‘a container for the man’ as he enters her body to fulfil his sexual desire.177 Hence, as the 
maternal-feminine and the material world are consigned to an umbilical relation to the 
symbolic, the body is constructed as containing our subjectivity, rather than in any way being 
coincident with it. The body-as-container privileges the internal, the space marked off as 
interior by the presence of skin, rather than recognising the possibility that the skin and the 
flesh may in fact constitute that internal space. 
 This modelling of body-as-container, this severance of consciousness from body, is the 
fundamental assumption behind the concept of terrorism itself. For in allowing the audience to 
remain a formless entity, Zulaika and Douglass inadvertently overlook another taboo at work 
in terrorism discourses. In reading terrorism studies as a symbolic discourse struggling against 
a resurgent material, we have seen its authors facing a problem that other sciences are not 
faced with; they cannot simply ‘forget’ the physical world. They are in fact too much aware of 
it, promoting a willingness to accept flaws and contradictions that have the potential to 
unravel the authority of their work. Nowhere does this need to privilege the abstract over the 
material manifest itself so prominently than in the necessity to leave the audience of terrorism 
as an ideal, immaterial presence. For although we are told repeatedly that the terrorist’s key 
aim is to ‘convince sceptical audiences to see the world in their terms,’178 terrorism studies fail 
to elucidate why the sensation of terror would help terrorists achieve this aim. Indeed, notably 
absent from the epistemological toolkit of terrorism studies is any in-depth analysis of the 
audience’s experience of terror, what terror actually is, what it means to be terrorised. At no 
point is it asked how the experience of ‘terror’ works in the terrorist’s favour, indeed, if it 
works at all, and if it does why? The question of how looking at an image, hearing a news 
report, watching footage of a terrorist atrocity translates into a sensation of terror within the 
audience is never asked. Rather, we are told: 
Terrorism beams into our homes through television screens, it assaults us in the 
newspapers and magazines . . . People do not seem to worry about the definition of 
terrorism at such times. They simply feel terror when they see the violence.179 
 
Terrorism studies and discourses thus take it as a given that terrorism ‘terrorises’ the intended 
audience. More than this, they assume that terrorist acts have a uniform efficacy in the 
production of terror, so much so that the sensation of terror is not considered worth 
examining.  As such, although studies such as Sprang’s identify a variety of factors as inflecting 
our experience of such atrocity, these are rendered irrelevant as the audience remains an 
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indistinct mass, a disembodied group who all experience terror the same way. The concept of 
terrorism, on the side of the analysts and the terrorists both, relies absolutely on the 
assumption that people will be terrorised, whatever the act, however its ‘brute facts’ are 
communicated. And yet what this terror is and why is should be conceived of as useful by 
those who induce it is a topic on which terrorism studies remains largely silent. The tabooed 
nature of such a question becomes clear when we reformulate it; to query the effect the 
deliberate maiming and murder of ‘innocent’ people has on the broader population inevitably 
risks being accused of disrespecting those who have suffered in such an event. Ultimately one 
risks losing out to the accusation of disrespecting the dead. 
 Yet it is precisely the failure to ask these questions that allows the dominant voices 
within a discourse to claim symbolic mastery, to proclaim what each individual death 
represents, whether these pronouncements come from the terrorists themselves, or those 
speaking in the name of the terrorised. This failure is highlighted by one of the few sustained 
studies of terrorism in context, Allen Feldman’s Formations of Violence. His impressive 
linguistic analysis of interviews conducted with paramilitaries, victims, and the residents living 
in Belfast at the height of The Troubles demonstrates that the continued experience of 
violence collapsed spatial and temporal distinctions in such a way that identity becomes 
defined by context, rather than individual subjectivity. This is not least because, in such a 
context, violent death brings about an ‘instrumental staging and commodification of the 
body.’180 This commodification is a ‘process by which an entity violently expelled from the 
social order is transformed into an emissary, a cultural donor and a bearer of seminal political 
messages.’181 Within the socio-historical context for Northern Ireland, then, terrorist violence 
renders the identity of the victim almost irrelevant, as the message is inscribed on the body 
through injuries suffered and the choice of location in which the corpse is left. Murder in this 
context means ‘the individual body is constructed as a mass article and as a social hieroglyph 
that opens the possibility of mythical communication with the masses.’182 The presumption 
that, in the face of terrorism, entire populations will be uniformly terrorised relies on the same 
gesture, turning the audience of terror into an undifferentiated mass that is defined by its 
context and the violence inflicted upon it. The audience becomes a container for 
representation, into which meaning is poured, be it by the terrorists themselves, or the 
governments who pursue counter-terrorism in its name. 
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 It is here that we return to Spivak’s formulation that response requires the 
construction of a subject, as well as its object. While the terrorists frequently explicitly state 
what they have taken their intended audience to represent, the same is not true of terrorism 
studies and discourses. What meaning is being assigned to the terrorised public in these 
discourses? What does the epistemological framework of terrorism take the audience to 
represent? In other words, what normative notions colonise the public body as the 
epistemology of terrorism works to produce a response in their name? Both Freud and Irigaray 
argue that the very concept of audience that underwrites terrorism discourses enacts an 
overwriting of sexual difference, immediately suggesting that the mass is read in terms of 
phallic-masculinity. This is borne out as we look at the moments where the unarticulated 
notion of terror that allows terrorism studies to unfold grazes the surface of the discourse. 
Welch tells us that thanks to the media’s inflated claims, ‘public fear of terrorism may be 
disproportionate to the actual risks, leading to choices and behaviours that are not entirely 
rational,’ leaving the public open to exploitation not only by the terrorists, but from 
opportunist politicians as well.183 The U.S. Army Field Manual describes a similar irrationality as 
awakened in the masses in the wake of terror, as ‘[t]he public demands protection that the 
state cannot give. Frustrated and fearful, the people then demand that the government make 
concessions to stop the attacks.’184 This sits in stark contrast with the same manual’s figure of 
the ‘rational terrorist’, who conducts ‘a cost-benefit analysis’ and ‘measures his group’s 
capabilities to sustain the effort.’ The experience of terror thus produces a self-destructive 
irrationality in the audience. If terror is understood as dangerous precisely because it yields an 
irrational crowd, it seems plausible that the assumed norm would be the opposite; a rational 
individual, the singular symbolically-constituted subject that is the ideal of a phallic economy. 
Terror, it seems, is the sensation that unravels the phallically-formed subject. 
 This presumption becomes more explicit in the few instances where the experience of 
terror is actually examined in terrorism research. Berry provides us with five models of why 
terrorism would be successful, all expressed in terms of the response of an impersonal ‘target’, 
until we reach the last scenario, in which a lack of certainty ‘in his or her convictions’ (which 
remain unspecified) may lead the target to give in to terrorist demands. An unstable 
investment in one’s culture, in other words, makes terror an efficacious emotion for the 
attackers. Flynn examines the victim’s experience of terrorism without direct contact with the 
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subjects themselves. Instead, he uses Weiss’s notion of ‘idiocide’ to explain the sensation of 
terror: 
There is a denial of status when an individual is brought down or kept from the 
position he normally or rightfully occupies, turning him into a victim . . . thereby 
making his promise meaningless . . . Where a loss in status precludes the carrying out 
of some role, a loss in stature affects an individual as a single unit. Starvation, torture 
and murder have it as an inescapable consequence. Indeed, every means of human 
destruction . . . is inevitably idiocidal, radically reducing the stature of an individual, 
making him less than a human can be and should be.185 
 
For Flynn and Weiss, then, the sensation of terror involves bringing the subject down, pulling 
them earthwards and out of the symbolic order as the vulnerability of the body is exploited. To 
be violently reminded of one’s material nature makes the overtly male subject somehow less 
than human. The sensation of terror, thus, is understood as that which threatens the ideal of 
the phallically-constituted subject, attacking its conviction, its stature, and its individuality. 
 Nowhere does it become clearer that the terrorised subject constructed by our 
epistemology of terrorism is in its normative state the rational, singular, disembodied subject 
of the phallic-masculine than in the position women occupy within these discourses. This 
begins to manifest itself in the persistent and widespread linguistic tick when talking about the 
victims of terrorism, as studies and news reports qualify the numbers as “including X number 
of women and Y number of children.” When terrorist atrocity targets civilian populations, and 
terrorism discourses themselves understand terror as that which arises in the masses, why is it 
that such qualifications are needed? The overt intent is frequently emotive, as Burleigh 
demonstrates when he tells us ‘[f]ive of the passengers were killed, including a young woman 
on her way to her wedding.’186Again, Schlesinger et al. argue that ‘television like the press 
tends to focus on those victims who are most vulnerable and innocent: women, children and 
animals,’187 in order to instil a sense of outrage at such violence in the audience. Yet the use of 
non-masculine subjects to engender emotional response is indicative of the fact that these 
subjects are in fact ‘exceptions’ that need locating within the narrative of terrorism. For as 
terrorism discourses install the phallic-masculine as the norm, the presence of others within 
terrorism becomes inexplicable. Indeed, their presence is emblematic of the obscenity of 
terrorist violence: 
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Like other warriors, terrorists recognized innocents – people not involved in conflict. 
Terrorists usually excluded women, children, and the elderly from target lists . . . By 
the early twentieth century, terrorists began to attack people previously considered 
innocents to generate political pressure.188 
 
The willingness to bring the non-masculine into terrorism marks the descent from 
warrior to monster. Installing the phallic-masculine as the normative subject thus produces a 
hierarchy of innocence, in which some subjects become even more illegitimate targets than 
others. Such a hierarchy implies that attacking the non-masculine is a particularly powerful 
strategy for disturbing the subjective norm, for producing symbolic consequences across a 
culture. By marking the non-masculine as innocent and out-of-bounds in legitimate violence, 
can we not read terrorism discourses as claiming this territory as their own? For as we have 
seen, the non-masculine subject/object is the very space that establishes the contours of the 
phallic-masculine subject. Terrorist violence exploits this dependence, targeting the non-
masculine to challenge the phallic subject, appropriating the ground upon which the phallic 
symbolic rests for its own purposes. Thus, the epistemology of terrorism must view the non-
masculine as an exceptional target, the illegitimate target of an already illegitimate violence, in 
order to repress the recognition that the phallic-subject relies absolutely on the appropriation 
of the non-phallic. In essence, as the phallic-masculine is posited as the terrorised subject, the 
non-masculine target becomes illegitimate twice-over to secure its primacy. 
 If the phallic symbolic renders the non-masculine as exceptional in order to stabilise its 
umbilical relation to the world, this suggests that the greatest threat to this stability will 
emerge when this repressed ground itself perpetrates the violence. To put it another way, it is 
when the non-masculine decides to exploit the forgotten flesh in order to bring about symbolic 
consequences that the phallic-masculine is put under greatest pressure. It is little wonder, 
then, that women’s turn to terrorism comes to represent a particularly profane form of 
illegitimate violence: 
Faced with a truly horrible terrorist act – a pretty young woman with a bomb strapped 
to her body walks into a crowd of happy teenagers waiting for a bus and blows herself 
and several other pretty young women into a bloody mass of gore – it is tempting to 
see terrorism as a manifestation of pure evil.189 
 
In a discourse concerned with defining and explaining the use of exceptional, illegitimate 
violence, women’s aggression is somehow even more excessive, more problematic, more 
aberrant. As we shall explore in detail in Chapter 2, the exceptional status accorded to 
women’s terrorism means that it is deemed as requiring special scrutiny, particular 
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explanation, an epistemology all of its own, as it cannot be accounted for in the normative 
modelling of the terrorist, or of women. Suffice to say for now, that Burleigh sums up the 
prevalent trend in the treatment of women’s violence as he repeatedly characterises the 
female terrorist as someone ‘who had followed her boyfriend . . . into terrorism,’190 regardless 
of the specific historical or social context he is addressing. The figure of the female terrorist is 
always absorbed back into the phallic economy, as the influence of the men around her is 
brought to the fore. In this regard, the Suffragette movement becomes a conspicuous absence 
in terrorism studies. In their own historical moment, many of the actions taken by these 
women were considered terrorist, and yet the histories and case studies that make up 
terrorism studies rarely, if ever, make reference to their activities. This cannot simply be 
because we now read their cause as justified, for the anti-apartheid activities of the African 
National Congress in South Africa consistently appear across the discourse, testifying to the 
complexities of defining terrorism. Could it be, rather, that this forgetting is emblematic of the 
desire to leave women outside of terrorism discourses altogether? 
  
The Ethical Interruption of Terrorism Discourses 
The epistemology of terrorism, it seems, constructs the phallic-masculine as its a priori 
subject. Responses founded on such discourses will always work to maintain this ideal of 
subjectivity, meaning that when government and nations pursue counter-terrorist policies on 
behalf of their terrorised citizens, they simultaneously reinforce the security of the phallic-
masculine. In a very real sense, the entire concept of terrorism relies on the phallic 
construction of masculinity. Terrorist violence is assumed to have symbolic power through its 
exploitation of the phallic’s fleshy origins and the audience is presumed to be terrorised as 
they are taken to be representative of such a subjectivity. The concept of terrorism is therefore 
grounded in a phallic repression of the body. In this light, the absence of a scrutinised concept 
of terror is not an oversight: it is a necessity. If we read terrorism as the collision of the 
symbolic and its forgotten flesh, the idea that there is a universal experience of terror becomes 
impossible, for the phallic-masculine and the repressed feminine occupy different positions in 
relation to both. For an awful instant, the phallic-masculine becomes aware of its own missing 
body, while the feminine strains against its silence and feels its phallically-designated 
immanence. This is not to straightforwardly suggest that men and women will have specific, 
recognisable experiences of terror, but rather that our relationship to our bodies, which are by 
no means homogenous, plays a crucial part in how we experience terror. It is this possibility 
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that is ruled out as we are merged into a terrorised audience, a merging that forecloses any 
recognition that, instead of being containers for our consciousness, we are in fact coincident 
with our bodies, that ‘the boundary of the containing body might be skin, while passing 
through the mucous membranes, and through the body and the flesh.’191 The idea that our 
bodies are the means through which we perceive the world, and that the environment they 
inhabit will influence those perceptions threatens to undermine the very notion of terror and 
with it, terrorism. For if we acknowledge that those actions labelled as terrorist do not have a 
universal, uniform effect, it becomes impossible to produce even the most basic definition of 
terrorism – that which terrorises. Embodying the experience of terror unravels the concept of 
terrorism as something universally recognisable, dangerous, useful, and as such, questions the 
validity of elevating these actions to anything other than criminal. Forgetting the body and 
leaving the experience of terror unexamined becomes crucial in maintaining the integrity of 
the phallic subject, at both the level of the conscious and unconscious. Keeping the body at 
bay becomes pivotal in giving the symbolic and its institutions license to act against that which 
threatens it. 
When attempting to formulate an ethical response to terrorism, we must therefore be 
careful not to replicate the disavowal of the body that facilitates the concept of terrorism. Any 
such forgetting of our materiality in favour of abstracted notions of identity risks remaining 
within the same conceptual framework, rather than providing us with an alternative approach. 
Arguably, it is this that leads Hegel into difficulties as he grapples with the implications of The 
Terror’s bloody realisation of Enlightenment values in The Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, 
widely recognised as the first philosopher to tackle terrorism as we have come to understand 
it today,192 The Terror had its roots in the marriage of a Kantian morality that views thought as 
superior to the material and a utilitarian mode of thought that regards all consciousness as 
useful.193 Such a match means there is nothing to prevent the use of violence in realising 
abstract ideals in concrete reality. As Kain notes, Hegel has a certain admiration for the French 
Revolution as a rational idea translated into a social reality,194 yet the bloody nature of The 
Terror troubles him. He argues that this violence arose from the Revolution’s grounding in 
Rousseau’s ideal of a factionless, universal government, for demanding that each citizen put 
personal interest aside in the name of a universal good not only reduces the agency of 
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governance to the solely negative mode of disposing of those unwilling to make such a 
sacrifice, it simultaneously drains each individual life of meaning. For Hegel, then: 
The sole work and deed of absolute freedom is therefore death, a death too which has 
no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely 
free self. It is the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no more significance than 
cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water. 195 
 
For Hegel, The Terror is the realisation of rational values without an awareness of the 
transcendental. To prevent the reduction of the meaning of the individual human life to nil, he 
argues for what van der Luft characterises as ‘the mediating influence or humanising counsel 
of deep faith.’196 Faith in an absolute other comes to secure the significance of each individual 
life, as understanding ourselves as expressions of an absolute whole allows us to accept that 
each human life is working towards a universal good. Turning to the transcendental, then, 
becomes the means through which we prevent life becoming merely ‘useful’, while at the 
same time guaranteeing individual freedom.  
 This turn to the transcendental as guarantor explicitly mirrors the phallic turn away 
from its material origins to find its ideal reflected back in the face of God. Hegel does not seem 
to acknowledge that identification with an absolute other can facilitate the reduction of 
human life in much the same way as Rousseau’s social contract does in his eyes, for if the 
transcendental acts as guarantor, what is to prevent the colonising of that abstract space by a 
specific concept of the universal? Indeed, it is precisely the attempt to assert mastery over the 
transcendental that has characterised terrorism discourses in the twenty-first century. Thus it 
is perhaps no surprise that we find Habermas calling for ‘a strict universalism in which the 
same respect is demanded for everyone.’197 Speaking in the months after the September 11th 
attacks, Habermas argues that rational progress towards a universal good is achieved by 
ensuring the participation of a multitude of voices in open dialogue. In such a dialogue ‘people 
must, step by step, widen their original perspectives, and ultimately bring them together.’198 
They do so by a process of ‘mutual perspective-taking’, whereby each one in turn becomes the 
speaker or the listener.199 Through such an engagement, it is possible to ‘develop a common 
horizon of background assumptions in which both sides accomplish an interpretation that is 
not ethnocentrically adopted or converted but, rather, intersubjectively shared.’200 In other 
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words, such a dialogue permits difference to be overwritten in favour of finding a universal set 
of values, which then become the horizon for all cultures. Habermas thus argues that terrorist 
violence arises as this communicative action fails or is no longer possible. As such, he locates 
the September 11th attacks as resulting from the crumbling of global communication. For 
Habermas, the speed of mass communication coincides with the shutting down of 
communicative action, the increasing disparity between the richest and poorest populations, 
and the rejection of modernity’s cultural relativism by Islamic theocracies, producing an overall 
breakdown of worldwide communication. The only way to revive this collapsed communicative 
sphere, in Habermas’ view, is to insist that every citizen in the West adheres to a constitution 
that installs a universal equality, so that minority voices can change the ‘self-understanding’ of 
the majority. Ultimately, Habermas calls for a universalism with the potential for a ‘self-
correcting learning process.’201 
For Habermas, overcoming violence is a matter of overwriting difference, as subject 
and other find a common horizon. Yet the possibility of establishing such a universal horizon 
works against the material reality of our bodies. It implies that we can – and should – 
overcome or forget physical difference, be it morphological, sexual, racial, as we strive to 
better humanity. Habermas’ humanity is one that forgets its material nature once again. It is 
faith in the abstract, in the power of communication alone that secures the recognition of the 
minority, of the other. But as we have seen, relying on such abstraction facilitates the 
forgetting of the other. Habermas recognises this, and as such demands a stricter adherence 
the values of equality already present in our culture to ensure that the other’s voice is heard. 
In this respect, Habermas mirrors the gesture of terrorism discourses, as he re-asserts the 
power of our current symbolic economy. Indeed, even his rhetoric demonstrates this shared 
ground, as his reading of terrorism is peppered with the conventional definitions and 
epistemological assumptions that we see in terrorism studies. Habermas’ mutual horizon is 
thus always already colonised by the concept of equality, one that emerges from within our 
current culture. If recognition is guaranteed by the abstract, therefore, the other is always 
already constituted in terms that arise in our symbolic before we have even reached that 
horizon.  
Habermas’ approach thus remains within the logic of the culture in which he is trying 
to intervene. His ethical gesture constructs the space allotted for the other already present in 
our symbolic economy, as Irigaray argues: 
If our hospitality confines itself to offering a place or a room for guests, it is because 
we are not yet able to do better. We offer to the other that which we unconsciously 
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reserve for ourselves: an enclosed space partly defined around a void. The place that 
we give to the other in fact amounts to a representation of the place that we ourselves 
occupy – a space apparently open in a closed world.202 
 
Yet it is precisely such a horizon or space that we are attempting to open-up as we disrupt 
existing epistemological approaches, in order that the other can be heard. How do we ensure 
that we have not pre-figured this mutual horizon before we have encountered the other? For 
Irigaray, cultivating the understanding that we are all embodied subjects is the only means of 
securing such an ethical encounter. Becoming aware of both ourselves and others as 
corporeal subjects is to approach the other with the realisation ‘[f]or me, an incarnate subject, 
you are an incarnate subject.’203 By acknowledging that we are coincident with our bodies, we 
recognise that our perceptual horizons are limited and shaped by our materiality and as such, 
we can only know the world and the other through our bodies. Our bodies locate us in space 
and time in such a way that the possibility of colonising the other with projections of our own 
subjectivity is fundamentally undermined. Instead, when we meet with the other, we 
understand they are a ‘”you who are not and will never be me or mine,” you are transcendent 
to me in body and in words, in so far as you are an incarnation that cannot be appropriated by 
me, lest I should suffer the alienation of my freedom.’204 For Irigaray, then, it is the cultivation 
of material difference, not the disavowal of it, that opens up the possibility of an ethical 
encounter with the other. For as embodied subjects, the encounter is no longer constituted by 
abstract concepts, but is shaped by a metaphysics of ‘reciprocity in touching-being touched’, 
as each reaches out to the other with an awareness of their own limitations and the 
irreducibility of the other thanks to their corporeal nature. As Hirsh notes, this means that the 
meeting with the other always resembles the psychoanalytic encounter,205 for each subject 
speaks from their position in the world, and the other recognises that their words are imbued 
with meaning specific to that relation. By this exchange of terms, by listening to the meaning 
each word or gesture holds for the other, the two approach a mutual horizon, generating a 
new meaning between the two. Thus, to approach the other as incarnate becomes a process 
in which we ‘find gestures or words which will touch the other in his, or her, alterity.’206 
 To meet with the other in an ethical way in Irigarayan terms, then, is to enact a radical 
suspension of preconceived ideas and meanings. In his analysis of the September 11th attacks, 
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Derrida proposes a similarly radical ethical approach. He first argues that ‘the prevailing 
discourse, that of the media of the official rhetoric, relies too readily on received concepts like 
“war” and “terrorism”’,207before moving on to suggest, like Žižek, that characterising the 
attacks as a ‘major event’ ignores the fact the possibility of such an atrocity was already within 
our culture’s horizon, as part of a systemic auto-immune pervertability. Thus, he goes on to 
deconstruct the impressions of the event that the ‘organized information machine’ of the 
media, political rhetoric, and the language of terrorism discourses produce. The resulting 
analysis has clear parallels with the critique an Irigarayan reading of terrorism has produced 
thus far. Where a Derridian and Irigarayan approach diverge, however, is in the ethical 
interventions their work makes possible. Like Irigaray, Derrida questions our current 
conception of hospitality and tolerance, claiming that ‘[w]e offer hospitality only on the 
condition that the other follow our rules, our way of life, even our language, our culture, our 
political system, and so on.’208 This limited, regulated form of hospitality provides only a 
paternalistic, colonised space for the other and does amount to a meeting with the other. 
Rather, Derrida argues: 
Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to 
someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely 
foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly 
other. 209 
 
Pure hospitality thus involves laying oneself open to the absolutely other, rather than setting 
up the conditions for its arrival. It is therefore beyond the realms of legislation and discourse. 
But as Derrida notes, unless one is located within some form of symbolic system, such 
hospitality becomes impossible, for there would be nothing to lay open in the hospitable 
gesture: 
I cannot open the door, I cannot expose myself to the coming of the other and offer 
him or her anything whatsoever without making this hospitality effective, without, in 
some concrete way, giving something determinate. This determination will thus have 
to re-inscribe the unconditional into certain conditions. Otherwise, it gives nothing.210 
 
Derrida thus leaves us with a paradoxical model of hospitality, a welcoming of the other that 
he is never sure can be ethical. 
 It is here we find the crucial difference between the ways in which Derrida and Irigaray 
formulate the radical welcoming of the other. For while Derrida envisages meeting the other 
                                                          
207
 Derrida in Borradori, Time of Terror, 100. 
208
 Ibid., 128. 
209
 Ibid., 129 Italics in original. 
210
 Ibid. Italics in original. 
70 
 
within some form of cultural system, Irigaray insists on the material reality of opening the door 
to meet them: 
The place of the meeting cannot be merely ecstatic with respect to our real 
surroundings, nor can it reduce itself to a sensible immediacy. In the words that each 
tries to say to the other, or that are said of the other, the bodies and the earthly 
dwelling where they live must resonate. No word can reach the rhythm, even less the 
melody, allowing one to approach the other – outside oneself or within oneself – if it 
comes from an already existing discourse.211 
  
The meeting with the other takes place in a specific context, and as such, when each suspends 
their preconceptions and pre-established meanings, it is this shared space that acts as the 
concrete determinant, preventing each subject reducing the other to their own terms. This 
pivotal difference between Derrida and Irigaray’s ethical formulation arises thanks to Derrida’s 
forgetting of the body. For Derrida, the other represents the irreducible horizon of our culture, 
identity, subjectivity, just as it does for Irigaray. But for Irigaray, our current culture does not 
even have access to such a horizon. Unlike Derrida, Irigaray argues there is no space for 
difference in our symbolic economy, thanks to the disavowal of sexual difference. For in a 
phallic symbolic, everything is always reduced to the logic of the same, the I and not-I, the 
positive and negative elements of a singular ideal. As such, our culture can only become 
capable of recognising difference if we first acknowledge the reality of sexual difference: 
Not accepting and respecting this permanent duality between the two human 
subjects, the feminine one and the masculine one, amounts to preventing one of the 
two – historically the feminine – from attaining its own Being, and thus from taking 
charge of becoming what it already is and of the world to which it belongs, including as 
made up of other humans, similar or different.212 
 
By foreclosing the possibility of sexual difference, the phallic symbolic shuts down any 
recognition of difference, reducing all differences to its own terms. Thus, although some have 
questioned the primacy Irigaray places on sexual difference, as opposed to racial, cultural, 
class, religious differences, if one accepts that our symbolic is constituted by the phallus, it 
follows that our current concepts of these forms of difference are also phallically-constructed. 
Similarly, as Deutscher argues that as Irigaray addresses such differences, she demonstrates 
that ‘sexual difference is not, per se, our cultural goal. Instead, our goal is a culture that values 
and lives well with difference . . . sexual difference takes on the status of the means to this 
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end,’213 she inserts an artificial divide between Irigaray’s earliest work on sexual difference and 
her more recent attempts to apply her insights to present-day contexts. 
 For it is only by fully recognising that human life is created thanks to sexual difference 
that we can acknowledge the role of the maternal body in engendering our subjectivity. Only 
by acknowledging the maternal world as the one we first inhabit are we able to embrace our 
material existence, and in doing so, become aware of the limits and obligations that such a 
physicality imposes on us. By recognising the irreducible difference between men and women, 
and actively cultivating our sexuate identities with respect for that difference, we do more 
than reduce both sexes to their biology. We develop a subjectivity, a means of expression, a 
relation to the world appropriate to each one, instead of submitting all to the logic of 
sameness. Man and woman have their own relationship to the world, and even to the divine 
through their own transcendental experience, and neither must reduce the other to the logic 
that is appropriate only to themselves. The cultivation of sexual difference inscribes our 
material presence in corresponding symbolics in such a way that that difference is preserved, 
allocating each subject a personal autonomy that means we no longer need to make use of 
the other, of the world, and even of nature, to mark the borders of our identities. As bodies 
inhabiting the world, the environment we cohabit comes to stand as a third difference, one in 
which we can meet the other as other:  
It appears then that the real exists as at least three: a real corresponding to the 
masculine subject, a real corresponding to the feminine subject, and a real 
corresponding to their relation. These three reals thus each correspond to a world but 
these three worlds are in interaction. They never appear as proper in the sense of 
independent of each other. And when they claim to do this, they neglect one of the 
three reals, which distorts the whole.214  
 
In recognising and cultivating our incarnate identities and understanding that each subject has 
a specific relation to the world that cannot be reduced to our own terms, Irigaray argues that 
we reach what she describes as the sensible transcendental, for when we no longer make use 
of the other, transcendence is ‘no longer ecstasy, leaving the self for an inaccessibly absolutely 
other, beyond sensibility, beyond the earth. It is respect for the other whom I will never be, 
who is transcendent to me and to whom I am transcendent.’215 As embodied subjects, then, 
we become capable of overcoming the violence inherent in our present culture: 
Between us a transcendence always subsists, not as an abstraction or a construct, a 
fabrication of the same to ground its origin or to measure its development, but as the 
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resistance of a concrete and ideational identity. I will never be you, either in body or in 
thought.216  
 
It is through embracing our material presence and allowing each sex to cultivate a 
symbolic appropriate to its own relation to the world that difference can enter our culture 
without us colonising the space in which we meet with other. Moreover, it is by recognising 
the horizontal transcendence that exists between us, thanks to our irreducible subjectivity, 
that we can create a culture that no longer relies on the violence of the umbilical relation, on 
the reduction of the other and the material to a nourishing ground for our sense of identity. 
For once we have come to understand each other as irreducibly incarnate we can no longer 
reduce the other to our own stereotypes, reduce them to a representation within our 
symbolic: ‘[t]he other in us must remain flesh, living, moving. Not transformed into some idea, 
no matter how ideal. Not reduced to some sleep, more or less lethal.’217 Cultivating the 
sensible transcendental, therefore, means the other is never again at our disposal. 
 Reading terrorism through Luce Irigaray suggests the failure to recognise the body and 
sexual difference constitutes the common ground between terrorism discourses and our 
philosophical attempts to formulate an ethical approach that can disrupt the cycle of violence. 
Yet Irigaray’s ethics of the sensible transcendental is in itself problematic when we are 
considering terrorism. For Irigaray herself does not specifically address how such an approach 
will work when we are confronted by a hostile other. Moreover, if the body is precisely that 
which is exploited by terrorism, is there not a sense in which the terrorist is reading the other 
as incarnate? Similarly, if the body’s presence is disavowed in terrorism studies because it 
threatens to unravel the symbolic’s authority, does this not suggest that terrorism is a violent 
moment in which we become aware of ourselves as embodied subjects? Does this mean that 
an awareness of the sensible transcendental can be engendered through violence rather than 
in a mutual recognition of each other’s irreducible presence? It is with these questions in mind 
that we turn to literary representations of terrorism, to examine the extent to which the 
cultural spaces in which we play with the umbilical ties between the symbolic and its 
grounding share or rethink the assumptions that allow terrorism discourses to unfold. 
Specifically, if it is the sexuate body that constitutes the forgotten ground of both terrorism 
discourses and our philosophical thinking, it is looking at the role of the body and of sexuate 
identity in literary figurings of terrorism that can perhaps help us critique our existing culture, 
opening up new possibilities for thinking about terrorism. In other words, can literary 
representations of the body help us formulate a way in which to cultivate Irigaray’s sensible 
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transcendental in the face of violence? In order to begin to answer this question, it is first 
necessary to understand how the forgetting of difference situates women in relation to 
terrorism discourses, and it is to this we now turn. 
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Chapter 2: Embodying the Terrorist Other 
 
Analysing terrorism discourses through an Irigarayan lens may have provided us with a neat 
means of accounting for the methodological quirks and conceptual quagmires that prevail 
throughout the discipline. But adopting an Irigarayan approach in order to reframe the 
concept of terrorism immediately presents us with two significant problems. Firstly, if our 
flesh-and-blood bodies are precisely that which terrorism exploits in order to induce symbolic 
consequences, does recognising ourselves as embodied subjects necessarily lead to a cessation 
of violence? Is there not a sense in which terrorism already understands us as embodied and 
makes use of that very fact? Secondly, if terrorism discourses are working to stabilise a phallic 
economy, does this not suggest that there will be very real repercussions for women as 
counter-terrorist policies start to take centre-stage in national and international politics? Have 
such repercussions actually manifested themselves in our daily life, or does their absence 
imply that such discourses imply that terrorism is in fact a gender-neutral concept? 
 A chorus of voices have already begun to address these questions, testifying to the 
damage inflicted on countless women’s lives as a direct result of counter-terrorist actions and 
policies. Collections such as Terror, Counter-Terror: Women Speak Out bring together first-
hand accounts from women across the globe, to illustrate that while the post-September 11th 
counter-terrorist policies clearly had the most brutal impact on the lives of women in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, there were economic, political, and ethical consequences for women 
everywhere.218 Similarly, in works such as W Stands for Women, contributions from men and 
women describe how the Bush Administration merged gender politics and national security 
issues in such a way as to equate security with conservative sexual ideals.219 But while these 
critiques analyse the political fall-out of September 11th, 2001, feminist author and journalist 
Susan Faludi was made aware that terrorism could be read as having a very specific connection 
to the status of women at home as well as abroad on the day itself. A few hours after the 
attacks, she received a call from a male journalist, who proclaimed in ‘a bizarrely gleeful tone: 
“Well, this sure pushes feminism off the map!”’220 This was the first in a wave of media 
proclamations across the U.S. that stated the terrorist atrocities had ‘sounded the death knell 
of feminism.’221 As Faludi records: 
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In light of the national tragedy, the women’s movement had proved itself, as we were 
variously informed, “parochial,” “frivolous,” and “an unaffordable luxury” that had 
now “met its Waterloo.” The terrorist assault had levied “a blow to feminism,” or, as a 
head-line on the op-ed of the Houston Chronicle pithily put it, “No Place for Feminist 
Victims in Post 9-11 America.” 
“The feminist movement, already at a low ebb, has slid further into 
irrelevancy, “syndicated columnist Cathy Young asserted. “Now that the peaceful life 
can no longer be guaranteed,” military historian Martin van Creveld declared in 
Newsday, “one of the principal losers is likely to be feminism, which is based partly on 
the false belief that the average woman is as able to defend herself as the average 
man.”222 
 
For Faludi, these claims are part of a wider-reaching presumption that the rise of feminism and 
an attendant logic of equality have somehow rendered the U.S. vulnerable to terrorist attack, 
as society is gradually ‘feminised.’ Indeed, van Creveld’s statement captures the sense in which 
feminism is innately connected to women’s physicality and, as such, will confer the 
vulnerabilities of the female body onto those who embrace it. Thus, the logic goes that at a 
time when strength is required, feminism must dutifully fall to the wayside, a political brush- 
off Faludi describes as a “not now, honey, we’re at war” attitude.223  
 What this outpouring of media opinion brings to the surface is an unarticulated 
supposition that feminism is a unified entity whose existence is secured by masculine might. 
Feminism is a privilege, a luxury, a frivolous notion that women are permitted to indulge in at 
times of peace, but must be willing to give up when a nation is required to take an aggressive 
stance in order to maintain that peace. In other words, a stable phallic economy is happy to 
accommodate feminism when it takes the form of a demand for universal equality. For 
Irigaray, this is because such demands enhance the overwriting of sexual difference, providing 
women with ‘a chance to live freely’ only insofar as they ‘are forced to subject themselves to 
men’s means of production and enhance their capital or sociocultural inheritance.’224 Indeed, 
Irigaray refuses to identify her work with the term “feminism”, precisely because many 
feminist movements have taken the call for equality as the central aim. Moreover, Irigaray 
argues that once an interventional gesture has become an “-ism”, its capacity to induce change 
becomes drastically limited, as it is reduced to a stereotype by the symbolic economy, a 
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concept which can be readily defined and absorbed into its structure.225  The extent to which 
feminism had been rendered toothless when reduced to a stereotypical call for equality was 
revealed as the phallic economy came under attack. For as Faludi’s book records, when people 
responded to the attacks by reaffirming the consistency and superiority of the culture that 
constitutes their subjectivity, it was the assumption that feminism claims men and women 
were equals that suddenly made it ridiculous. Faced with the spectacle of ferocious violence, it 
seemed that politics were defined by one’s physical capacity to respond to such aggression. In 
this argument, women’s bodies are explicitly inscribed as the non-masculine, the “less-than-
ideal” subject, lacking the strength to respond defensively. To see feminism as anything other 
than a form of political pin-money, doled out to pampered women in a society protected and 
patrolled by male power is to delude oneself into thinking women are as physically capable of 
defending themselves as men. As such, the interventions feminism(s) make in political, social, 
and cultural spheres are dismissed as parochial and unimportant, as they are facilitated 
entirely by the masculine’s guardianship. 
Women’s capacity to participate in any arena beyond their immediate context is thus 
explicitly limited by their own physicality, while the masculine is perceived as able to act in 
national and international spheres. Women and the feminine are explicitly positioned in a 
relation of immanence, thanks to their materiality, while the disembodied phallic-masculine 
transcends the limitations of his environment to engage with the world on a global level, be it 
through political discourse or military might. Moreover, these overarching global channels are 
seen as the vectors through which serious participation in the world takes place; the local and 
the located are dismissed as parochial. In essence, woman becomes a political irrelevance 
thanks to her non-phallic body, and she only achieves recognition insofar as she is willing to 
adopt the phallic identity as her own.226 The strange equation of the rise of terrorism with the 
decline of feminism that Faludi documents seems to suggest that calling for an embodied 
subjectivity as a means of articulating an alternative approach to terror risks consigning 
women to further immanence and irrelevance. Isn’t the problem precisely that women are 
already understood as embodied subjects? 
In this context, the figure of the female terrorist commands a particular fascination for 
terrorism discourses. As women engaged in violence that is specifically aimed to affect a wider 
audience, women terrorists present our cultural economy with a paradox: their bodies should 
align women with the silent ground that subtends the symbolic, and yet, they make use of the 
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very materiality that should consign them to immanence. These are women willing to exploit 
the material world for their own ends, rather than accepting their position as representative of 
and coincident with that world. They are embodied subjects, donning the authority of the 
phallic-symbolic over the material and as such, present terrorism discourses with a unique 
problem: how does one assert the authority of the symbolic over the material, when the 
material itself is appropriating the authority of the symbolic? In this chapter, we first of all 
examine how the figure of the woman terrorist is dealt with in terrorism studies, as we critique 
the burgeoning field of ‘women and terrorism’ research that has come to prominence in the 
post-September 11th climate. Having established how the female terrorist is absorbed into the 
wider epistemology of terrorism, we then turn to two pre-September 11th novels, Nadine 
Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter (1979) and Doris Lessing’s The Good Terrorist (1985) in which 
women protagonists turn to some form of insurgency. As we shall see, in each of these novels, 
women’s embodiment is rethought as a space of resistance, rather than a disabling 
immanence. This resistant space allows both Gordimer and Lessing to cast an ironic light on 
specific socio-historical contexts and to critique the appropriative logic that supports the 
epistemology of terrorism. By comparing these earlier figurings of the woman 
terrorist/freedom-fighter with the dominant modelling of the female terrorist today, we can 
ask what, if any, avenues of thought have been shut down in the contemporary moment? To 
put it another way, what happens to women’s capacity to participate as subjects in the world 
around them when terrorism discourses enter the global arena?  
An Epistemology of Female Violence  
 Despite the fact that terrorism studies ostensibly work to bring disparate acts of 
violence into a shared analytical framework, there is one class of perpetrator that is deemed as 
warranting classification as a subset within this epistemology. This is not a class defined by 
their political, religious, or ideological aims, by their methods, or by dint of a mutual 
geographical or even historical context. Somewhat paradoxically within a discourse that strives 
to ensure its principle object of study remains formless by repressing its material nature, 
women are considered as a specific type of terrorist within terrorism studies, by virtue of their 
sex alone. In the last decade, this subset has expanded rapidly, as a growing canon of books 
and articles exclusively address the issue of ‘Women and Terrorism’.227 Indeed, this sense that 
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women’s participation in terrorism merits particular attention was encapsulated in 2005 as 
one of the leading journals in the field, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, dedicated a special 
issue to exploring women’s terrorist and militant actions. Given that this is a publication 
devoted to research on different forms of violence and conflict, the ring-fencing of women’s 
aggression in a special issue is indicative of its perceived exceptional status. Victor is not alone, 
then, when she tells us that the woman terrorist is ‘a very special kind’ of terrorist.228 
 Just how exceptional a creature the woman terrorist is becomes apparent when one 
realises that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ only enter the lexicon of terrorism’s epistemology 
when her presence makes them necessary. For example, it is rare for terrorism studies to 
specify that they intend to look at men and terrorism, or at masculine militancy. As Brown 
argues in her critical analysis of how Muslim women’s suicide terrorism is interpreted in 
Western discourses, ‘men’s participation in political violence is assumed and taken for 
granted’229 to the extent that terrorism and violence are implicitly associated with male actors. 
Similarly, in looking at the international legal ramifications of September 11th, 2001, 
Charlesworth and Chinkin note that when discussing terrorism, ‘sex remains unexceptional and 
unmarked if it is the male sex’ who has perpetrated the violence, as male violence is 
understood as the norm.230 The strength of this presumption comes to the fore in one of the 
rare instances in which a study places male and female terrorists alongside one another, Karen 
Jacques and Paul Taylor’s article, ‘Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different 
Reasons?’231 While the title of the article suggests that Jacques and Taylor are investigating 
whether differences in motivation can be legitimately mapped onto different sexual identities, 
it immediately becomes apparent that what the study is actually doing is providing an account 
of ‘the motivations and recruitment of female terrorists.’232They do so by ‘comparing the 
female cases to data on the motivations of male suicide terrorists . . . to begin to build up a 
picture of the unique personal motivations of female suicide terrorists.’233As such, their study 
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is structured by a series of hypotheses that explicitly locate female violence in relation to male 
violence: 
Compared to males, females will less often be . . .234 
Compared to males, females will be more . . .235 
 
Even when Jacques and Taylor anticipate there will be no difference in behaviour between the 
sexes, it is still necessary to understand the female by drawing comparison with the male: 
 
There will be no significant differences to the extent to which males and females are 
associated with . . .236  
 
Thus, although they elsewhere state that ‘males and females are equally capable of aggressive 
behaviour. . . they show no difference in their aggressive behaviour following a frustrating 
event’,237 it is clear from the questions that ground their research and the structure of their 
hypotheses that the authors are working within an epistemological framework that equates 
violence with masculinity. In taking male violence as the yardstick against which to analyse the 
female, Jacques and Taylor are following in a cultural tradition. For as people such as Ward and 
Neuburger demonstrate legal and epistemological systems all over the world interpret 
women’s violent or criminal behaviour ‘as a deviation from dominant male norms; female 
criminality is therefore defined by sociologists as a subculture.’238 
As Jacques and Taylor import explanations offered by existing material on (male) 
suicide bombings to construct an interpretative lens for female suicide attacks, they 
inadvertently unveil the gender bias present in the seemingly neutral terminology that 
permeates terrorism discourses. By bringing prior studies of apparently sexless individuals into 
contact with questions of gendered motivation, Jacques and Taylor accidently reveal how 
frequently their predecessors have silently equated words such as “terrorist”, “individual”, 
“extremist”, “group/organisation” and “identity” with men and masculinity. When Jacques and 
Taylor consider the possibility of women’s involvement in terrorism, it becomes necessary to 
assign each of these terms with a gendered qualifier. It is only when women enter the 
narrative that sex and gender become crucial distinctions, necessary for understanding violent 
behaviour. It seems that women’s terrorist activity is the one instance in which the 
epistemology of terrorism deems the body as a vital category. Rajan’s analysis of 
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representations of female suicide bombers in cultures across the globe supports this, as she 
finds that ‘[w]omen bombers, by and large, are represented in ways that highlight them first 
and foremost as women, in line with common social ideologies about women.’239 Be it in the 
media, in terrorist propaganda, or in political and academic discourses about terrorism, to talk 
about women suicide bombers is to talk about female behaviour. The apparent necessity for 
taking sex into account to explain female actions goes beyond discussions of the suicide 
bomber, as Neuburger found in her examination of sociological and criminological studies: 
Women . . . are determined by their biology. Their hormones, their reproductive role, 
necessarily determine their emotionality, childishness, deviousness, etc. These traits, 
in turn, characterise female crime. If crime can be explained in biological terms, any 
adequate explanation has to explain why female, but not male, biology determines 
deviant behaviour.240 
 
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the significance accorded to the body when women enter 
terrorism discourses is described in biological terms. ‘Female’ and ‘male’ describe the sexual 
characteristics of a subject or object, as opposed to the more nuanced, complex, and 
specifically human terms ‘woman’ and ‘man.’ Not only do the former carry connotations of 
‘natural’, instinctual or animalistic behaviour in the context of explaining human action, they 
also allot the terrorist the status of a gendered object, rather than serving as a genuine 
recognition that the person under observation has a sexuate identity. 
 This suggests that although the body enters the epistemological framework when 
women complicate the gender stereotypes of violence, terrorism studies still does not 
recognise or engage with sexual difference. Instead, the epistemology of terror constructs 
sexed objects, male and female terrorists, and reads the actions of each object through a 
culturally-constituted lens. Therefore, Jacques and Taylor make manifest the cultural 
assumptions that permeate terrorism discourses when they take male violence as the 
normative baseline against which female violence is the exception. Moreover, their study 
alerts us to the fact that women’s consignment to material immanence will cause problems for 
the epistemology of terrorism. For as Jacques and Taylor argue, whereas non-gendered studies 
of terrorism make claims such as ‘an individual’s psychological response to events and 
circumstances beyond their control’ motivates suicide terrorism, once women are taken into 
consideration, such statements become impossible as they do not take into account an 
‘equally important cited reason for female engagement . . . exploitation, whereby an 
organization or individual takes advantage of an individual’s specific circumstances to recruit a 
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suicide bomber.’241 When the male terrorist is presumed to be the norm, the epistemology of 
terrorism takes it as a given that certain combinations of circumstances and strains will lead 
men to deploy violence, and thus terrorism studies dedicate themselves to dissecting the 
cocktail of societal, economic, ideological, and psychological factors that result in such an 
eruption. However, when women enter the fray, there is no longer a clear passage from 
intention to action. Something about women’s terrorism resists and problematizes the 
explanations that account for the actions of their male counterparts. Rajan notes that this 
perceived resistance continues even when women suicide bombers have left testimonials 
articulating exactly ‘why they are planning to implode themselves; what they think about their 
freedom struggles, the war, the enemy, and even the leadership of their rebel movements and 
cultures; and what they hope will come of their missions.’242 For while the media, politicians, 
and terrorism researchers alike have little problem accepting that statements of intent 
released by terrorist organisations or individuals explain ‘normal’ terrorist violence, when 
women are involved, their words go unheeded. Instead, a woman’s attack elicits a wave of 
explanatory narratives on all sides of a conflict: 
Western nations tend to depict women bombers through common stereotypes of 
Third World women who are assumed to be victimized by Third World men and 
backward Third World cultures . . . In contrast, rebel nationalists produces images of 
women bombers to resonate with iconic cultural registers of femininity central to 
various anti-colonial nationalist movements in the colonial era, of women who 
sacrificed for and were loyal only to their cultures.243 
 
Thus, while global politics in the last decade has been shaped by the understanding that 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s statements explained their actions, it seems that women’s 
violence engenders a tussle for meaning, as different cultures attempt to insert such actions 
into their own agendas. Connections between statement and intent are immediately viewed as 
problematic when a woman is behind the detonator.  
 Can we not read this desire to inscribe ‘real’ motivations onto the figure of the female 
terrorist as arising from women’s culturally-designated state of immanence, her position as the 
fleshy other of the disembodied phallic-masculine? Understood as corresponding to phallic 
ideals of masculinity, the male terrorist is assumed to be accessible to the epistemological 
gaze. His material aggression is directed at bringing about change in the abstract, his 
motivations will correspond to abstract ideals, his subjectivity is reducible to the discrete 
categories of the epistemological framework. In a very real sense, the male terrorist is 
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constructed as the Other of a legitimate masculinity. Read as occupying the other side of the 
binary, however, the female terrorist is understood as embodied, as having a surface, as a 
physical object. Therefore, much like Freud’s dark continent and Lacan’s feminine-as-lack, she 
eludes the epistemological eye, it perceives her as an opaque object, whose materiality means 
that she cannot be penetrated. Rendered blind to her inner-workings thanks to her body, the 
epistemology must then provide its own explanation of woman’s actions, as it cannot discern 
the veracity of her claims by scrutinising their origins within her. The epistemology of terrorism 
thus reduces the woman terrorist to its construction of the female terrorist, ensuring her own 
words are ‘eclipsed by the hegemony of other representations about [her] within the same 
cultural space.’244 The female terrorist is thus always already the other of the terrorist Other.  
 In a very real sense then, the woman terrorist is a placed in a subaltern position within 
terrorism discourses, for as the other of the Other, she is located outside of the subject-Other 
binary and thus deprived of any capacity to act within that binary. Instead of her actions being 
understood in the terms she provides, the cultures around her inscribe her actions with terms 
they deem appropriate for her, inscriptions which Ness argues usually result in the ‘the 
portrayal of the female militant/terrorist as either passive victim or feminist warrior.’245 So 
established is her subaltern status within the epistemology of terrorism that even research 
which aims to excavate the woman terrorist from this doubly-subjugated position cannot 
entirely shake off its logic. For indeed, most investigations that focus solely on women’s 
participation in terrorism state the need to ‘work past gender stereotypes and begin to 
examine the conditions that really influence female violence.’246 But as Bloom’s statement 
suggests, while the intention in such studies is clearly to disrupt the overwriting of women’s 
violence with cultural stereotypes, they converge with established convention in assuming that 
there are ‘real’ influences hidden behind each woman’s action. Even studies which interview 
the women directly about the motivations behind their turn to terrorism and the causes their 
actions support rarely replicate the willingness of terrorism discourses to accept the male 
terrorist’s words as an accurate account.  
Jacques and Taylor’s research is an interesting case in point. They are plainly aware of 
the impact of gender-stereotyping on other people’s research and take steps to mitigate its 
effects in their own work. For example, they compensate for the fact that the majority of 
available data concerns male terrorism by creating a data set from information on 30 female 
and 30 male suicide bombers, unlike previous studies which include all available data. 
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Similarly, they reject the claims of prior research that women are more vulnerable than men to 
exploitation by terrorists groups as they suffer psychological trauma as a consequence of rape 
or relatives’ deaths. Jacques and Taylor argue instead that ‘when men and women endure the 
same living conditions . . . it is reasonable to assume that they suffer the loss of a loved one to 
a similar extent,’ and that ‘both sexes are open to exploitation.’247 Furthermore, they resist the 
conventional wisdom that women’s turn to terrorism is inherently connected to a demand for 
sexual equality or liberation, as ‘the present data showed no instances of this occurring as a 
motivation and it is therefore not explored as a motivational category.’248 Jacques and Taylor 
are thus patently alert to the presence of victim and feminist militant stereotypes in research 
on women’s violence. Yet despite this awareness, by taking male violence as the norm, Jacques 
and Taylor’s study installs the presumption that female terrorism is exceptional within its 
epistemological framework, and as such, their research is obligated to find the ‘real’ reason 
behind women’s violence, the distinctive trait that marks it as different to normal terrorism. 
From the outset of their article, it is plain where Jacques and Taylor presume this distinction to 
reside: 
where there is arguably less understanding of female involvement [in terrorism] is the 
personal level. How are females persuaded or recruited into extremism? What 
motivates them into carrying out an act of suicide terrorism?249 
 
Jacques and Taylor are not alone in presuming that the personal level is where 
women’s violent activism becomes distinct from men’s. As Victor sets out to interview the 
families, friends, and organisations connected to female suicide bombers, as well as failed 
suicide attackers, she tells us ‘it was crucial to understand the social environment that pushes 
these young women over the edge of personal despair.’250 Skaine argues that as ‘[w]omen are 
shaped by their personal circumstance,’251 we need an empathic, rather than purely historical, 
analytical approach to understand their actions.252 Dearing claims that women suicide 
bombers are ‘pressured by peers or driven by personal crisis,’ although some ‘are driven by 
what appear to be altruistic reasons.’253 In contrast, as Bloom examines the role women played 
in the Chechyen takeover of the Dubrovka theatre in 2002, she stresses that they participated 
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‘of their own free will but many had very personal motives for being there,’254 suggesting there 
is a necessary distinction between will and personal motivation. 
 Dearing’s suspicion of the ‘appearance’ of women’s motivations encapsulates the 
anxiety the figure of the female terrorist arouses within the epistemology of terrorism. As an 
embodied object, her motivations are never on open display, even when she tries to make her 
motivations explicit. The concept of the personal works to alleviate the anxiety her physicality 
causes, as it provides us with the epistemological tools to get beneath her obstinate skin. By 
locating woman’s motivations within her, as arising out of her state of immanence, it becomes 
possible to use her body as a means of discovering her true intent. Understanding women’s 
violence then becomes a process of interpreting her immanence, of unearthing personal 
histories to discover what brought about the recourse to terrorism. It is perhaps no surprise 
that such investigations repeatedly find deaths of family members and friends, rape and 
humiliation at the hands of occupying forces, and the traumatic witnessing of bloody violence 
in the lives of women who have turned to terrorism in conflict zones. Where no such violence 
exists, studies frequently find a charismatic male lover, a manipulative brother, or a woman 
who has failed to meet the demands made of her in a patriarchal society, because she has ‘an 
inability to bear children or may be pregnant’255 or because of ‘declining marriage 
prospects.’256 Rendered inscrutable by her embodied nature, women’s motivations are instead 
found in her immediate surroundings, embedded in her domestic sphere. 
 This is not to suggest that investigating personal histories is not a legitimate means for 
understanding the decision to turn to terrorism. Rather, it throws into stark relief the ways in 
which the personal is absent from the discourses of male violence. For even as Jacques and 
Taylor argue that men and women are similarly afflicted by loss, they maintain that it is still 
possible to distinguish between the personal and the political: 
Even women whose motivations for participation includes an ideological element are 
often found to hold dualistic personal and ideological motivations, rather than pure 
religious or nationalistic motives. Male motivations are more likely to be found in 
group membership . . . previous involvement in the conflict . . . and/or religious 
involvement . . . than personal involvement.257 
 
As Jacques and Taylor attempt to categorise motivations as ‘Religious/Nationalistic Reasons’, 
responses to ‘Key Events’, ‘Revenge’ and ‘Personal’, they bring to the fore the notions of 
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personal and political or pure motivations that permeate the discourses around terrorism. As 
they try to impose distinctions on the psychological responses to key events, the desire to 
avenge the death of a loved one, and personal motivations, Jacques and Taylor are attempting 
to draw a categorical divide between the personal and the political. Given that anger, despair, 
frustration, and trauma arguably permeate all these categories, what is it that constitutes a 
personal motivation? According to Jacques and Taylor, the personal involves low self-esteem, 
depression, isolation from society, shame and dishonour, and monetary problems.258 In other 
words, the personal consists of unhappiness within one’s immediate environment, rather than 
displeasure with the wider world. But what is it that makes this category of unhappiness 
somehow applicable to women but not to men? How is it that men can suffer the loss of a 
loved one and still be seen to have “pure” ideological intent, while for a women, the same loss 
renders her actions at best, an anomalous hybrid of impetus, and at worst, “purely” personal? 
 The answer lies in the fact that all such investigations rely on linguistic and textual 
sources to unveil the truth behind terrorist action. While Jacques and Taylor are as aware as 
Rajan that different cultures represent women’s terrorism in terms that coincide with their 
own stereotypes of femininity,259 their study mirrors the gesture of all such research in failing 
to recognise that individual subjects will similarly represent the world in their own terms. The 
possibility that, when explaining their actions in terms of nationalist feeling or family history, 
different subjects could in some way be describing the same motivation escapes the 
mechanisms of such studies. The epistemology of terrorism fails to acknowledge the findings 
of psychoanalytic and sociolinguistic research, findings that Irigaray’s own research supports, 
namely that ‘[m]an and woman do not generate language and structure discourses in the same 
way.’260 Irigaray’s analysis, in fact, anticipates the findings of research that concentrates on 
unearthing women’s motivations through their own testimonies and those of their immediate 
circle. For as we saw in Chapter 1, Irigaray posits that women speak in relational terms, from 
their own position in the present moment, addressing themselves directly to another subject. 
Men, on the other hand, take themselves to be the speaking subject, not addressing 
themselves to anyone in particular, and relate themselves to objects or abstract ideas 
associated with masculinity. For women, deprived of their own symbolic and positioned 
outside of the phallic economy, to speak in a phallic tongue is always a process of reaching out 
to a listener from a position of immanence while, for men, language is a means of establishing 
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their place in the world as a whole.261 It is perhaps little wonder then, that research into 
female terrorism consistently finds that ‘males were found to be more often motivated by 
religious/nationalistic factors compared to females, whereas females cited more revenge 
motivations and more personal reasons than men.’262 These conclusions rest entirely on the 
forgetting of difference, on the presumption that all subjects have equal, universal access to 
systems of representation. It is only such a priori assumptions that allow any deviation or 
difference in the language used to be read as indicative of an intentional production of 
meaning. 
 This is the key to why women’s violence in particular is vulnerable to ideological or 
cultural manipulation. For while authors such as Rajan, Neuburger, and Gonzalez-Perez have 
explored in detail the ways in which patriarchal cultures produce readings of women’s 
aggression that ‘support specific (often conservative) cultural ideologies about women,’263 they 
cannot account for what it is in women’s violent action that makes it so open to such 
appropriation. Neither can they explain why academic attempts that strive to dislodge these 
conservative stereotypes inevitably regurgitate them as the personal enters the epistemology 
of female terrorism. Thanks to her subaltern position within the discourse, a woman’s voice is 
heard but not listened to in a manner that acknowledges her specificity as a subject. Instead, 
her relation language is appropriated, inserted into pre-established notions of female 
embodiment, and thus heard as articulating ‘personal’ intent. Thus, when she tells us that the 
death of a loved one led her join a terrorist organisation, there is no recognition in 
interpretations of her actions that this loss is connected to the suffering of a community at 
large. It is precisely this disavowal of difference and stripping away of language’s capacity to 
express a multitude of meanings that supports the epistemological exploration of terrorist 
motivations. Just as women’s relation language is read as indicating that she should be 
understood in personal terms, so men’s turn to the abstract is construed as providing the 
terms in which their actions should be framed. Therefore, whether in the guise of the gender-
neutral ‘terrorist’ or considered specifically as a male terrorist, his psychological influences are 
considered, but never in isolation, instead being contextualised by political, economic, social, 
and educational factors. Poverty, disenfranchisement, and a sense that one’s identity and 
status have been maligned are seen as factors leading the gender-neutral terrorist to redress 
this assault on their identity by turning to the ‘compelling collective identities’ offered by 
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terrorist organisations,264 but these motivations are never read as ‘personal’. It seems that the 
epistemology of terrorism follows gendered lines as it tries to draw distinctions between 
talking about one’s family and ethnic or nationalistic motives, referring to one’s immediate 
social sphere and cultural ideologies at large, between describing personal pain and testifying 
to the suffering of society as a whole. Yet again, we find a loop between the terrorist object 
and the framework in which it is understood. The reliance on the words used by the terrorists 
themselves to designate motivational categories combines with the epistemological modelling 
of these categories as somehow ‘primary’ and ‘secondary,’265 making manifest terrorism 
discourses’ faith in the symbolic’s capacity to convey discrete, concrete meaning. For it is only 
by assuming that the words of the terrorist mean what they say that the epistemology can 
claim access to their motives. Moreover, it is only by thus asserting that the terrorist always 
has a clear and lucid purpose behind their violence that the epistemology can justify its 
existence, for as we have seen, it is the symbolic intentions of terrorism that make it more 
exceptional than murder. 
 The figure of the female terrorist is therefore doubly problematic for terrorism 
discourses. Not only does she represent the repressed maternal-material turning on itself, her 
state of immanence blurs the lines epistemology necessarily draws between personal and 
ideological intent. By bringing the body into a discourse that works to disavow our materiality, 
she carries the possibility that personal unhappiness lies behind the abstract rhetoric of 
ideological, nationalistic, or religious justifications. Such a possibility would demand an 
empathetic approach to terrorism, an empathy we have already seen is strictly tabooed. 
Similarly, the female terrorist threatens to undermine the concept of terrorism itself, for it is 
the absence of emotional motivation that secures the distinction between terrorism and 
murder. Therefore, it becomes vital that the “personal “ is established as a category peculiar to 
women alone. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the rapidly expanding library of studies 
that concentrate on the female suicide bomber. While women have been involved in militant 
organisation even before the term “terrorism” came into existence, the female suicide bomber 
commands a particular fascination for modern research; the number of pages dedicated to her 
far outweigh the instances of such attacks. For it is here that our notions of the emotional and 
the ideological seem to converge; when an individual chooses to end their own life in order to 
deliver a blow to the world around them, how can we draw a distinction between a 
pathological unhappiness that leads one to end one’s life and the pure, ideological intent that 
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the notion of terrorism relies on? Again, the epistemology of terrorism falls back on the words 
of the terrorist to secure this distinction. Terrorism studies separate suicide terrorism into the 
‘altruistic’ and the ‘fatalistic’ acts,266 with the former being motivated by ideological motives, 
the latter resulting from personal reasons. Thanks to their relational language and the need to 
read women through their bodies, it is no surprise that Jacques and Taylor conclude that 
female suicide terrorism is nearly always fatalistic.267 This is the overwhelming trend in 
research into women’s suicide terrorism: while male suicide bombers are understood to be 
making an ideological statement, female suicide bombers are read as committing suicide, as 
‘proactively seeking a way to end their lives.’268 Not only is her violence rooted in pain, her 
death is simply an expression of that pain, disconnected from broader contextual factors and 
symbolic intent. Her decision to become a suicide bomber is thus a testament to her 
pathology, not her commitment to a cause. 
 The pathology of the female suicide bomber is the most overt manifestation of the 
pathology assumed to lie behind all female violence. For when women, ‘who are the bearers of 
life . . . are turned into killing machines,’269 they are read as deviating from an infinitely-
tolerant feminine norm. The fact that they alone among the female population have resorted 
to violence suggests that these women are uniquely unable to cope with the conditions around 
them. For a woman to eschew the natural tolerance and passivity of femininity, for her to 
forget ‘that women are apolitical [and] . . . that women’s primary purpose and function is to be 
a mother and a wife rather than having an individual identity of her own,’270 something 
extraordinary must have occurred. By designating her motivations as personal, the 
epistemology of terrorism suggests that this aberration lies within each female terrorist: it is 
her vulnerability to her own emotional states that leads the individual woman to violence. At 
the mercy of her emotions, the female terrorist is therefore never quite the master of her own 
actions. Instead, terrorist ‘organizations attempt to exploit’271 her suicidal desires, decide to 
‘use female suicide bombers’,272 or more generally ‘to make use of women.’273 Even as Bloom 
argues that the Chechnyan Black Widows ‘go to their deaths voluntarily’, she installs the logic 
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of the use made of women’s emotional vulnerability for, as a ‘result of the stress from the war, 
women are highly impressionably and readily convinced to carry out a suicide mission.’274 The 
problematic presence of women’s terrorism is thus accounted for within the epistemology 
through the logic of use as her personal pathology renders her useful to the terrorist Other. 
The woman terrorist’s pain is absorbed into the grand narratives of ideological motivation, as 
she becomes the pathological female terrorist, a ‘resource’275 for proper terrorist activity. 
 As such, epistemological constructions of female violence echoes the claims that 
feminism became irrelevant once the September 11th attacks reset the global political agenda. 
This connection becomes explicit when the presence of women in terrorist organisations puts 
feminism under the epistemic lens. Increasingly, the roles assigned to women within terrorist 
organisations are used as a means of vilifying the group. Organisations that state women are 
considered ‘equal’ within a movement are criticised as being ‘not entirely able to divest 
themselves of the widely held beliefs about gender embedded in the culture surrounding 
them’,276 while groups that exclude women because they ‘belong in the crib and kitchen’277 are 
scorned for their sexism. Cook and others concentrate on women’s presence in conservative 
Islamic movements to discredit the groups’ actions, by accusing them of hypocrisy, sexism, and 
a willingness to abuse women.278 Much as the Bush administration cloaked its invasion of 
Afghanistan in the rhetoric of women’s rights, terrorism studies reduces feminism to a demand 
for equal rights in order to pillory terrorist organisations for failing to provide ‘equal 
opportunities’, holding such groups to higher standards of equality than is present in the 
surrounding societies. This appropriation of feminist rhetoric means feminism is no longer 
about recognising women’s subjectivity; instead, it becomes a tool for distinguishing between 
enlightened and deviant masculinities, as the terrorist is exposed as a perpetual misogynist. 
Much as the terrorist Other uses the female terrorist, so her presence is used by terrorism 
discourses to undermine this Other’s legitimacy. Moreover, not only is the female terrorist the 
exploited emotional other of a hypocritical misogynistic Other, if she herself espouses feminist 
beliefs or calls for equality, it is a ‘misguided feminist movement’279 which has rendered her 
vulnerable to such manipulation. Feminist ideals and fantasies of equality coalesce with 
women’s natural emotional instability in such a way as to leave her dangerously open to the 
aims of the terrorist Other. When Jacques and Taylor choose to tackle and dismiss feminism as 
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motivation for militancy within the ‘Personal’ category,280 their decision is emblematic of the 
way in which feminism is collapsed into the personal in terrorism discourses as a whole. The 
possibility that feminisms could provide ideological, political, and revolutionary motivations is 
rarely recognised within these discourses, even when researchers such as Cunningham and 
Gonzalez-Perez have discovered that women are more likely to be involved in militant action 
that directly addresses their status as civilians.281 Hence, not only does the epistemology of 
female violence reduce feminism to a personal rather than an ideological agenda, it inflects 
feminism with pathological overtones; it becomes an ethos which leaves women vulnerable 
and dangerously deluded. 
 While critics such as Brown rightly argue that we need to excavate women’s terrorism 
from its subaltern position in order to become capable of responding to their violence, in 
asking how our own culture is terrorist, we need to ask what the subaltern status of the female 
terrorist means within our own culture. Returning again to Spivak’s epistemological master, we 
need to ask how the norms installed by our approach to terrorism impact on our own sense of 
subjectivity. For instance, Nacos eloquently illustrates that women’s political agency in the 
West suffers from being translated in the same way as women’s terrorist violence. Just like the 
female terrorist, the female politician is always connected to her body, always imbued with a 
personal agenda.282 It seems that when a woman makes a foray into the abstract political and 
ideological spheres, her body marks her attempts as ironic, for it testifies to a personal intent 
that is inconsistent with her overt purpose. So prevalent is this irony that even as women try to 
articulate an alternative politics, a new ideology in the guise of feminism, this is undermined 
by the very body that necessitates its existence. Embodied subjectivity, it seems, is ultimately 
what leaves woman without the capacity to act in the symbolic, as her materiality brings her 
politics into proximity with the pathological. But the division between the personal and the 
political is in fact inscribed on her body precisely to prevent it entering into the symbolic. What 
happens when we move beyond the sphere of terrorism studies and political rhetoric about 
terror? Is the female body still read as a depoliticising presence or does woman’s materiality 
become a site of resistance, a space that resists this process of symbolic inscription? Does 
cultivating woman’s materiality in fact constitute a radical overcoming of the boundaries 
between the ideological and the personal in such a way that the two are no longer read as 
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inconsistent, but instead are somehow inextricably connected? As we turn to two literary 
representations of women involved in terrorist or freedom-fighting activities, I suggest that it 
is not a coincidence that both Nadine Gordimer and Doris Lessing choose women as the 
protagonists in their texts. As we shall see, both authors cultivate women’s material 
immanence as a means of producing a radical critique of the specific socio-historical context 
around them.   
 Both Nadine Gordimer and Doris Lessing’s politics were forged as they witnessed the 
disastrous effects of colonial rule in Africa. Living in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
respectively, these women saw first-hand the consequences of a politics and culture based in 
an epistemology that used the body as means for defining the subject. But if the colonial and 
South African authorities used skin as marker to distinguish legitimate subject from a sub-
human other, their epistemological constructions did not necessarily permeate through the 
white and black skins and colonise the interior world of those under the regime. Hence, while 
the authorities claimed to be able to delineate a divide between white and black, legitimate 
and illegitimate, good and bad, the experience of living under this epistemological regime 
served to undermine the possibility of making such distinctions. Throughout their oeuvre, 
Gordimer and Lessing have repeatedly examined how the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
contradict and complicate the claims of the political, writing against the validity of substituting 
the epistemological construct for the living subject in the political sphere. Yet both authors 
suggest the individual’s capacity for resisting such epistemic appropriation is so radical as to 
prevent the possibility of the subject being absorbed into any grand narrative, even if they 
chose to associate themselves with a particular approach.283 Writing against systems of power 
that appropriate the individual’s body to inscribe their own interpretation, Gordimer and 
Lessing effectively undermine the ability to impose divisions and categories on the body that 
terrorism studies rely on in order to proclaim that they know the terrorist. How, then, do 
Gordimer and Lessing figure the female terrorist, and can their representations illuminate 
possibilities that the epistemology of terrorism has cast into the shadows? Moreover, as the 
vast majority of research on women and terrorism has been produced after September 11th, 
2001, can examining novels written in and addressing contexts prior to the attacks help us 
expose what has been foreclosed in terrorism discourses in their aftermath? 
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Resistant Skins and the Politics of Irony in Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter and Doris 
Lessing’s The Good Terrorist 
 
 Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter (1979) and Lessing’s The Good Terrorist (1985) place the 
figure of the would-be terrorist or freedom-fighter in hugely different contexts. Burger’s 
Daughter traces Rosa Burger’s attempts to locate herself within one of the myriad political 
narratives that circulated in apartheid South Africa. More specifically, Gordimer shows Rosa 
struggling with her personal heritage at the precise moment that Black Consciousness has 
come to the fore in the anti-apartheid movement. Rosa has been thrust into the political 
sphere thanks to the anti-apartheid and communist activism of her parents. After her father, 
Lionel Burger, dies as a political prisoner, all eyes turn to Rosa to see if she will take up his 
legacy. While the friends, officials, and activists around her read her as variously inherently 
activist, a potential insurgent, a spoilt white girl, or simply as a woman, Rosa’s movements 
through South African society leave her disillusioned about her ability to embrace any of these 
roles fully. She escapes to Europe, only to return months later and embrace the role her 
genealogy had seemingly assigned her. By contrast, Lessing’s The Good Terrorist is set in what 
is recognisably Margaret Thatcher’s Britain and follows the life of a communist squat in North 
London through the eyes of Alice Mellings. While Alice works tirelessly to turn the squat into 
something resembling a middle-class home, her comrades are more concerned with the move 
from political rhetoric to terrorist violence. Rejected as potential recruits by both the IRA and 
the mysterious Soviets, the commune embark on a farcical campaign of their own, devoid of 
political intent and yet with bloody results. Despite these very different settings, both texts are 
united by the ironic tone that pervades them, an irony that has proved deeply problematic for 
readers and critics, as we shall see, not least because this tone prevents the easy transition 
from the novel’s prose to the author’s political comment. This frustration with the author’s 
refusal to articulate a clear political stance is heightened by the very fact that Gordimer and 
Lessing have taken pains to situate their work in recognisable socio-historical contexts. What I 
want to suggest is that this irony is in itself the political gesture Gordimer and Lessing make, 
and that fundamentally it is the body of the woman classed as “terrorist” from which this 
gesture emerges. 
 Indeed, the history of Burger’s Daughter as a text is testament to this very possibility. 
As Clingman and others have demonstrated, Burger’s Daughter is a deeply intertextual novel, 
peppered with extracts from and references to non-fictional, philosophical, and literary texts. 
But as Barrett argues, it is the presence of the non-fictional references in particular that makes 
Gordimer’s intertextuality more than a Gennettian comparative gesture. A pamphlet from the 
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Soweto Students Representative Council is reprinted in full; Stephen Biko’s reworking of Hegel 
as the basis for Black Consciousness is given voice by Duma Dhladhla; and Clingman detects 
Joe Slovo’s 1976 essay ‘South Africa – No Middle Road’ as an underlying presence throughout 
the novel. 284 Unmarked quotes from Marx, Lenin, and communist thinkers dot the prose. 
Moreover, Lionel Burger is explicitly modelled on the real-life activist Bram Fischer sharing not 
only his history, but also using Fischer’s own testimony before the court in his own trial. 285 For 
Barrett and Clingman, such intertextuality creates ‘a bridge between fact and fiction,’286 vital in 
the context of apartheid South Africa, where texts, political groups, and specific people like 
Biko, Slovo, and Fischer were banned: ‘[t]he aim of using intertextuality was . . . to disseminate 
ideas, to encourage people to think and thereby to lead them to question the status quo.’287 
Intertextuality allowed Gordimer not only to draw insightful comparison, then, it allowed her 
to integrate prohibited words so they could circulate among a wider audience.  
Yet Burger’s Daughter was initially banned by the South African Directorate of 
Publications. In a move that Gordimer has argued was designed to demonstrate the regime’s 
open-mindedness to the wider world, the Director himself appealed against the ban his own 
committee had instituted.288 For Gordimer, this was an empty gesture, accorded only to white 
South African authors who had achieved international renown. The appeal solicited a series of 
reports which investigated what the book was about and which were subsequently published 
once the ban was overturned. The committee concluded not only that Burger’s Daughter 
would ‘hold the interest and attention of few other than the "dedicated"’,289 but that it was 
safe to publish because it was ‘”[v]ery badly written.”’290 The critical reception of the book 
seemed to concur, for whereas satire highlights the failings of individuals or cultures to live up 
to their espoused ideals, irony points out the inconsistences alone, leaving the reader without 
a sense of where the moral high ground is situated. Therefore, as Smith notes, Gordimer’s use 
of irony left readers without a clear sense of ‘who is being got at’, and thus produced a novel 
that was ‘too ambiguous, too elusive, in a context in which there can be no deviation from 
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service in the cause of liberation.’291 Yet the absence of an overt moral high ground gave 
Gordimer’s novel a form of plausible deniability, as she put all South African politics under 
scrutiny, not simply the apartheid regime. Coupled with Gordimer’s white skin, irony became 
the means through which Gordimer could slip banned material past the censors and into the 
world. 
 The Good Terrorist provoked a similar frustrated bafflement in its initial critical 
reception. Like Gordimer, Lessing situates her novel in a specific political and historical 
moment: the unions’ struggles against Thatcher’s policies, the Socialist movement’s anxious 
relationship to Soviet Russia, and the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) terrorist campaign on 
mainland Britain are all present within the text. Again, given the specificity of the novel’s 
context, critics found Lessing’s ironic style confusing at best, particularly as they read the novel 
in light of Lessing’s well-established leftist politics. Greene speaks for many when she writes 
that what she found ‘horrific about [The Good Terrorist] is the way in which Lessing seems to 
turn on her own former beliefs in a mood of savage caricature.’292 Less sympathetic critics read 
Lessing as committing ‘a libel on hippies’293 or launching ‘an old radical’s revenge on the new 
radicals,’294 frequently interpreting Alice’s mother, Dorothy, as a serving as mouthpiece for 
Lessing’s own new-found conservatism.295 But Lessing herself has stated that she was inspired 
to write The Good Terrorist by the media coverage of the car-bombing of Harrods in London on 
17th December, 1983: ‘The immediate thing was the Harrods bombing . . . Here the media 
reported it to sound as if it was the work of amateurs. I started to think, what kind of amateurs 
could they be?’296  
Carried out by the Provisional IRA, this attack was simultaneously claimed and 
disowned by the IRA Council as an unauthorised attack in a statement released the day after 
the bombing: 
The Irish Republican Army has been operational in Britain throughout last week. Our 
volunteers planted the bomb outside Woolwich barracks and in the car outside 
Harrods store. The Harrods operation was not authorised by the Irish Republican 
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Army. We have taken immediate steps to ensure there will be no repetition of this 
type of operation again . . . We regret the civilian casualties, even though our 
expression of sympathy will be dismissed. Finally, we remind the British Government 
that as long as they maintain control of any part of Ireland then the Irish Republican 
Army will continue to operate in Britain until the Irish people are left in peace to 
decide their own future. 297 
 
Claiming and denying involvement, assuring the public it won’t happen again at the same time 
as restating its intentions to continue militant action, the IRA’s statement was rife with 
contradiction. But so was the government’s response, as the then British Home Secretary Leon 
Brittan commented that ‘[t]he nature of a terrorist organisation is that those in it are not 
under disciplined control.’ 298 If the terrorist organisation is inherently disorganised, one is left 
wondering in what sense it can be deemed an organisation at all, or what it would mean to be 
organised? The responses of all parties to Harrods’ bombing effectively exposed the terrorist 
as a flawed, inconsistent figure, and it is precisely this that Lessing sets out to explore in The 
Good Terrorist. 
 Critics such as Lurie, Watkins and Greene have argued that Lessing’s novel adopts an 
‘oxymoronic title’,299 although such readings usually locate this tension as arising from Alice’s 
behaviour, as ‘[i]n Alice the personal and political are most drastically at odds in that her 
personal energies go to creating while her political efforts go to destroying . . . hence the 
oxymoron “good terrorist.”’300 But to see this oxymoron as referring to the discordant roles 
Alice adopts within the novel is to overlook the fundamental assumption that creates this 
tension even before one has opened the book: the “good terrorist” is only oxymoronic if one 
accepts that the terrorist is always inherently “bad”. Placing this realisation in the web of 
contradictions surrounding the figuration of the terrorist in the aftermath of the Harrods 
bombing immediately complicates such an assumption. For if the terrorist is an inconsistent 
object, how can one possibly claim that he or she is innately “bad”? Arguing that Lessing’s use 
of irony is indicative of her personal critique of the contemporary left is to presume Lessing is 
simply inscribing her own beliefs onto a particular context. However, read alongside the 
rhetoric around the bombing, it becomes clear that the irony which permeates The Good 
Terrorist is consonant with attempts to define the terrorist Other. In effect, Lessing mirrors the 
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contradictory logic present in the reposts to the attack on Harrods, extending it into the world 
of the terrorist themselves. Thus, when Donoghue criticises The Good Terrorist for its attempts 
to revisit a scene that ‘has already been lodged in our minds by television programs and 
newspaper photographs . . . and [for trying] to make us imagine afresh what journalists and 
cameramen have so often delivered,’301 he accidently captures what Lessing is doing. She is 
taking the representations of the terrorist that the audience have become so familiar with, and 
fleshing them out as real characters, giving us terrorists so confused and inconsistent as to 
accord with the statements by the IRA and Britton. The Good Terrorist is therefore not so much 
about Lessing’s personal politics as it is concerned with throwing into relief the nonsensical 
nature of the rhetoric around terrorism. Moreover, if the epistemology of terrorism constructs 
this Other by assuming it can define and know the terrorist, by entering the world of the 
terrorist, Lessing suggests that the stability and coherence this approach invests in its object 
are pure fantasy, as shall become clear. Rather than a weapon for conducting a crippling attack 
on the Left, then, Lessing’s irony is in fact an act of resistance, working against attempts to 
reduce the other to defined and knowable categories. 
 Interestingly, as critics try to read The Good Terrorist by explaining Alice’s behaviour in 
terms of her psychology, this resistance manifests itself. Not only do such readings echo the 
epistemological approach of terrorism discourses to female violence, their conclusions are 
strikingly similar too. To a certain extent, The Good Terrorist suggests that we have unimpeded 
access to mental processes that inform Alice’s actions, as the reader shares her perspective 
and the text adopts a prose style Scanlan describes as ‘surface realism’, with ‘its bubbling slop 
buckets and greasy packets of chips.’302 But what this realist access to Alice reveals is somehow 
problematic. The only explanation Alice offers up for her current psychological make-up is the 
fact that as a child, she was traumatised by having to sleep in her parents’ room when they 
held parties: 
When there were parties, when there were people in the house, it seemed Alice 
became invisible to her mother, and had no place in her own home . . . Sleeping in her 
parents’ bedroom made her violently emotional, and she could not cope with it.303 
 
Alice’s supposed boyfriend Jasper has a similarly petty trauma lurking behind his actions, as we 
are told his anger stems from a hatred of his father for being ‘stupid enough to go in for 
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dubious investments.’304 Faye alone has suffered violence in her past, but as Roberta starts to 
describe Faye’s upbringing, Alice thwarts her narrative: 
“Communes. Squats. If you don’t take care, that’s what they become – people sitting 
around discussing their shitty childhoods. Never again. We’re not here for that. Or is 
that what you want? A sort of permanent encounter group. Everything turns into that, 
if you let it.”305 
 
For Greene, this interruption combines with the seeming pettiness of the instances that have 
psychologically scarred the other comrades to suggest ‘Lessing draws a curtain across this 
aspect of her characters’ lives, in a spirit of impatient dismissal.’306 In response to this apparent 
obfuscation, critics have a tendency to go looking behind this curtain, trying to understand why 
this ‘collection of sick people . . . symptoms have taken a political turn.’307 But efforts to locate 
the genuine psychological origins of the group’s terroristic turn in Alice’s ‘desire for union with 
her mother,’308 or in the frustrated sexualities within the commune309 work against the novel’s 
realist language. The text does describe the seeds of each character’s symptoms; they are 
simply not deemed satisfactory by Lessing’s readers. Attempts to find the “real” psychological 
motivations circulating beneath the surface realism of the text assume that the reasons given 
are illegitimate, demonstrating an a priori understanding of what constitutes a “genuine” 
psychological explanation for terrorist violence. By providing her terrorists with apparently 
paltry psychological injuries, Lessing resists the established epistemology and in doing so, 
exposes the extent to which it is the culturally-constructed terrorist object we engage with, 
rather than the terrorists themselves. 
 Burger’s Daughter has induced a similar brand of critique as critics turn to Rosa’s 
psychological development in the novel in order to find the authorial political commentary 
Gordimer’s irony withholds. Again, the realist prose, the specificity of the novel’s context, and 
the recognition that Rosa’s life history coincides with the National Party’s rise to power and 
the institution of apartheid310, all lead readers to argue that Rosa’s interior world is a form of 
political allegory. If The Good Terrorist inspires a critical gesture that looks behind the curtain 
of the text, understanding Rosa by contrast involves a process of extraction. Burger’s Daughter 
is a collection of Rosa’s first-person narratives, addressed to a ‘you’ who is variously her lover 
Conrad, her step-mother Kathya, and her dead father, placed alongside third-person narratives 
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that observe Rosa from the perspectives of a biographer, gossiping friends and family, 
newspaper coverage, and secret service surveillance reports. As the novel revisits the same 
moments in different narrative modes, the authority of any single account is undermined, 
‘creating ‘a tension between external image and internal voice, between “she” and “I”.’311 The 
reader thus ‘continually mediates the two, correcting the errors of the eye, emerging from the 
spell of the internal voice,’312 in an attempt to discern the significance of a moment from 
among these competing interpretations. 
 Burger’s Daughter thus invites or requires the reader to work to find the text’s 
meaning, as it frustrates the reader’s access to the novel’s presumed intent. But such 
excavations of meaning become problematic when they fail to recognise that this hindrance of 
the reader’s epistemic eye is central to the novel’s political intervention. When Uledi Kamanga, 
Smith, Head, Cooke, and others trace Rosa’s psychological development throughout the novel, 
they not only produce notably consistent readings, they install another narrative layer over 
Rosa’s presence by disentangling her from the narrative strands within the text. 313 These 
psychological or psychoanalytic metanarratives almost universally connect the instance where 
Rosa witnesses a black driver whipping a donkey with Rosa’s later meeting with Zwelinzima, 
reading these moments as awakening some kind of sexual or sensual realisation within her. 
While these moments are rendered as revelatory in the novel, the process of extracting them 
from the novel and inserting them into a psychological account of Rosa’s discovery of her 
femininity, her repressed sexuality, or her development after she is ‘expelled from the 
womblike infantilization she is subjected to from so many sources’314,  works against the text 
itself. Rosa constantly reflects on the moods and motivations she detects in herself and others, 
often turning to the psychoanalytic for insight, as she shares Conrad’s interest in Jung and 
other analysts.315 Yet she simultaneously challenges the ability of such accounts to explain 
everything, as she rejects Conrad’s psychoanalytic reading of her childhood home, insisting 
‘[t]here’s more to it. More than you guessed or wormed out of me in your curiosity and envy, 
talking when the lights were out, more than I knew, or wanted to know until I came to you.‘316 
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 Nowhere does the tension between text and psychological narrative become more 
apparent than in the significance such readings accord Rosa’s late-night telephone call with 
Zwelinzima Vulindlela. Following a chance encounter in London which Rosa recognises 
Zwelinzima as her one-time childhood companion, Baasie, he calls Rosa to confront her with 
the reality of her idealised childhood memories. Zwelinzima’s angry words are frequently read 
as ‘presag[ing] the revolution of [Rosa’s]identity once again,’317 with many agreeing with 
Barnouw’s claim that this confrontation leads Rosa to return to South Africa. But Barnouw 
makes it plain that this interpretation runs counter to Rosa’s own explanation:  
In one of her monologues addressed to her dead father, Rosa explains that it was not 
Baasie who has sent her back to South Africa, since he insisted that she and her family 
had lived “like anyone else,” . . . Yet her decision is clearly influenced by the young 
black activist’s rejection of her father’s contribution to black struggle . . . 318 
 
While there is no question that Zwelinzima’s words have a profound effect on Rosa, when 
critiques follow Barnouw in claiming that ‘Rosa’s mind – and person – is changed dramatically 
by a late-night telephone conversation’,319 they do so by ignoring Rosa’s own words, for in the 
monologue Barouw refers to, Rosa tell us: 
It isn’t Baasie – Zwel-in-zima, I must get the stress right – who sent me back here. You 
won’t believe that. Because I’m living like anyone else, and he was the one who said 
who was I to think we could be different from any other whites. Like anyone else; but 
the idea started with Brandt Vermeulen. You and my mother and the faithful never 
limited yourselves to being like anyone else.320 
 
Rosa, it seems, pre-empts critical analysis of her behaviour, realising that those around her – 
including the reader – will insert her actions into narrative that is not her own in order to give 
them coherence. As Rosa simultaneously address her father and the reader, she knows that 
both presences will cast their narrative shadows over her attempts to elucidate her own 
motivations. In a text that actively works to undermine the possibility of authoritative 
narrative, Rosa knows that, ironically, her own will not be believed.  
 Both the third-person narratives within the novel and the critical metanarrative thus 
construct Rosa as ‘an object in the eyes of others whose internal reality remains unknown’321 
but can accessed by inserting her into a particular epistemological framework. In doing so, 
these narratives replicate both the gesture and methodology of terrorism discourses, 
overwriting Rosa’s own words as they hunt for the “real” explanation in her personal sexual 
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development. Yet as Head suggests, such approaches presume that Rosa is embedded in the 
narratives around her, while in fact the opposite is true. For as Head notes, although Rosa’s 
accounts are permeated with temporal ‘focalizers’ that suggest she is variously in the present 
moment or reflecting on the past, encouraging a sense that she is developing within the novel, 
these temporal markers are disingenuous, creating ‘an effect of uncertainty and vacillation 
which a closer reading, taking on board the matter of temporality, disproves: it is not that Rosa 
is confused, but rather that, ultimately, she is not. A resolution is anticipated in the 
juxtaposition.’322 Rosa, then, is imparting knowledge to the reader from a temporality exterior 
to the text; she is speaking from a point of resolution, and is guiding the reader/listener 
towards this point. As such, to ignore Rosa’s claims that her apparent transformation began in 
her encounters with Brandt Vermeulen is to risk missing the radical intervention Burger’s 
Daughter makes into the political sphere. So what is this transformative idea? 
Immediately prior to Rosa’s decision to enlist the help of self-styled New Afrikaner 
Brandt Vermeulen in obtaining her passport through his political connections, Rosa comes 
face-to-face with the shifting climate of black anti-apartheid politics as Black Consciousness 
comes to the fore. In a meeting with her parents’ black political allies, she watches as the 
white liberal journalist Orde Greer rallies against Duma Dhladhla’s Black Consciousness politics. 
Disconcerted by Dhladhla’s rejection and distrust of white activism, Greer finally demands to 
know ‘What would you do if you were me?’ In response, Dhladhla ‘looked at Greer, 
importuned, triumphant and bored. ‘I don’t think about that.’’323 This encounter leads Rosa to 
reflect on her parents’ politics, realising that their activism was based on the refusal to “limit” 
themselves to being like everyone else, a refusal to accept that as human bodies with black or 
white skins, they were necessarily caught up in the same system that divided people by 
colonising those skins with specific meaning. For Rosa, her parents were only able to presume 
they could transcend these divisions and assume solidarity with the repressed black population 
through abstraction: ‘They had the connection because they believed it was possible.’324 This 
very combination of abstraction and belief is what allows apartheid to unfold, meaning it is 
only the different intentions behind the rhetoric that marks the Burgers’ anti-apartheid politics 
from those they oppose. In a country where ‘words classified people into black and white, 
were used to write the existence of black people out of history, were forced out of people 
under torture and turned into stories which could be used against them, their family and their 
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friends,’325 the faith of the Burgers’ and their fellow activists in the power of words to 
differentiate their political gesture from that of apartheid through conveying their true 
intentions is naïve at best. Realising this, Rosa tells us ‘I have lost connection. It’s only the 
memory of childhood warmth for me.’326 
This loss of connection, of the ability to locate oneself outside the system of 
oppression by faith in rhetoric alone, leads Rosa to Vermeulen’s door. As the third-person 
surveillance and biographical accounts make plain, by visiting Vermeulen, Rosa is entering new 
territory, visiting  ‘people whose allegiance made her father their enemy,’327 and following a 
map that ‘did not direct her past the Supreme Court or the old synagogue converted for use as 
a court to which she knew the way.’328 As Rosa puts it: 
I was entering each time a place that didn’t exist for my father and that he would 
never have put me in, never, although he sent me to prisons; that he would never 
have set foot in himself, although I had inherited from him and from my mother the 
necessity of deviousness wily enough to get myself there . . . 329 
 
This sense of entering a new place, of a shared meeting ground made possible by Rosa’s loss of 
connection, permeates her time with Vermeulen. As a New Afrikaner, we are told, Vermeulen 
has returned from his studies in the United States and Europe uncontaminated by ‘foreign 
ideas of equality and liberty, to destroy what the great-great-grandfather died for at the hands 
of a kaffir and the Boer general fought the English for.’330 Rather, Vermeulen has returned with 
a new vocabulary, one which strengthens the apartheid regime’s ability to face the challenges 
posed to it, be it from the criticisms lobbied by the global community or the home-grown 
unrest stirred up the Communist presence. Vermeulen and his ilk wish to 
transform the home-whittled destiny of white to rule over black in terms that the 
generation of late-twentieth-century orientated Nationalist intellectuals would 
advance as the first true social evolution of the century, since nineteenth-century 
European liberalism showed itself spent in the failure of racial integration wherever 
this was tried, and Communism, accusing the Afrikaner of enslaving blacks under 
franchise of God’s will, itself enslaved whites and yellows along with blacks in the 
denial of God’s existence.331 
 
Having been confronted with the evolving discourse of Black Consciousness, Rosa now meets 
the emergent form of an new apartheid logic, a logic that eschews its roots and adopts the 
terms of contemporary global social and political thought to secure the survival of its 
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principles. For Vermeulen’s aim is to continue the apartheid vision by weeding out the 
elements within its logic that threaten to undermine it: 
He did not shrink from open contact with blacks as his father’s generation did, and he 
regarded the Immorality Act as the relic of an antiquated libidinous backyard guilt 
about sex that ought to be scrapped, since in the new society of separate nations each 
flying the flag of its own skin, the misplacement of the white man’s semen in a black 
vagina would emerge, transformed out of all recognition of source, as the birth of yet 
another nation.332 
 
The gesture of the New Afrikaner, then, is to reframe apartheid logic in more palatable terms, 
providing new language for old principles by couching them in terms of social evolution. For 
Rosa, Vermeulen’s rhetoric shares a common ground with her parents’ own politics, and thus 
when she meets him, she becomes aware of: 
a place where a meeting was possible between those for whom skin is an absolute 
value and those for whom it is not a value at all; a place whose shameful existence 
recognizes a possibility of there being anything to say between migrant miners, factory 
workers, homeless servants, landless peasants, and the class and colour that lives on 
them.333 
 
This shameful place, whose existence was fundamentally disavowed by the Burgers and their 
fellow communist activists, is a place framed by the appropriation of skin. Be it making skin the 
defining trait of subjectivity or by according it no inherent meaning at all, both the New 
Afrikaners and the white anti-apartheid activists meet in the tussle over the value according to 
skin.  
 But whereas the rhetoric of the white communist ‘faithful’ relies on denying the 
existence of this common space for fear of rendering their efforts hopelessly, ineffectually 
ironic, Vermeulen has recognised the power of exposing one’s own idiosyncrasies to ridicule: 
He and his sort were the first to be sophisticated enough to laugh at the sort of thing 
only denigrators of the Afrikaner volk were supposed to laugh at: the Dutch Reformed 
Churches’ denouncement of the wickedness of Sunday sport or cinema performances, 
the censorship board’s ruling that white breasts on a magazine cover were 
pornography while black ones were ethnic art.334 
 
Vermeulen himself is ‘playfully boastful,’ ‘entertaining’ with an ‘ability not to take himself 
seriously.’335 It seems the ability to laugh at the ridiculous within one’s own logic, to be the first 
to point out the absurd consequences of one’s own politics becomes a means of reinforcing 
one’s logic at its weakest point. To scan one’s own narratives with an ironic eye ensures that 
such manifestations of vulnerability can be removed without challenging the logic that brought 
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them into being. This is the idea that Rosa takes away from her meeting with Vermeulen, an 
idea that lies dormant throughout Rosa’s sojourn in France and London, but that has ripened 
into a transformative force by the time Rosa is confronted by Zwelinzima. It is only by 
recognising that the seeds of Rosa’s transformation were planted before she left South Africa 
and were cultivated by her experiences of Europe that one can fully comprehend the nature 
and implications of the change that brings her back to her homeland. 
 Escaping the epistemological frameworks of South African politics by going to stay with 
her step-mother Katya near Nice, Rosa experiences her flesh as a source of pleasure rather 
than political intrigue. As Read puts it, ‘[s]educed by the image of sensuousness, pleasure, 
romance, [Rosa] inhabits her body differently than in South Africa.’336 When her lover Bernard 
proclaims ‘I am full of semen for you’ Rosa knows that unlike her pretend romance with the 
political prisoner Noel de Witt, ‘[i]t has nothing to do with passion that had to be learned to 
deceive prison warders; and you’re no real revolutionary waiting to decode my lovey-dovey as 
I dutifully report it.’337 Free from narratives that designate each body as overtly political, ‘Rosa 
came to awareness of her own being like the rising of a tick of a clock in an empty room.’338 As 
such, Liscio argues that Rosa discovers jouissance, ‘the timelessness of Nice is where pleasure 
and appetite . . . take precedence over action and responsibility. It is a self-enclosed, womblike 
space outside time and sequence.’339 Indeed, Rosa’s new sensual awareness is imbued with a 
childlike selfishness, as she comes to identify herself with the women in Europe: 
Something is owed to us. Young women, girls still. The capacity I feel, running down 
the sluiced alleys under flower-boxes to meet the man who tells me his flesh rises 
when his ears recognize the slither of my sandals, the flashes of bright feeling that 
buffet me at this point where I see the sea, the abundance for myself I sense in whiffs 
from behind the plastic ribbons of open kitchen doors . . . I see everything, everything, 
have to stop to stroke each cat . . . Or I go blindfold in the darkness of sensations I 
have just experienced, deaf to everything but a long dialectic of body and mind that 
continues within Bernard Chabalier and me even when we’re not together.340 
 
Yet if Rosa’s newly embodied awareness is initially self-absorbed, Liscio argues after Irigaray 
and Hélène Cixous that this realisation of jouissance leads to a new ethical awareness in Rosa, 
as ‘[p]leasure in the self is what enlarges the capacity to move freely toward a real other rather 
than one who will unconsciously be sought to fill one’s lack . . . Rosa’s growth opens her to the 
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other as other, rather than as reflection of self.’341 Read too describes Rosa’s sensual awaken 
in France as giving Rosa the means to move past ‘the arrogant authority of seeing-and-
knowing to the humility of listening and insight.’342 In essence, both Read and Liscio 
characterise Rosa as achieving something resembling Irigaray’s sensible transcendental as she 
learns the capacities and limits of her flesh through her sensual experiences, so as to no longer 
require the appropriation of the other to mark her subjectivity’s boundaries. 
 It is perhaps in light of these strands of critique that the novel’s epigraph is best 
understood: ‘I am the place in which something has occurred.’ As many critics note, Gordimer 
is citing Lévi-Strauss, but again, in a form of overwriting, this reference is usually offered up as 
illuminating only certain aspects of Burger’s Daughter, with little space being given to asking 
what it means to ‘be’ a place ‘in’ which something can occur. 343 While Gordimer does not give 
the source of this quote, Lévi-Strauss makes a remarkably similar comment in an interview 
about his work: 
Le livre passe à travers moi, je suis le lieu où pendant quelque mois ou anneés, des 
choses s’elaborent et se mettent en place, et puis ells se séparent comme si c’était une 
excretion.344 
 
(The book goes through me, I am the place where for some months or years, things are 
developed and put in place, and then they separate as if it were an excretion.) 
 
When Lévi-Strauss speaks of being a place then, he is figuring himself as an interior space 
capable of ingesting things from the outside world, gathering them together into new 
arrangements, before pushing them back out into the world. Hence, to be a place is to have an 
interiority that generates meaning. Elsewhere, Lévi-Strauss elaborates on how this interiority is 
constituted: 
I exist. Not, of course, as an individual, since in this respect, I am merely the stake – a 
stake perpetually at risk – in the struggle between another society, made up of several 
thousand million nerve cells lodged in the ant-hill of my skull, and my body, which 
serves as its robot. Neither psychology nor metaphysics nor art can provide me with a 
refuge. They are myths . . . 345 
 
For Lévi-Strauss, then, the subject is located in the neural networks of the brain and as such, it 
is the brain that becomes the interior space which ingests information and excretes new 
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meaning. While this formulation locates the subject in the grey matter of the brain, it 
nonetheless renders the rest of the body as simply the brain’s container, moving past fleshly 
existence and into a minute network of cells hidden in the skull. Yet the logic of digestion and 
excretion that allows such a place to create meaning carry with them connotations of the 
passage through orifices, movement through the membranes that separate the body’s interior 
and exterior, the exposure of foreign bodies to the transformative influence of the body’s 
organs. To be the place in which something has occurred, then, one must necessarily have a 
body. 
 It is this recognition that the body is a place in which meaning can be constituted that 
lies at the heart of Rosa’s decision to return to South Africa. Prior to her trip to Europe, Rosa is 
unable reconcile her own sensual experiences with her awareness that her father’s politics 
share conceptual ground with the masters of apartheid. For example, as she hugs Marisa, one 
of her father’s black activist friends, their meeting is marked with an intense physicality: 
To touch in women’s token embrace against the live, night cheek of Marisa, seeing 
huge for a second the lake-flash of her eye, the lilac-pink of her inner lip against 
translucent-edged teeth, to enter for a moment the invisible magnetic field of the 
body of a beautiful creature and to receive on oneself its imprint – breath misting and 
quickly fading on a pane of glass – this was to immerse in another mode of 
perception.346  
 
In the immediacy of the moment, this sensuality alerts Rosa to the parallels between ‘the 
transformation of the world a man seeks in the beauty of a woman’347 and the white 
population’s association of the sensual with blackness, regardless of their politics. But Rosa is 
alert to the fact there is a boundary between the two, a pane of glass, and so does not confuse 
her attraction to Marisa with assumed consonance with her. Indeed, she understands that it is 
precisely this confusion that allowed her father to assume he could speak on behalf of or with 
that other, overwriting the difference present in the other’s body. Yet at the same time, Rosa 
has a sense that our material vulnerabilities may be what we share. As she recalls her sharing a 
bed with Baasie as a child, the need for warmth, sleep and urination unite the two: 
I was remembering a special, spreading warmth when Baasie had wet the bed in our 
sleep. In the morning the sheets were cold and smelly, I told tales to my mother . . . 
but in the night I didn’t know whether this warmth that took us back into the 
enveloping fluids of a host body came from him or me.348 
 
Prior to her visits to Vermeulen and Europe, Rosa’s bodily experiences induce contradictory 
impulses, on the one hand luring her into an attraction that risks appropriating the other, 
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while on the other, providing her with a sense that there is perhaps a communality that can be 
shared across the boundaries of race and gender. If being unable to cope with the 
contradictory position her own senses and South African politics put her in is what drives Rosa 
to Europe, it is coming to understand herself as an embodied subject, as a place capable of 
producing meaning specific to herself that makes it necessary for her to return. 
 As we see from the very beginning of Burger’s Daughter, the contrast between third-
person observations and Rosa’s own accounts expose the limitations of such attempts to know 
the object’s interiority. The novel opens with a biography-style observation of Rosa as she 
waits outside a prison to visit her incarcerated mother, scrutinising Rosa in great detail: 
Rosa Burger, about fourteen years old at the time . . . was small for her age, slightly 
bottle-legged . . . with a tiny waist. Her hair was not freshly washed and the cartilage 
of her ear-tips broke the dark lank,[sic] suggesting that the ears were prominent 
though hidden . . . Her profile was prettier than her full-face; the waxy outline olive-
skinned people often have, with the cave of the eye strikingly marked by the dark 
shining strip of eyebrow and the steep stroke of eyelashes, fuzzing at the ends like the 
antennae of moths . . .nostrils that cut back too sharply, half-healed and picked-at 
blemishes round the big soft mouth that curled and tightened . . . a mouth exactly like 
her father’s.349 
 
The observer tries to give us a sense of who Rosa is through her physical appearance, hinting 
that her political heritage is inscribed in her genes. But the observer has no direct access to 
Rosa, left to speculate that ‘she probably had not slept well the previous night’350 and turning 
to her school reports for further insight into Burger’s daughter. If this account can only 
attempt to read signs of who Rosa is from her exterior appearance and her location, Rosa’s 
own experience of her body in that context shows the flaws of such readings. As she recalls 
standing outside the prison, she tells us it was not the political situation that resulted in her 
mother’s imprisonment that concerned, but rather that her 
real awareness is all focused in the lower part of my pelvis, in the leaden, dragging, 
wringing pain there. Can anyone describe the peculiar fierce concentration of the 
body’s forces in the menstruation of early puberty. . . outside the prison the internal 
landscape of my mysterious body turns me inside out, so that in that public place on 
that public occasion . . . I am within that monthly crisis of destruction, the purging, 
tearing, draining of my own structure. I am my womb, and a year ago I wasn’t aware – 
physically – I had one.351 
 
From the very beginning, Rosa’s body, her skin, marks the limit of attempts to know 
her. Her body is a boundary that third-person narratives cannot cross, frustrating access to her 
identity and thus leading to readings of her that do not correspond to her own reality. But it is 
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not just these third-person narratives that her personal recollections work to highlight as 
flawed. Recalling how her parents’ used her as a means of passing messages to the imprisoned 
Noel de Witt, Rosa undermines their assumption that she is acting purely in the name of 
politics, as she reveals that her flesh not only concealed her true intentions from the prison 
authorities, but also from her parents: 
I was not a fake. Once a month I sat as they had sent me to take their messages and 
receive his, a female presented to him with the smiling mouth, the gazing yet evasive 
eyes, the breasts drooping a little as she hunched forward, a flower standing for what 
lies in her lap.352 
 
The political interpretation of her actions becomes the guise through which Rosa 
communicates her own desire, rather than vice versa. Throughout the novel, then, Rosa’s body 
and recollections of her physical experiences undercut the efforts of others to insert her into 
external narratives. In doing so, she leaves the reader as confused as Vermeulen, as he tries to 
read Rosa’s intentions in her physicality: ‘There was no indication of what impression she 
wanted to make, this girl . . . she was either so vulnerably open that her presence in the world 
made an impossible claim, or so inviolable that her openness was an arrogant assumption – 
which amounted to the same thing.’353 
 But if, as Head suggests, Rosa is speaking to us from a point of resolution, can we not 
read the way in which Rosa’s physicality and sensuality cast an ironic light across the narratives 
that seek to shape her as an intentional intervention? Or to put it another way, as a political 
intervention? For as Rosa returns to South Africa to work in a hospital, it is to live ‘like anyone 
else’, rather than assume her anti-apartheid sentiments place her as somehow outside the 
system of oppression: 
Nothing can be avoided. Roland Ferguson, 46, ex-miner, died on the park bench while I 
was busy minding my own business. No one can defect. 
I don’t know the ideology: 
It’s about suffering. 
How to end suffering. 
And it ends in suffering. Yes, it’s strange to live in a country where there are still 
heroes. Like anyone else, I do what I can. I am teaching them to walk again, at 
Baragwanath Hospital. They put one foot before the other.354 
 
In coming to understand herself as an embodied subject, Rosa finds a means to resist and yet 
participate in the culture which locates her in the position of oppressor. The rejection of 
ideology in favour of the recognition of suffering is in effect a move away from the abstract in 
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favour of a politics grounded in the human body. This is a perilous gesture in the context of 
apartheid South Africa, for the regime’s logic makes use of the body to justify the repression of 
those with black skin. But Gordimer suggests the crucial difference in Rosa’s gesture is that in 
recognising herself as an embodied subject, she respects the limits her flesh imposes on her 
and understands the flesh of others marks a horizon she cannot pass. Thus, Rosa’s sense of 
herself as place in which meaning is produced prevents her imposing her terms on the other. 
Yet for Gordimer, this ethical awareness does not reduce each subject to the personal alone, 
unable to participate in the political sphere for fear of colonising the other. Rather, as we have 
seen, recognising oneself as a place establishes the body as a site of resistance, a place that 
cannot be permeated by grand narratives or accessed by the epistemological eye. Moreover, 
Burger’s Daughter suggests that it is by embracing the contradictions that accompany 
embodied existence in South Africa as opposed to denying the contradictions between one’s 
personal experience and one’s politics that one can secure ethical intentions. For just as 
Vermeulen and his cohorts laugh at the weaknesses in their own politics in order to maintain 
their fundamental principles, so the inconsistencies between the rhetoric around Rosa and her 
personal experience reveal the flaws that threaten to undermine the ethical intentions of the 
anti-apartheid movement. The ironic insight that Rosa’s embodied subjectivity instigates thus 
acts ‘like a kind of corrective, a rein.’355  
 In a culture that assumes the body of the other can be appropriated, Gordimer 
refigures it as always resisting the epistemological frameworks that try to inscribe external 
narratives upon it. Not only does the flesh of the other render their interiority unknowable, it 
is by learning to speak from one’s own embodiment that one can counter the appropriative 
gestures that allow such politics to unfold. In other words, by rejecting the artificial divide 
between the ‘personal’ and ‘political’, one resists the very system that relies on these 
distinctions and ensures that one’s ethics have no common ground with those you oppose. In 
the figure of Rosa, then, Gordimer gives us a woman who becomes a freedom fighter 
specifically because she rejects the ability of the ideological to represent the other, a woman 
for whom the distinction between the personal and political are consonant with the system of 
oppression. In contrast to the vulnerable female terrorist, Rosa’s radical acceptance of her 
immanence is precisely that which renders her dangerous to the State and results in her 
imprisonment. 
 If Burger’s Daughter suggests faith in the ideological facilitates the appropriation of 
the other, The Good Terrorist demonstrates how this translates into terrorist action. Indeed, 
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Lessing’s novel connects this terroristic turn to the fact that the comrades in the squat lack any 
sense of themselves as embodied subjects, as places capable of articulating meaning. 
Throughout the novel, the comrades use ideological knowledge and affiliations both to convey 
to the group who they are and to judge each other. Faye garners respect in spite of her volatile 
personality as she ‘had read a great deal, more than any of them, and was particularly well up 
on Althusser,’356 Jasper has ready access to ‘the familiar phrases of the socialist lexicon’ thanks 
to his reading socialist publications,357 while previous experiences in communes secures Alice a 
place in the squat. Lack of overt political affiliation leads the dedicated within the commune to 
view Jim, Philip, Mary and Reggie with suspicion, while Comrade Andrew’s presumed 
connections with the ‘Russians’ mean the group accord him the status of ‘the real thing.’358 So 
important is ideological rhetoric in establishing identity within the commune that there is little 
sympathy for those perceived as lacking such dedication; no one is perturbed by Jim’s 
departure, while Philip’s death leaves everyone but Alice unmoved. Moreover, through Alice’s 
observations, we are continually made aware that the comrades rarely speak in something 
resembling their own voice, as she detects repeatedly the effort behind an apparently 
spontaneous expression. Roberta speaks not in her own voice but in ‘a made-up one. 
Modelled on Coronation Street, probably.’359 Faye’s cockney accent rapidly falls away as the 
‘raw, raucous, labouring’ voice emerges from her ‘lower depths.’360 Rather than a collection of 
sick people, then, what Lessing gives us is group who strive to insert themselves into abstract 
narratives and equate themselves with certain stereotypes in order to establish their sense of 
identity. 
 Lessing brings this to the fore in the figure of Alice, for despite the novel’s realist 
prose, Alice remains a curiously elusive body.  
Alice was stocky, and she had a pudgy, formless look to her. Sometimes a girl of 
twelve, even thirteen, before she is lit by pubescence, is as she will be in middle age. . . 
Alice could seem like a fattish clumsy girl, or sometimes, about fifty, but never looked 
her age, which was thirty-six.361 
 
In contrast to the moderately political Mary, ‘a pleasant ordinary girl, all brown shining curls 
and fresh skin [l]ike an advertisement for medium-quality toilet soap,’362 Alice’s physicality 
does not correspond to a distinct form, slipping between girlishness and middle-age but never 
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coinciding with her actual existence. Moreover, unlike Rosa Burger, Alice seems numb to the 
sensual despite her preoccupation with establishing creature comforts in the squat. While the 
other occupants of No. 43 Old Mill Road refuse to wash in cold water, Alice is undeterred by 
the discomfort of cold water against her skin.363 Sensual pleasure similarly eludes Alice, for 
although she repeatedly cooks the group homemade soups, she is puzzled by the obvious 
pleasure others take in similar efforts: 
[Alice] sat gratefully watching Caroline, who worked smiling, full of a rich secret 
contentment that seemed to spill out over her, like candlelight. Alice felt meagre, dry; 
she did these things, cooked and fed and nurtured, but it was out of having to, a duty. 
She had never in her life felt what she saw brimming over in Caroline who, as she 
licked a spoon to test a sauce, looked at Alice over it as though she were sharing some 
pleasure with her that only the rare, the initiated, of the world could even suspect. 364 
 
Nowhere does Alice’s lack of initiation into the world of the sensual become more apparent 
than when she is confronted with the sexual desire of others. The notion that her mother’s 
friends Theresa and Anthony ‘were naked at night in bed together’ leaves Alice feeling sick,365 
while the ‘grunting and panting, moaning and wanting’ of Bert and Pat’s passion repulses 
Alice, ‘her ears assaulted, her mind appalled.’366 Alice, we are told, has decided ‘to do 
without’367 sex, preferring instead her sibling-like relationship with Jasper: ‘Alice liked it when 
people made the mistake . . . ‘People often take us a brother and sister.’’368 
 Estranged from the sensual and sexual, with a curiously fluid physical presence, Alice is 
arguably a fleshless figure for much of the novel. Indeed, Alice’s body is only present in 
fragments, be it in the ‘tears streaming’369 from her eyes throughout the text, the heart she 
has to keep ‘on a short cruel chain like a dangerous dog’370 because of its tendency to ache and 
yearn, or her stomach, which churns and leaves her feeling sick at the smallest trigger. Her 
only persistent exterior surface is her wrist, which becomes a conduit through which Jasper 
pulls Alice into whatever he intends to do. Without a fleshly awareness to construct a sense of 
herself as place capable of absorbing exterior narratives and turning them into something new, 
Alice instead has a chameleon-like ability to slip into the skin that the discourses around her 
require. As she goes to the Council, she shucks her revolutionary skin and becomes what she 
considers the Council want to see: 
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the pretty daughter of her mother, short curly fair hair nicely brushed, pink and white 
face lightly freckled, open blue-grey gaze. A middle-class girl with her assurance, her 
knowledge of the ropes, sat properly in the chair, and if she wore a heavy blue military 
jacket, under it was a flowered pink and white blouse.371 
 
Talking to the squat’s neighbour Joan Robbins, Alice can repeatedly adopt the ‘smile of a 
householder,’ entering into the suburban niceties of gossips over the hedge, or at least ‘that’s 
what observers would see.’372 She is every bit the boss’ daughter, ‘[i]ndolent and privileged,’373 
when she visits her father’s office, while she consistently remembers herself in her mother’s 
home as ‘a good girl, a good daughter, as she had always enjoyed being.’374 In contrast to this 
decorum, Alice becomes a feral, ‘spitting’ creature, with ‘her blood on fire, her face distorted 
with excitement’ as she participates in political protest,375 or alternatively switches to ‘her 
‘meeting voice,’ for she had learned this was necessary’ when the group engages in political 
discussion, even though ‘[t]o her, it sounded false and cold’. 376 If it is Rosa’s physicality that 
renders the discourses around her ironic, it is Alice’s lack of flesh which exposes the 
inconsistency of her position. Without a sense of herself as a distinct space, Alice moulds 
herself to fit the requirements of her context. Shaped entirely by the demands of each 
situation, Alice literally becomes a ‘figure of speech,’ cloaked in a linguistic skin appropriate to 
the narrative requirements of her various contexts. 
 Alice’s willingness to slot herself into the required rhetorical mode confers irony on 
her actions and as such, she is emblematic of the commune as a whole. While each member is 
keen to situate themselves within ideological rhetoric, they do so purely to provide themselves 
with a means of distinguishing themselves from ‘the bloody middle classes’377rather than for 
the cause they espouse. This produces a ‘heavy-handed irony about allies of workers who 
never work,’378 whose efforts are not welcomed by those at the picket lines379 and whose 
actions are motivated by desire, not politics: 
Faye said excitedly: ‘I’d like to have a go at one of those vans. You know, when I saw 
that thing standing there, armoured, all lit up, it had wire over the windscreen, I just 
hated it so much – it looked bloody evil.’380 
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It seems that Lessing is in accord with terrorism discourses, constructing the comrades as 
peculiarly vulnerable to ideological influences thanks to their personal vagaries. But in fact, 
Lessing suggests something subtler is taking place. From the moment that Alice and Jasper join 
the commune at the novel’s opening, the comrades’ discussions revolve around the desire to 
show ‘serious’ commitment to their cause, even if that cause itself remains undefined. We 
learn from Bert that getting serious involves approaching the IRA as volunteers, a suggestion 
that precipitated the departure of half of the previous squatters, for as Bert describes it, ‘I 
underestimated the political maturity of the cadres.’381 Setting up a commune, therefore, does 
not constitute serious political commitment in the eyes of the comrades, despite the fact they 
are all nominally members of the Communist Centre Union (CCU). In fact, creating a shared 
domestic space is entirely apolitical, as Alice observes as she reflects on her efforts to repair 
No.43 while the others are out at protests: ‘Here I am, fussing about the house, when they are 
doing something serious.’382 Moreover, Pat speaks for the majority when she argues 
maintaining the communal space becomes a direct threat to the group’s political aspirations: 
‘My point is that this business of having a nice clean house and a roof over our heads is 
beginning to define us. It is what we do.’383 The comrades thus share terrorism discourses’ 
assumption that the domestic sphere is devoid of political or ideological intent. It is action that 
takes place beyond the domestic confines of the squat that is worthy of the accolade of 
seriousness. 
 But even attending protests, fighting the police, and splashing political slogans across 
London are not enough to constitute serious commitment. Convinced of the amateurish 
nature of their interventions so far, Bert and Jasper attempt to volunteer the group for 
terrorist action, approaching both the IRA and unspecified Russian comrades. In each case, 
they return rejected as these organisations ‘had not taken Jasper and Bert seriously.’384 
Stripped of the ideological narratives that would inscribe their desire for violence with a cause, 
it becomes apparent that for the comrades, it is not the attachment to a cause that is 
conceived as bestowing seriousness. For they all concur with Bert that ‘the comrades present 
see no reason to accept directives from Moscow,’385 and Jocelyn impresses them all as she 
argues ‘[w]ho are the IRA to tell us what to do in our own country?’386 Ultimately, the group 
decide to turn to violence without the permission or justification of ‘any other extraneous 
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source,’387 and in doing so, evacuate their actions of any ideological or political intent. Yet as 
they finally lay their hands on the matériel that will facilitate their turn to violence, they share 
the sense that they are now commencing on ‘Real work.’388 But having rejected the authority 
of external ideological and political influences, what supports this continued sense within the 
group that their need for violence is anything other than an expression of the personal? How is 
it they assume they are still pursuing something serious when they have rejected their political 
influences as irrelevant? Scanlan provides us with a clue when she argues that Lessing’s 
terrorists echo the axiom that terrorism emerges where words fail. For Scanlan, ‘[t]he terrorist 
despairs of "mere words" in an age of mass journalism, arguing that speech can only be heard 
when it is supplemented with dynamite.’389 The comrades share this assumption that the 
terrorist’s capacity to garner media attention makes them significant, rushing off to buy all the 
newspapers, ‘from The Times to The Sun’390 in the early hours of the morning to see how their 
experimental bombing of a bollard is reported. Furious that the only attention their actions 
have merited is ‘a little paragraph in the Guardian, that said some hooligans had blown up the 
corner of a street,’ the group are left ever more determined: ‘We’ll show them.’391 This lack of 
media recognition spurs the group on, leading them to plant a car bomb outside the Kubla 
Khan Hotel, killing five people including Faye as she fails to get out of the car in time. Gathered 
around the radio after the event, it becomes plain how significant the media’s representation 
of their actions is for them, as Alice’s last-minute call to the Samaritans leads the media to 
believe the attack was perpetrated by the IRA: ‘Well, what about that,’ said Jocelin. ‘What a 
fucking nerve.’392 It is neither political ideology nor simply the desire to murder that motivates 
Lessing’s terrorists: it is the desire to be taken seriously, a seriousness which only media 
attention can assign. Thus, in an ironic twist that echoes Zulaika and Douglass’s claims that 
terrorism discourses construct the very object they set out to describe, Lessing gives us a 
household of individuals aspiring to the image of the terrorist purveyed by the media. 
 The comrades’ mutual quest to inscribe serious purpose to their lives, to decisively 
differentiate themselves from the middle class masses, does not leave them vulnerable to 
exploitation by ideological organisations; it inspires them to equate themselves with the 
epistemological object of the terrorist. In doing so, Lessing renders the epistemological 
attempts to understand the terrorist’s motivations as inherently flawed, for she suggests the 
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terrorists themselves have no clear sense of why they are pursuing this course of action. How 
can terrorism discourses claim to know the terrorist’s rationale when they lack any definitive 
sense of this themselves? For throughout the novel, Alice has foregrounded the possibility that 
the individual is not necessarily aware of their own motives. She is a political activist who 
refuses to engage with political texts, for fear that ‘if she persevered, allowing one book to 
lead her on to another, she might find herself lost without maps.’393 For Alice it is 
inconceivable ‘that a comrade with a good, clear and correct view of life could be prepared to 
endanger it by reading all that risky equivocal stuff that she might dip into, hastily, retreating, 
as if scalded.’394 Hence, Alice retreats from the very words that could be used to explain her 
involvement in terrorist action. Deprived of an ideological explanation for her presence in her 
current situation, the turn to the personal to find motive is similarly frustrated, for although 
we have access to Alice’s mind, it is a mind that remains mysterious to Alice herself. She is 
continually surprised by her own actions and intuitions. For example, she is passive in the face 
of her own insight as, out of the blue: 
 she remarked dreamily, ‘What have you and Bert decided then?’ 
A quick movement from Jasper, which she noted, thinking, I didn’t know I was 
going to say that . . . then she remarked, in her dreamy voice and to her own surprise, 
‘With the comrades in 45, I wonder. . .’ She stopped. Interested in what she had said. 
Respectful of it. 
 But he had shot up on his elbow and was staring at her. . . He did not ask: How 
do you know about the other house. . . he had learned she could do this: know, 
without being told.395 
 
Moreover, Alice’s encounters with her mother reveal that there are vast gaps in Alice’s 
memory, for a mere ‘[t]hree hours after she had left home screaming abuse at her mother, she 
dialled her number’ in order to ask for money, unable to remember that her mother is in fact 
broke and selling her home.396 Although the reader now knows that Dorothy Mellings must 
move out, Alice cannot retain this information, repressing it in favour of her own idealised 
version of her mother’s situation. Even having access to Alice’s mind, then, does not open up 
the possibility of explaining her actions, for ‘Alice did know that she forgot things, but not how 
badly, or how often.’397 Such small instances of observation from an exterior narrator pepper 
the text, revealing how far Alice fails to understand her own emotions: ‘What Alice felt then 
was a slicing cold pain – jealousy; but she did not know it was that’.398 Thus Alice’s own 
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thoughts mingle with small instances of external observation in a way that suggests that she 
herself is not fully aware of what drives her. 
Alice’s bemusement at her own behaviour becomes most pronounced when she is 
overwhelmed by the desire for violence. For instance, as she and Philip examine the kitchen 
the Council has attempted to make uninhabitable, ‘[s]he said, ‘I could kill them.’ She heard her 
voice, deadly. She was surprised at it. She felt her hands hurting and unclenched them.’399 At 
such moments, Alice no longer coincides with herself, standing back and observing her actions 
in a way that suggests she is no more privy to her interior workings than the reader. This 
becomes particularly troubling in light of Alice’s periodic violent eruptions: 
Luckily there was no one to see her, as she exploded inwardly, teeth grinding, eyes 
bulging, fists held as if knives were in them. She stormed around the kitchen, like a big 
fly shut in a room on a hot afternoon, banging herself against the walls, corners of 
table and stove, not knowing what she did, and making grunting, whining, snarling 
noises – which soon, she heard. She knew that she was making them and, frightened, 
sat down at the table, perfectly still, containing what she felt.400 
 
Yet such violent moments of self-abandonment are troubling precisely because the reader is 
watching, looking for an explanation that Alice is unable to give. Interestingly, if it is throwing 
herself against the world that enables Alice to reach a point in which she can contain her 
feelings, it is in the rare instances where Alice becomes aware of her flesh-and-blood body as a 
sensual entity that she becomes utterly impenetrable to the reader’s gaze. As she removes a 
wedge of stolen cash from her underwear to hand it over to Jasper: 
The package of notes had got caught in the waist-band of her jeans, and she stood 
fumbling. Her fingers were sliding over the satiny warmth of her skin, and in a sweet 
intimate flash of reminder, or of warning, her body (her secret breathing body which 
she ignored for nearly all of her time, trying to forget it) came to life and spoke to her. 
Her fingers were tingling with the warm smoothness, and she stood there looking 
puzzled or undecided, the packet of notes loose in her hand. She looked as if she were 
trying to remember something.401 
 
As Alice is awakened to the possibility of her flesh, the reader sees only that flesh, not into her 
mind, as she enters a kind of trance that remains outside the frame of the narrative: 
She even put her seduced fingers to her nose and sniffed them, seeming even more 
puzzled and dismayed. She understood she was standing on the pavement with people 
walking past, the traffic rushing up and down – had been standing there, stock-still, for 
how long?402 
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To have flesh, it seems, is to resist the epistemological gaze altogether, as Alice’s physicality 
forecloses the access to her consciousness altogether. 
 The ideas that the subject may not understand their own actions and that the body 
resists attempts to know the subject’s interior coalesce as the comrades decide to embark on 
their terrorist adventure. After Faye’s suicide attempt and Philip’s death, Alice becomes an 
increasingly physical form but a dwindling narrative presence. She begins to sleep deeply, 
missing events that mean that like Alice, the reader has to rely on the accounts of those 
around her. She becomes progressively mute and yet more physically present than at any 
other time: 
 They all looked at Alice. 
 Alice did not move, but stirred her tea. 
 ‘Well, what’s wrong with you, then?’ demanded Jasper. 
 ‘I’m tired,’ she said. 
She got up, in a way that seemed both impulsive and mechanical. She seemed 
surprised she had got up and was going to the door. Jasper was after her and had her 
by the wrist . . . A long pause, and she came back to her chair, went on stirring her tea 
as if she had not left. 403 
 
Whereas once Alice’s intuitive words surprised her, now her physical movements do. She now 
becomes a heavy, reluctant presence, physically pushed and pulled into the narrative flow of 
the novel as Jasper calls her to a meeting to decide on the target: 
It was as if, for her, getting up on his order and coming downstairs was going to 
commit her more than she wanted, commit her again, when she had made a decision . 
. . ‘Oh no,’ said Alice, breathless, to the wall. ‘Oh no, I can’t.’ But she suddenly got up, 
dragged on her jeans and jersey, and went down.404 
 
Alice’s actions contradict her words, as her body pursues the terrorist cause despite her vocal 
reticence. Just as Alice’s sensual awareness renders her consciousness obscure to the 
narrative, so her increased physical presence in the approach to terrorist action coincides with 
an absence of narrated thought, leaving Alice a puppet-like presence. In fact, given that the 
majority of the novel is constituted by Alice’s thought-processes, as her consciousness falls 
silent, Lessing is suggesting that there is nothing to be narrated, that Alice’s decision to follow 
the terrorist plot through remains beyond the bounds of what can be known through narration 
and thus cannot be considered a decision at all. Alice, in effect, does not know why she has 
turned to terrorism and, as such, remains curiously detached from her actions. It is only 
minutes before the attack her thoughts emerge again, as she realises ‘people might be killed . . 
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. oh no, that couldn’t happen!’405 leading her to make a frantic call to the Samaritans in an 
attempt to warn people, adding as ‘an afterthought’ the claim it is an IRA attack.406 As 
motiveless terrorist, blind to the consequences of her actions, Alice ends the novel sitting in 
the squat’s kitchen the day after the attack: 
Smiling gently, a mug of very strong sweet tea in her hand, looking this morning like a 
nine-year-old girl who has had, perhaps, a bad dream, the poor baby sat waiting for it 
to be time to go out and meet the professionals.407 
 
This final observation from the external narrative voice reveals the ultimate irony of Alice’s 
situation. For it is implied that ‘the professionals’ Alice intends to meet are those investigating 
terrorist activity, professionals who are interested in Alice precisely because of her inadvertent 
connection to the IRA. Unlike the narrator and the reader, these professionals will presume 
that Alice had distinct motives, inscribing the vacuum of Alice’s conscious intent with their own 
interpretations, making her the subject they want her to be. For in giving the reader access to 
the very psychological and personal spaces the epistemology of terrorism wants to penetrate, 
The Good Terrorist suggests that even presuming there is anything revelatory to be found in 
such spaces relies on constructing an epistemological object who knows their own mind. In 
exposing the flaws and inconsistencies of the terrorist object, Lessing opens up the possibility 
that even the terrorist does not comprehend their motivations, and in doing, renders the 
discourses that presume to know what the terrorist does not ironic. 
 In both Burger’s Daughter and The Good Terrorist, the presence of women serves to 
complicate the epistemological assumptions that facilitate the construction of the terrorist 
object. But rather than becoming merely problematic presences that require exceptional 
explanation, women in Gordimer and Lessing’s work resist altogether the distinction between 
the personal and the ideological that underpins the concept of terrorism. In Burger’s Daughter, 
it is precisely the rejection of this artificial division that brings about the possibility of insurgent 
action, while The Good Terrorist suggests that categorising motivations as ideological or 
personal involves an a priori colonisation of the terrorist object. In each instance, then, 
women’s immanence resists rather than facilitates epistemological understanding. Moreover, 
it is arguably because women are always understood in terms of their immanence that 
Gordimer and Lessing choose to engage with these specific socio-historical moments through a 
female protagonist, for women will be read in relation to their context. As such, it is the 
presence of women that allows the specificity of their context to enter the text and to be read 
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in terms appropriate to it, rather than inserted into an abstract narrative of terrorism in 
general. Rather than being automatically apolitical by virtue of her immanence, woman’s 
embeddedness allows Gordimer and Lessing to critique the discourses that claim to know and 
narrate a particular ideological context. In other words, instead of leaving her psychologically 
vulnerable to exploitation by the masters of grand narratives, Gordimer and Lessing figure 
women’s personal experience as that which resists appropriation, fundamentally challenging 
the epistemology of terrorism’s claims to know the terrorist.  
 Yet both Burger’s Daughter and The Good Terrorist were written and published nearly 
two decades before terrorism discourses reached the height of their influence. Arguably, 
although Gordimer and Lessing give us women who shake the ground upon which the 
epistemology of terrorism rests, as we have seen, the post-September 11th, 2001 rhetoric 
around terrorism does not recognise the potential nuances and challenges posed by women’s 
involvement in terrorist or militant action. Instead, as terrorism discourses come to the fore in 
global politics as never before, they carry with them traditional stereotypes of women as 
passive participants or emotionally vulnerable individuals. Whilst we have long realised that 
legal and cultural frameworks in even the most ‘liberated’ countries take the masculine as the 
normative, human subject, to date such frameworks remain idiosyncratic, regional, and 
contextual. However, it is within emerging global discourses like those around terrorism,  
seemingly nothing to do with gender and sexuate identities, that understandings of normative 
identities are being exported, absorbed, and encoded at a global level. This quiet installation of 
a global norm has the potential to be incredibly tenacious, as it remains largely beneath the 
level of explicit articulation and produces a hegemonic epistemological and ontological reading 
of women and femininity that is harder to counter than the explicit anomalies thrown up by 
regional or culturally-specific genderings. It is with this in mind that we now turn to post-
September 11th literature, to see how far our idiosyncratic symbolic spaces have come to share 
the conceptual ground of global terrorism discourses. Has September 11th, 2001, impacted on 
concepts of gender within our own culture? 
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Chapter 3: Ian McEwan’s Saturday and Meaning Things After September 11th 
 
In the author’s note that opens The Second Plane: September 11: 2001-2007 (2008), Martin 
Amis asserts boldly: 
[I]f September 11 had to happen, then I am not at all sorry that it happened in my 
lifetime. That day and what followed from it: this is a narrative of misery and pain, and 
also of desperate fascination. Geopolitics may not be my natural subject, but 
masculinity is. And have we ever seen the male idea in such outrageous garb as the 
robes, combat fatigues, suits and ties, jeans, tracksuits, and medics’ smocks of the 
Islamic radical?408 
 
Throughout this collection of short stories and newspaper articles written in response the 
attacks and their aftermath, we see Amis striving to establish the boundary between the 
West’s ideals of masculinity and those outrageous versions of masculinity that burst so 
violently onto the world stage on September 11th, 2001. For Amis, there is little doubt that the 
rhetoric of terrorism is in fact about gender, a tussle between conflicting models of 
masculinity. Thus, responding to the terrorist Other becomes a process of asserting one’s own 
ideals, or more specifically, establishing one’s own concepts of masculinity as superior. As an 
author, Amis feels he is well-placed to go about this rethinking of masculinity. His short stories 
enter the minds of the September 11th attackers and Saddam Hussein’s body-doubles, each 
time exposing them to be misogynistic, slavish, miserable men, while his articles call for a 
rejection of moral relativism that refuses to recognise that Western men are better than these 
depraved creatures, a fact to which women’s relative positions in Islamic and Western 
societies pay testament.409 Neither Amis’ focus on differing kinds of masculinity nor his use of 
women to mark the borders between the outrageous and the enlightened man are particularly 
new to his work, for as Diedrick notes, ‘Amis has a great deal to say about men – as fathers, 
mentors, friends, rivals, domestic or world-historical tyrants. He has so much to say, in fact, 
that women are often crowded off the page . . . reinforc[ing] the perception that in Amis’s 
world, the primary purpose of women is to delineate relationships between men.’410 What is 
perhaps more intriguing is that Amis is not the only British author to detect this need to 
differentiate Western masculinity from Islamic or terrorist masculinity in the wake of the 
September 11th attacks. 
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 Ian McEwan prefaces his novel Saturday (2005) with an extended quote from Bellow’s 
1964 novel Herzog, opening with a question: ‘For instance? Well, for instance, what it means 
to be a man. In a city. In a century. In transition.’411 Setting his novel in London eighteen 
months after the attacks, in the build-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, it is clear that 
McEwan intends his novel to be read in relation to Bellow’s exploration of a man in crisis, and 
to be understood as an examination of what it is to be a man at this particular socio-historical 
juncture. In accordance with an Irigarayan reading of terrorism, then, both Amis and McEwan 
perceive the resurgence of the material in the terroristic moment as throwing masculine ideals 
into crisis. But if McEwan shares this conceptual ground with terrorism discourses, this 
suggests in rethinking what it is to be a man, a Western man, a British man, in a global 
community that places him alongside the terrorist Other, McEwan will need to replicate 
terrorism discourses’ insistence on the tie between symbolic and the material in order to 
distinguish his notions of masculinity from those of this threatening Other. As such, it is 
perhaps no surprise that in Saturday we see one of the central figures in British postmodern 
literature rejecting linguistic playfulness and notions of moral relativism, for the times demand 
a different understanding of language and require a definitive moral or ethical code. By 
bringing scientific and literary discourses into dialogue, Saturday works to connect language to 
the material world and in doing so, develops an ethical approach based on language’s 
profound connection to the human body and subjectivity. Yet if McEwan understands 
terrorism as posing a unique threat to masculinity, this alerts us to the fact that he shares 
conceptual ground with the discourses about terrorism that infiltrated the global sphere more 
thoroughly than ever before after September 11th. As we examine McEwan’s reworking of the 
connection between language and the material, between text and world, we must ask how far 
this shared ground leads McEwan to rearticulate conservative notions of identity and thus limit 
the ethical nature of his approach. In other words, how far can rethinking what it is to be a 
good man in a world where bad men exist help us develop a ethical gesture that disrupts the 
cycle of violence? 
 
Apprehensive Language 
 Ian McEwan’s oeuvre has repeatedly explored the ability of language and narrative to 
describe our experiences of the real world. Amigoni provides us with a particularly evocative 
term for describing the interest in the relationship between the word and the world in his 
reading of McEwan’s Enduring Love (1997). Like Saturday, this earlier novel also pits scientific 
                                                          
411
 Ian McEwan, Saturday (London: Vintage Books, 2006), Preface. 
121 
 
and literary disciplines against one another, drawing into question the ability of either 
narrative convention to relay any story. Amigoni develops this overt concern with narrative by 
citing Joe Rose, the scientific journalist who is Enduring Love’s protagonist. As Rose attempts 
to write, he is overwhelmed by anxiety: 
These words referred to a dog when I wrote them, but re-reading them, I began to 
fret. I couldn’t find the word for what I felt. It was clearly not true that without 
language there is no thought. I possessed a thought, a feeling, a sensation, and I was 
looking for its word . . . Fear was too focused, it had an object. Dread was too strong. 
Fear of the future. Apprehension then. Yes, there is was, approximately. It was 
apprehension.412 
 
Amigoni insightfully argues that ‘apprehension’ is not only the word Rose is looking for; it is 
the term that characterises Rose’s entire encounter with language. For Amigoni, this brief 
passage invokes all the nuances of ‘apprehension’: an arresting of meaning, a form of 
comprehension, and a kind of anxiety. Rose’s fretting over finding the correct word 
demonstrates that ‘the challenge of representing material ‘sensation’ registered in the body is 
no simple task of fitting the word to the thought.’413 There is no simple correlation between a 
word and a thought, thus there is no guarantee that one’s words will apprehend one’s 
meaning. The uncertainty leads to a general anxiety about language, leaving the whole process 
of writing inflected with apprehension in all its forms.  
 Amigoni’s formulation becomes particularly interesting when thinking about 
Saturday’s setting in the wake of the experience of terror induced by the September 11th 
attacks. Rose’s apprehension begins as he tries to connect thought, word, and bodily 
sensation, in an attempt to capture what he feels at a material level. This moment shows the 
apprehensive relationship to language beginning prior to narrative, emerging instead from a 
fundamental anxiety about language’s ability to ‘apprehend’ anything. Through the figure of 
Rose, McEwan locates this apprehension as a specifically literary anxiety, for until this 
moment, Rose’s scientific background has led him to assume there is a transparent 
relationship between signifier and signified. Interestingly, it is immediately after he has 
witnessed the tragic death of another man that this assumption begins to unravel, suggesting 
that Rose’s apprehension about language is directly connected to this experience. If being 
present at the brutal and unexpected demise of another brings about Rose’s literary anxiety, 
can we read McEwan as suggesting there is an inherent connection between terrorism and 
literature? 
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 Just as it is Rose’s doubts about his prose being about a dog that alert him to the 
apprehensive relationship language has to the world, Maurice Blanchot uses a cat to illustrate 
why literary language has particular cause to make us anxious. For Blanchot, ‘everyday 
language’ maintains the claim that language ‘calls a cat a cat, as if the living cat and its name 
were identical.’414 Literature, by contrast, aims to replicate the movement that made language 
possible. In Blanchot’s terms, non-literary language assumes an ability to grasp the world 
efficiently: 
Language is reassuring and disquieting at the same time. When we speak, we gain 
control over things with satisfying ease. I say, “This woman” and she is immediately 
available to me, I push her away, I bring her close, she is everything I want her to be, 
she becomes the place in which the most surprising sorts of transformations occur and 
actions unfold: speech is life’s ease and security. We cannot do anything with an object 
that has no name.415 
 
Like Irigaray, Blanchot argues that the language, the symbolic, puts the world at our disposal in 
a way that puts us at ease with it. But as for Irigaray, Blanchot recognises that this comforting 
control is gained at the expense of that which is named:  
A word may give me its meaning, but first it suppresses it. For me to be able to say 
“This woman,” I must first somehow take her flesh-and-blood reality away from her, 
cause her to be absent, annihilate her. The word gives me the being, but gives it to me 
deprived of being. The word is the absence of that being, its nothingness, what is left 
of it when it has lost being – the very fact that it does not exist. Considered in this light 
speaking is a curious right.416 
 
Blanchot thus coincides with Irigaray in arguing that language substitutes a word or sign for 
the flesh-and-blood reality of its referent. It is no surprise then, that Blanchot locates language 
as having its origins in ‘a sort of immense hecatomb,’ as everything must be annihilated, or 
sacrificed, in order to make everything absent, and thus open to representation. For Blanchot 
as for Irigaray, language is based on the forgetting of life, and as such is inextricably conjoined 
with death: 
Of course my language does not kill anyone. And yet, when I say, “This woman,” real 
death has been announced and is already present in my language; my language means 
that this person, whilst here right now, can be detached from herself, removed from 
her existence and her presence, and suddenly plunged into a nothingness in which 
there is no existence or presence; my language essentially signifies the possibility of 
this destruction; it is a constant, bold allusion to such an event . . . if this woman were 
not really capable of dying, if she were not threatened by death at every moment of 
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her life, bound and joined to death by an essential bond, I would not be able to carry 
out that ideal negation, that deferred assassination which is what my language is.417 
 
Here, a crucial difference emerges between Blanchot and Irigaray’s thought, for while Irigaray 
postulates that in cultivating sexuate difference, we can develop symbolic cultures that 
correspond to and respect the living presence of the other, there is no such hope for Blanchot. 
Instead of remembering life, the woman’s real presence only testifies to the certainty of death 
and it is this certainty that allows language to unfold.  
 Thus, literature has a very specific relationship to death for Blanchot. Again, while 
Irigaray’s thinking opens up the possibility that literature can act as a space in which the 
symbolic can be played with, altered, opened up in a way that pre-figures change in our 
culture’s imaginary, literature’s play with language represents something very different for 
Blanchot. For him, literature strives to replicate the annihilation that permits language to exist, 
in order ‘to become the revelation of what revelation destroys.’418 Literature, in effect, causes 
the meaning of words to become absent so that all language is available to it, mimicking the 
overwriting of presence that creates language. This is a radical annihilation, depriving words 
and the world of stable meaning by co-opting the negation that gave birth to language. 
Literature thus: 
allies itself with the reality of language, it makes language into matter without 
contour, content without form, a force that is capricious and impersonal and says 
nothing, reveals nothing, simply announces – through its refusal to say anything – that 
it comes from night and will return to night.419 
 
In its appropriation of the movement that facilitates the creation of language, literature 
becomes dangerous, threatening to destabilise any claim language has to apprehend the 
world. Blanchot explicitly connects literature’s negation of language to the Reign of Terror, as 
this was the revolutionary moment in which life achieved its goals by turning to death ‘in order 
to gain from death the possibility of speaking and the truth of speech.’ 420 Hence Blanchot 
embeds literature’s radical annihilation in the moment which gave birth to the concept of 
terrorism. The consequence is, as Thurschwell puts it, ‘that literary writing is itself, in its 
essence, already terrorist.’421 What is more, the writer becomes an agent of revolutionary 
negation in Blanchot’s terms. The writer’s capacity to imagine any world, any possibility, allots 
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them a freedom they do not have in actuality. Redfield argues that in Blanchot’s formulation, 
the writer too becomes a radically negative figure in taking on this mantle of freedom: ‘[g]lobal 
and immediate, the writer’s sovereign negation negates nothing, because it offers everything 
instantly.’422 The writer’s freedom to imagine the world is therefore as dangerous as the 
literature he produces, annihilating this world in order to write another.  
 Blanchot thus figures literature as replicating the repression of the material that allows 
a phallic symbolic to unfold. This becomes particularly interesting given that McEwan has 
chosen to frame Saturday with an epigraph which explicitly ponders what it is to be a man in a 
particular historical moment. Be it conscious or not, it is this proximity between writer and 
revolutionary, author and terrorist, that arguably lies beneath the anxieties about language 
that permeate Saturday. As we examine  how McEwan figures the relationship between 
language and identity, and locates these figurings in a specific historical moment, it becomes 
clear that Saturday is a novel in which McEwan attempts to foreclose the terroristic capacity of 
literature. In the face of the deviant masculinity that emerged with the September 11th attacks, 
it becomes necessary to make a clear distinction between the self and the Other, between 
author and terrorist. Saturday, then, is a novel in which McEwan attempts to draw the moral 
distinction that separates good masculinity from bad, specifically by reasserting the symbolic’s 
umbilical attachment to the world. For if Blanchot ultimately concludes that ‘[e]very time we 
speak, we make words into monsters with two faces, one being reality, physical presence, and 
the other meaning, ideal absence,’423 it is this monstrousness that we see McEwan battling 
against in Saturday.  
The Problem of Reference 
 In her analysis of Saturday, Laura Salisbury observes that within the novel, ‘the events 
of September 11, 2001, the ‘War on Terror’, and the largest political demonstration in the 
U.K.’s history against which Henry’s narrative is initially staged, all gradually fade out . . . 
recede in favour of the ‘backbone’ of the plot.’424 Set in London, the novel opens as the 
protagonist, Henry Perowne, wakes early to witness a burning plane cross the dawn sky. We 
then follow Perowne through his day, which is disrupted as he attempts to avoid the protest 
march against the plans to invade Iraq. Driving down a side-road, Perowne collides with 
another car and is aggressively confronted by its occupants. Perowne, a neurosurgeon, realises 
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the ring-leader Baxter has Huntington’s disease and defuses the situation by using this 
knowledge. We then follow Perowne through the rest of the day as he prepares for a small 
family reunion that evening, a reunion which nearly ends in tragedy as Baxter invades the 
Perowne household with a knife. On one level, then, as the day progresses the plot moves 
from a sudden and immediate engagement with the complexities of the contemporary geo-
political climate to focus increasingly on the personal. Arguably, much of the criticism 
produced regarding Saturday echoes this movement, frequently opening with an 
acknowledgement that the events listed by Salisbury are clearly present in the novel, before 
quietly relegating their presence to the status of a ‘backdrop’ as they insert the novel into the 
larger narrative of McEwan’s literary career. There seems to be an implicit acceptance that in 
stating that ‘[h]owever much Saturday captures the mood of post-9/11 anxiety, its central 
ideas are drawn from other sources,’425 one has sufficiently engaged with the explicit presence 
of these events within the text. Just as the novel introduces these elements into the text at the 
beginning and then gradually brings Perowne’s private life and thoughts to the fore, so 
readings of Saturday mention the overt historical context before focusing on a plot that 
‘threatens to be Henry Perowne’s own personal 9/11, bringing with it a convulsive disruption 
of his domestic space’426 or inserting the novel into a narrative of the ‘evolution of McEwan’s 
post-9/11 thought’.427 
While these readings provide some excellent insights into both the thought that 
underpins McEwan’s work and the myriad nuances at work within Saturday, relegating the 
broader context explicitly invoked in the novel to background noise is to miss one of the key 
questions set up by the novel. Saturday is widely recognised and read as continuing McEwan’s 
well-documented involvement in the ‘two cultures’ and ‘third culture’ debates,428 in which 
thinkers such as John Brockman, Richard Dawkins, and other members of the Reality Club 
assert that scientific discovery should serve as the foundation for ethical thought, meaning the 
Humanities have an obligation to reflect the truths science unveils. Indeed, as Marcus puts it, 
Saturday unambiguously sets up ‘the competing claims of science/medicine and literature to 
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‘truth’’429 in the form of the relationships the neurosurgeon Henry has with his poet and 
‘literate, too literate daughter Daisy,’430 and to a certain extent, his father-in-law, John 
Grammaticus, an acclaimed poet. But as Childs notes, Saturday is McEwan’s first novel to 
engage fully with the present,431 be that in terms of narrative structure or historical context. 
Taking this observation together with the decision to openly draw the September 11th attacks 
and their political aftermath into the text, it becomes appropriate to ask why it is that the 
‘post-9/11 climate’ proves so pertinent to McEwan’s interest in and representation of the ‘two 
cultures’ and ‘third culture’ debates? There is no immediately apparent connection, and yet 
something within our understanding of the attacks, their aftermath and the representation of 
them seems to make the link so apparent that it does not merit examination. Somewhere 
along the line, the religion-versus-rationality, science-versus-art, nature-versus-nurture 
dichotomies have blurred, meaning that attacks by religious extremists seem an obvious 
backdrop for McEwan to situate his representation of the third culture debate against.  
To read the novel purely in terms of McEwan’s thought is to ignore the emphasis 
placed on September 11th as an era-defining instant in the novel’s opening pages. As a flaming 
object passes across the dark sky above London, Perowne is quickly alerted to the nature of 
the burning object as ‘a low rumbling sound, gentle thunder gathering in volume . . . tells him 
everything.’432 Realising it is a burning plane, Perowne feels that ‘the spectacle has the 
familiarity of a recurrent dream,’433 reflecting on his own in-flight fantasies: 
Plastic fork in hand, he often wonders how it might go – the screaming in the cabin 
partly muffled by that deadening acoustic, the fumbling in bags for phones and last 
words, the airline staff in their terror clinging to remembered fragments of procedure, 
the levelling smell of shit. But the scene construed from outside, from afar like this, is 
also familiar. It’s already almost eighteen months since half the planet watched, and 
watched again the unseen captives driven through the sky to the slaughter, at which 
time there gathered round the innocent silhouette of any jet plane a novel association. 
Everyone agrees, airliners look different in the sky these days, predatory or doomed.434 
 
Right from the novel’s opening, September 11th, 2001, is figured as a defining experience. Not 
only do the opening pages of the novel include the striking image of a distressed plane flying 
ominously over a the centre of a city, Perowne’s thoughts demonstrate just how pervasive the 
impact of the attacks is, entering into both his daydreams and his everyday awareness of what 
planes ‘should’ sound and look like, as well as altering everyone’s perceptions of airliners. 
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 Perhaps it is because the peculiar familiarity Perowne senses as he watches the 
flaming plane make its way towards Heathrow captures a sense of the peculiar familiarity we 
now have with the footage, stories and repercussions of September 11th that this extraordinary 
opening scene is not given the same credit for shaping the novel as McEwan’s other 
exceptional openings. For while critics draw parallels between Enduring Love, The Child In Time 
(1987) and Atonement (2001) in terms of narrative structures, characters, use of scientific 
rhetoric, and the apparent fascination with the nature of the relationship between narrative 
and truth, the opening events in each of these novels are persistently given credit for shaping 
the rest of the narrative in a way that Saturday’s burning plane is not. Given that McEwan sets 
the novel on the day in which the largest protest the U.K. had ever witnessed took place – 
February 15th, 2003 – in the city through which the biggest march took place, it becomes even 
more surprising that the September 11th attacks are so easily understood as a background 
element. For although the protests were against the U.S.-led plans to invade Iraq, it was 
apparent that the Bush administration had, at worst, partly built their case for war on 
completely unfounded claims that linked Saddam Hussein’s regime to al-Qaeda; and at best 
were attempting to make use of the post-September 11th climate to gain support for their 
plans. Thus, the specific historical setting of the novel ties the text to the attacks of 2001. 
Given this specificity, rather than splitting away recognisable patterns within Saturday and 
inserting them into other pre-established McEwan narratives, should we not instead be 
reading these well-established McEwan themes as being placed in a dialogue with September 
11th and its aftermath? 
 The opening description of the burning plane provides a hint as to how the attacks on 
the World Trade Center relate to McEwan’s more familiar concerns with the relationship 
between science and literature. Again, as Perowne watches the plane’s descent, he cannot 
help but draw parallels with watching the attacks unfold: 
That is the other familiar element – the horror of what he can’t see. Catastrophe 
observed from a safe distance. Watching death on a large scale, but seeing no one die. 
No blood, no screams, no human figures at all, and into this emptiness, the obliging 
imagination set free.435 
 
These words echo phrases McEwan himself has repeated in articles he produced in the days 
immediately after the attacks, and in later interviews.436 Perowne locates the source of his 
horror as being the inability to see in detail what is unfolding as his distance from the events 
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allows his imagination free reign over them, for there is no bloody actuality to frame and limit 
the possibilities his own mind invents. Elsewhere McEwan has described this very distance as 
something that struck him as he watched the smoke billowing from the towers; ‘[i]t was that 
gap between what we really knew must be going on and the fact that you couldn’t actually, in 
those first instances, see any human distress.’437 Terror emerges thanks to our knowledge of 
what must be happening and the distance that prevents us from confirming what we know: 
the space between knowing and seeing allows the mind to fill in the gaps. The gap between 
the brutality of the event and the witness is thus what imbues the event with terror. 
As the plane continues to blaze its way across the early morning sky, Perowne’s 
thoughts enter into the space between himself and what he is witnessing, and it is in the train 
of these thoughts that we see traces of what constitutes the terror of this gap. As the ‘plane 
emerges from the trees, crosses a gap and disappears behind the Post Office Tower’ Perowne 
contemplates the temptation to read the presence of ‘a hidden order, an external intelligence 
which wants to show or tell him something of significance’ as being behind his somnambulant 
rise from bed, a temptation that he regards as foreign to his understanding of the world, but 
that he recognises in others as the ‘primitive thinking of the supernaturally inclined,’ thinking 
that his psychiatric colleagues ‘call a problem . . . of reference.’438 Perowne hypothesises that 
such problem could lie behind the fire he is now witnessing, which in turn would lead to 
‘another problem of reference’ as the passengers on-board pray ‘to their own god for 
intercession.’439 Finally, as the plane disappears from view, this chain of thought culminates in 
Perowne’s recollection of a ‘famous thought experiment’: 
A cat, Schrödinger’s Cat, hidden from view in a covered box, is either still alive, or has 
just been killed by a randomly activated hammer hitting a vial of poison. Until the 
observer lifts the cover, from the box, both possibilities, alive cat and dead cat, exist 
side by side, in parallel universes, equally real. At the point at which the lid is lifted 
from the box and the cat examined, a quantum wave of probability collapses. None of 
this has ever made any sense to him at all. No human sense. Surely another example 
of a problem of reference.440 
 
Despite claiming that this experiment has never made any sense to him, something in 
Perowne’s understanding of this experiment leads him to link the problem of reference to 
what he has just witnessed. An unarticulated connection is made between the freedom of 
Perowne’s imagination to fill in the spaces he cannot see and the various examples of 
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problematic referentiality that enter the text. Yet, even as this connection remains below the 
surface of the text, Perowne is still quick to explicitly dismiss it: 
To Henry, it seems beyond the requirements of proof: a result, a consequence, exists 
separately in the world, independent of himself, known to others, awaiting his 
discovery. What then collapses will be his own ignorance. Whatever the score, it is 
already chalked up. And whatever the passengers’ destination, whether they are 
frightened and safe, or dead, they will have arrived by now.441 
 
Just as Perowne initially dismisses his initial concern that ‘there’s something he should be 
doing’442 by imagining the actions of others called to duty by the burning plane, so too he 
concludes that the fates of both the cat and the passengers on the plane are entirely 
independent of his knowledge. Perowne is sure these events will reach a conclusion regardless 
of whether he knows about it or not. To think otherwise is to approach an ‘excess of the 
subjective, the ordering of the world in line with your needs, an inability to contemplate your 
own unimportance.’443 Yet while Perowne feels it is ‘beyond the requirements of proof’ that 
there is physical reality independent of the limits of his perception, this knowledge does not 
prevent his imagination from attempting to fill in the gap between what he has physical 
evidence for and what he presumes he knows. 
 It is not only the obliging imagination’s willingness to fill in hypothetical details that 
makes the space between referent and representation problematic for Perowne. Just as the 
burning plane initially turns his thoughts to the problem of reference, so later, it serves to 
highlight to Perowne the possibilities for manipulation that the instability of reference permits. 
As the incident is reported on the television news, it is ‘made real at last, the plane, askew on 
the runway, apparently intact . . . Schrödinger’s dead cat is alive after all.’444 This realisation 
leads Perowne to recognise the risk that lies in such reliance on the media for verification: 
This past hour he’s been in a state of wild unreason, in a folly of overinterpretation. It 
doesn’t console him that anyone in these times, standing at the window in his place, 
might have leaped to the same conclusions. Misunderstanding is general all over the 
world. How can we trust ourselves? He sees now the details he half-ignored in order to 
nourish his fears: that the plane was not being driven into a public building, that it was 
making a regular, controlled descent, that it was on a well-used flight path – none of 
this fitted the general unease. He told himself there were two possible outcomes – the 
cat was dead or alive. But he’d already voted for the dead, when he should have 
sensed it straight away – a simple accident in the making. Not an attack on our whole 
way of life then.445 
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The television images of the plane on the ground act as the evidence that Perowne’s senses 
were missing before. Yet he realises he did in fact have all the evidence to hand as he 
witnessed the event; in a Baudrillardian gesture, he simply ignored certain details in order to 
insert what he was seeing into the ‘general unease’ of the global climate. This neurosurgeon 
who prides himself on his observational rationale realises that he too is capable of ignoring the 
evidence in favour of an a priori understanding. Moreover, he locates his willingness to read 
the evidence in this way as originating with the media itself. Just as the media tells Perowne 
how significant an incident is based on the order in which stories are reported, so too the 
global ‘general unease’ and ‘misunderstanding’ that shape Perowne’s reaction have their roots 
in the media’s representation of events. As the full facts about what he has witnessed come to 
fruition later in the day, Perowne feels his initial responses to the burning plane are: 
part of the new order, this narrowing of mental freedom, of his right to roam. Not so 
long ago his thoughts ranged more unpredictably, over a longer list of subjects. He 
suspects he’s becoming a dupe, the willing, febrile consumer of news fodder, opinion, 
speculation and of all the crumbs the authorities let fall.446 
 
Through persistent exposure and reliance on the media’s representation of world events, 
Perowne has ‘lost the habits of scepticism . . . he isn’t thinking clearly, and just as bad, he 
senses he isn’t thinking independently.’447 The combination of terror and media representation 
leave Perowne unable to think for himself, rendering him part of the faceless audience that 
terrorism discourses rely on. As such, Perowne becomes a member of a Baudrillardian 
audience, unable to respond to events in a spontaneous or independent way. 
This becomes particularly apparent in Perowne’s first encounter with Baxter. As 
Perowne watches Baxter and his two accomplices approach, he becomes aware that:  
He is cast in a role, and there’s no way out. This, as people like to say, is urban drama. 
A century of movies and half a century of television have rendered the matter 
insincere. It is pure artifice . . . Someone is going to have to impose his will and win, 
and the other is going to give way. Popular culture has worn this matter smooth with 
reiteration . . . Furthermore, nothing can be predicted, but everything, as soon as it 
happens, will seem to fit.448 
 
The history of media representations of male confrontation within an urban setting 
immediately limits the possible responses available to Perowne in this situation, either 
because the repeated representations have set up a series of cultural ‘rules as elaborate as the 
politesse of the Versailles court,’ or because the reiteration has smoothed a path of thought so 
frictionless that it is impossible for Perowne to gain enough purchase on his situation to think 
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his way off the beaten path. This moment of violence becomes a Baudrillardian ‘artifice’ before 
it has even occurred, as it is pre-figured by images of male confrontation, and afterwards, will 
fit a recognisable, pre-established trope of urban drama. More than this, pre-established 
representation means that violence becomes inevitable regardless of the specifics of the 
situation, for just as Perowne focused in on certain aspects of the burning plane in order to 
insert it into an established pattern of understanding, so too all the men present on University 
Street translate certain key elements of their surroundings to insert themselves into a 
recognisable scenario. Representation, then, has the potential to come between the subject 
and the world in such a way as to limit or dictate how the subject interacts with that world. 
Here, Perowne’s thinking echoes that of terrorism discourses, presuming that media 
representation has the capacity to reduce the individual’s capacity to respond, as well as 
encouraging the perpetuation of violence.  
 Perowne’s personal experience thus suggests that it is necessary to resist the capacity 
of representation to prescribe the individual’s understanding of the world, creating an 
undifferentiated herd instinct. Indeed, Saturday suggests it is precisely because 
representations have such reductive power that our use of language should be shaped by an 
understanding of moral obligation, as we shall see. But if Perowne’s encounters with violence 
are designed to be read in relation to the post-September 11th climate, what does McEwan set 
up as a means to resist such reduction to a group-mind in the face of media representation? 
Specifically, he gives us the individual mind, and it is the connection between the individual 
mind and language that works to produce McEwan’s rethinking of identity and ethics in the 
presence of the violent Other.  
 The Slice -of- Mind Novel 
Saturday is widely recognised as participating in a tradition of ‘slice-of-life’ literary 
fiction, with the use of free indirect discourse and the twenty-four hour time frame most 
frequently leading to comparisons with Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1925) and James 
Joyce’s Ulysses (1922).449 Head, however, argues that McEwan is not simply continuing the 
work of his predecessors, as some have suggested, nor providing a critique of the modernist 
project. Rather, Head suggests that McEwan is ’trying to produce . . . a diagnostic ‘slice-of-
mind’ novel – working towards the literary equivalent of a CT scan.’450 Whether or not this 
attempt is entirely successful is questionable in Head’s view, but nonetheless, ‘[s]tylistically . . . 
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the novel makes a bold attempt to engage with [the] immediacy of human consciousness.’451 
One of the consequences of the use of free indirect discourse to generate this immediacy is a 
sense of completeness that makes it difficult to move beyond the limits of the text. In reading 
Saturday, we are carried along with Perowne’s thought processes, following the line and flow 
of his internal arguments, and thus not only have access to the information and reasoning that 
underpins his thinking, but are given the sense that everything available to Perowne has been 
taken into account.  
This becomes particularly apparent when comparing the thorough, articulate account 
of Perowne’s meeting with Professor Taleb and his ensuing pro-war stance with his 
fragmented debate with Daisy over the impending invasion of Iraq.452 When immersed in 
Perowne’s thoughts, the flow of his reasoning brings the reader along with him, or in Ross’s 
terms, ‘McEwan’s use of a unitary center of perception . . . situates the reader within a 
discursive universe that is relentlessly judicious, probing, and “superior.”’453 When vocalising 
his opinions, however, the logic behind Perowne’s position no longer seamlessly leads us to a 
conclusion. In producing a slice-of-life novel, McEwan, according to Head, ‘has adopted a style 
that gets very close to the experience of reading,’454 or perhaps to put it another way, has 
adopted a style that mimics the reader’s experience of thought in such a way as to generate a 
closed-circuit between reader and text. To read Perowne’s thoughts is to think through them 
with him. This hermetic relationship is reinforced by Perowne’s awareness of other points of 
view, and even by his own moments of doubt. The fact that he acknowledges that he ‘might 
have been with’ the anti-war protestors ‘in spirit at least . . . if Professor Taleb hadn’t needed 
an aneurysm clipped,’455 and that ‘[w]henever he talks to Jay, Henry finds himself tending 
towards the anti-war camp’456 demonstrate a degree of awareness and flexibility that 
reinforces the feeling that Perowne’s final opinions have been arrived at after carefully 
considering all angles. It is perhaps no surprise then that in discussing the novel, the overriding 
temptation becomes one of engaging with Perowne directly, by addressing the very issues his 
thoughts circle around on this particular Saturday. Taken alongside the tendency to read 
McEwan’s work as part of his own literary history, this frequently produces critiques that, as 
Hillard notes, ‘take for granted that Perowne speaks for McEwan,’ a reading that Hillard also 
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notes McEwan does not necessarily discourage.457 If we accept that McEwan is attempting to 
produce a slice-of-mind novel, building on the modernist slice-of-life text as exemplified by 
Mrs Dalloway, which portrays ‘an ‘ordinary’ mind on an ordinary day in order to explore wider 
social, cultural and political issues,’458 then it becomes crucial to move beyond the seductive 
completeness of Perowne’s train of thought and ask instead: why examine this particular mind 
at this particular moment? 
To begin to answer this question, first it is necessary to ask what concept of mind the 
text presents us with. There are at least two strands to the text’s modelling of the mind 
operating within the novel, one at the diegetic level of the text presented to us by Perowne’s 
knowledge of the brain, and one the text itself presents us with in representing Perowne’s 
thought patterns. Indeed, I would suggest that it is possible to link these two models to the 
two primary encounters with ‘exceptional’ brains within the text, in the form of Baxter’s 
Huntington’s disease and Lily Perowne’s dementia. Although both minds are unravelling 
because of disease, the effects of their particular disease bring about different movements 
into oblivion, and it is the form of this movement that provides us with a model of what the 
‘normal’ mind is. Specifically, Baxter’s condition serves as an exemplar of Perowne’s 
understanding of the mind, while his mother’s dementia aligns itself more with the literary 
representation provided by the text, as we shall see. 
For Perowne, Baxter’s condition is an example of ‘how the brilliant machinery of being 
is undone by the tiniest of faulty cogs, the insidious whisper of ruin, a single bad idea lodged in 
every cell, on every chromosome four.’459 More specifically, his situation is described as 
‘beyond pity. There are so many ways the brain can let you down. Like an expensive car, it’s 
intricate, but mass-produced nevertheless, with more than six billion in circulation.’460 The 
suggestion here is that the brain is machine-like, both in its operation and in its mass-produced 
nature, and thus is made vulnerable both by its susceptibility to mechanical failure and the 
potential for errors in the process of mass-production. Further, this model of the brain permits 
Perowne a professional detachment; there is no point in pitying a machine for having an inbuilt 
flaw. Thinking in mechanical terms about the brain permits a mechanical or scientific 
detachment. 
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This is not the case when it comes to Perowne’s mother, Lily. Although Perowne traces 
the medical effects of dementia, his observations are inflected with an awareness of precisely 
what it is that is being lost through the damage to brain matter: ‘[t]he disease proceeds by tiny 
unnoticed strokes in small blood vessels in the brain. Cumulatively, the infarcts cause cognitive 
decline by disrupting the neural nets. She unravels in little steps.’461 Material deterioration 
equates directly to loss of individuality. The breakdown of brain matter is the breakdown of 
subjectivity, as the small movements of the disease through the brain are mirrored in the ‘little 
steps’ through which the subject loses any cohesive identity. Indeed, the damage to Lily’s brain 
reveals precisely where subjectivity, as human consciousness, is located: 
Damage from the small-vessel clotting tends to accumulate in the white matter and 
destroy the mind’s connectivity. Along the way, well before the process is complete, 
Lily is able to deliver her rambling treatises, her nonsense monologues with touching 
seriousness. 462 
 
The process that has yet to be complete is the total erasure of Lily’s consciousness, a process 
so comprehensive as to deprive her of the ability to express ‘herself’. As it is the mind’s 
connectivity that is being destroyed by the progress of the disease, this suggests that her 
subjectivity lies within these connections. But it is the eventual loss of language that 
represents the final, absolute destruction of the subject. For now, Lily’s nonsensical 
communication maintains a semblance of individual identity, for Lily if for not for her son: 
She doesn’t doubt herself at all. Nor does she think he’s unable to follow her. The 
structure of her sentences is intact, and the moods which inflect her various 
descriptions make sense.463 
 
As long as the neuronal matter in her brain remains intact enough to permit her access to 
language, Lily can communicate and in doing so, articulate some sense of ‘herself,’ albeit an 
identity stripped down to the bare minimum of subjectivity, able to do little more than imbue 
a grammatical structure with some sense of mood. Once the connectivity of the brain is 
destroyed beyond a certain point, even this rudimentary language will be lost, and with it the 
last vestige of subjectivity.  
 In Baxter, we are given ‘a special case’, a genetic exception in which the error in the 
production of his genetic make-up means that his identity is determined by his body to such a 
degree that his future appears fated: 
It is written. No amount of love, drugs, Bible classes or prison sentencing can cure 
Baxter or shift him from his course. It’s spelled out in fragile proteins, but it could be 
carved in stone, or tempered steel. 464 
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Whereas Baxter is described as being completely at the mercy of his genetic condition, as his 
movements, moods, and behaviour are all part of the ‘expression of his condition,’465 Lily’s 
exceptional state suggests that, rather than consciousness being a fundamental expression of 
biological material, there is something in being able to express oneself that constitutes that 
consciousness. Thus, in Baxter we are presented with a model of the mind as pure expression 
of the code contained within our genes, as consciousness and subjectivity written in the 
cellular matter of the body. Lily’s condition, by contrast, introduces an ambiguity into this 
relation, as it is the ability to express herself that is exposed as being vulnerable to her material 
existence; her access to language is fundamental to her subjectivity, and the deterioration of 
her language is as much a loss of her consciousness as is the loss of neuronal connections.  
 Despite recognising how pivotal his mother’s access to language is for her sense of 
self, Perowne reads the ambiguity this introduces into his concept of the mind as being an 
illustration of what contemporary neuroscience has yet to discover: 
For all the recent advances, it’s still not known how this well-protected one kilogram 
or so of cells actually encodes information, how it holds experiences, memories, 
dreams and intentions. He doesn’t doubt that in years to come, the coding mechanism 
will be known . . . Just like the digital codes of replicating life held within DNA, the 
brain’s fundamental secret will be laid open one day. But even when it has, the 
wonder will remain, that mere wet stuff can make this bright inward cinema of 
thought, of sight and sound and touch bound into a vivid illusion of an instantaneous 
present, with a self, another brightly wrought illusion, hovering like a ghost at its 
centre. 466 
 
While Perowne acknowledges that there is a difference between the brain and the mind, he 
has no doubt that the mind is shaped entirely by the ‘mere wet stuff’ of the brain. Again, 
despite the implicit recognition in this passage of the significance of representation in forming 
consciousness, in the ‘inward cinema,’ the ‘vivid illusion of an instantaneous present’ and the 
ghost-like self, Perowne does not allow room in his thinking for the possibility that 
‘representation’ might in turn sculpt the mind, in direct contradiction to his experience of the 
media’s influence on his day-to-day thinking. He remains a steadfast ‘professional reductionist’ 
who ‘can’t help thinking’ people’s lives are determined by invisible folds and kinks of 
character, written in code, at the level of molecules.’467 Thus, while the temptation is to read 
the contrast between Perowne the neuroscientist and his artistic offspring as representing the 
crucial debate within the text, in the pairing of Baxter and Lily, McEwan takes the science/art 
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debate beyond the conflicting methodologies and into a discussion of the kinds of subjectivity 
each approach allows us to articulate. We shall return to Lily and the relationship between 
language and body her disease articulates, but for now, we shall turn to the kind of subjectivity 
and ethical approach offered up by Perowne’s professional reductionism. 
 Consciousness, subjectivity, and identity all become expressions of the material reality 
of the brain in Perowne’s model, with the mind being a mysterious means of facilitating a 
connection between the interiority of material existence and the external world – mysterious 
yet undoubtedly the result of complex interactions at a molecular level. Interestingly, Perowne 
feels that even when science has laid bare how the microscopic biological workings of the 
brain dictate our lives, we will still be left in awe of the brain’s workings, as ‘wonder will 
remain.’ There is an intriguing tension here with the sensation of terror, as both wonder and 
terror emerge in the space between knowing what must be happening and seeing it for 
oneself. This tension comes to the fore as we explore how Perowne’s turn to the body for 
articulating subjectivity differs from that of Irigaray’s sensible transcendental. Perowne’s 
modelling of the mind has interesting parallels with Lévi-Strauss’s understanding of the brain 
as the place of the subject, and it is here we again find the crucial difference between the 
scientist’s turn to the body and Irigaray’s own. Perowne believes – or knows – that who we are 
is determined by our genes, right down to the position we occupy in society,468 while Irigaray 
argues that we need to recognise that the subject is always sexuate, a defining characteristic 
that is ultimately initiated at a genetic level. But while both positions agree that the material 
nature of the body is central in constituting subjectivity, the manner in which this material is 
approached means that Perowne and Irigaray draw very different conclusions as to how the 
body constructs identity, and what precisely is constructed. For Perowne, the account of ‘how 
matter becomes conscious’ may be beyond his imagining, ‘but he knows it will come . . . as 
long as the scientists and institutions remain in place, the explanations will refine themselves 
into an irrefutable truth about consciousness . . .That’s the only kind of faith he has.’469 The 
brain, as a material substance, will ultimately give up its secrets under the scrutiny of science, 
providing us once and for all with a definitive, empirical, observable truth about what it is to be 
human. The brain is taken in isolation, ‘laid open’ like a dissected cadaver in order to display its 
inner workings. Perowne pursues a reductionist line of thought emblematic of a phallic 
scientific tradition that Irigaray describes as ‘a masculine anatomic science, usually thought 
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starting from cadavers or from animal experimentation.’470 Thus Perowne’s conception of the 
brain echoes Lévi-Strauss, rendering the brain as biological matter in isolation, a master organ 
removed from the very body over which it has mastery.  
Perowne’s ‘faith’ in modern scientific practice imbricates his understanding of 
subjectivity with the ideals of phallic masculinity as he figures the brain and the mind, and in 
his attempts to ‘find a morality, an ethics down among the enzymes and amino acids when the 
general taste is for looking in the other direction?’471 The brain is a machine, a computer, 
highly-specialised matter that requires similarly highly-specialised machines to decode that 
which it has encoded. The self is an immaterial illusion, haunting the centre of the machine, a 
disembodied observer, whose true nature can only be revealed and defined by the detached, 
objective, observant scientist. Not only, then, is the robot a Straussian robot, the self a 
Cartesian ghost in the machine, consciousness is only knowable by the few specialists 
equipped to know the brain in its entirety, installing the neuroscientist as the epistemological 
master of what it is to be human thanks to his expertise in atomising the body’s materiality. It 
is no surprise then that, in Perowne’s frequent revisiting of moral questions, the microscopic 
material of life secures his ethics. Moreover, Perowne’s turn to the world of neurons and 
genetics as determining subjectivity coincides with a Darwinian interpretation of human 
existence. When reflecting on Larkin’s musing that he would ‘make use of water’ if 
constructing a religion, Perowne posits that: 
he’d make use of evolution. What better creation myth? An unimaginable sweep of 
time, numberless generations spawning by infinitesimal steps complex living beauty 
out of inert matter, driven on by the blind furies of random mutation, natural selection 
and environmental change, with the tragedy of forms continually dying, and lately the 
wonder of minds emerging and with them, morality, love, art, cities – and the 
unprecedented bonus of this story happening to be demonstrably true.472 
 
For Perowne, just as subjectivity is an expression of genetic material, so elements of 
human culture are all part of the process of physical evolution, capable of instilling wonder 
even when read as such. Perhaps it is inevitable then that Perowne’s view of history is 
positivist, as he finds the claims of Daisy’s university lecturers that ‘the idea of progress old-
fashioned and ridiculous’ as an affront, a cause for ‘indignation’.473 For Perowne, rejecting the 
idea of progress is to ignore the fact that life, in cities like London at least, ‘has steadily 
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improved over the centuries for most people, despite the junkies and beggars now.’474 Such a 
rejection works against the evidence, as ‘[a]t every level, material, medical, intellectual, 
sensual, for most people life has improved.’475 The qualification Perowne feels he has to add, 
the ‘despite’ and ‘for most’ are telling. For as Perowne’s reductionist thinking coincides with a 
particular reading of Darwinist evolution, our position within a society is determined by our 
genes, reifying society’s structure by interpreting it as a consequence of evolution. This 
produces a specific conception of our responsibilities to one another within this ‘natural’ 
system. For when one’s fate is determined by one’s biology, it becomes apparent that ‘[n]o 
amount of social justice will cure or disperse this enfeebled army haunting the public places of 
every town,’476 this army being those whose genetic make-up puts them at an evolutionary 
disadvantage. As Head observes, while Perowne repeatedly reflects that chance plays a 
deciding role in laying down one’s genome, it is still an individual’s genome that dictates who 
will be lost to the world of drug addiction and who will be pursuing an academic career and 
publishing poetry in Paris.477 
 Such a view produces a particular universalism that underpins Perowne’s ethical 
formulations. As Salisbury puts it, ‘Henry, it seems, knows that there is shared material 
substrate that subtends human behaviour.’478 But unlike Irigaray’s sensible transcendental, 
Perowne’s awareness of our incarnate nature leaves subjects potentially interchangeable: ‘For 
a vertiginous moment Henry feels himself bound to the other man, as though on a seesaw 
with him, pinned to an axis that could tip them into each other’s life.’479 The man in question is 
a street cleaner, facing the futile task of clearing a central London street during the protest 
march. Differentiated only by the minute molecular differences that swing the evolutionary 
balance, they are connected in a such a way as to be potentially interchangeable. Humanity, 
then, becomes universally bound to one-another through a shared molecular materiality which 
differentiates humanity via varying degrees of genetic fortune. In perceiving himself to be at 
the apex of this evolutionary chain, Perowne is conscious of his duties to those less fortunate 
than himself, as he reflects on his initial encounter with Baxter: 
Did he, Henry Perowne, act unprofessionally, using his medical knowledge to 
undermine a man suffering from an neurodegenerative disorder? Yes. Did the threat 
of a beating excuse him? Yes, no, not entirely . . . he, Henry, was obliged, or forced, to 
abuse his own power – but he allowed himself to be placed in that position.480  
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For Perowne, his genetically-determined lot in life has given him power over others, and 
despite Baxter’s clear physical advantage over him (also genetically determined), Perowne 
reads himself as being the responsible party, depriving Baxter of a controlling stake in the 
situation. This is repeated later, as Perowne operates on Baxter and then decides to take it 
upon himself not to press charges, but instead to ‘do what he can to make the patient 
comfortable’ whilst at the same time ensuring he is securely in the system ‘before he does 
more harm.’481 Social responsibility becomes a matter of the Perownes of this world not 
abusing their advantageous position for their own ends, and instead managing those who are 
doomed from birth not to thrive, providing them with consolation whilst keeping them from 
doing harm: 
You have to recognise bad luck when you see it, you have to look out for these people. 
Some you can prise from their addictions, others – all you can do is make them 
comfortable somehow, minimise their miseries.482 
 
Watching ‘the sort of person who can’t earn a living, or resist another drink, or remember 
today what he resolved to do yesterday,’483 Perowne’s thoughts tread the fine line between his 
reductionist analysis and the logic used by the tyrannical regimes of people he despises – 
Saddam Hussein, ‘Hitler, Stalin, Mao’.484 But though Perowne’s genetic determinism brings him 
perilously close to articulating something akin to eugenics, his is an ethics based on an 
understanding of the material gained through medical training. Thus, rather than merely 
condemning the weak to failure, Perowne’s brand of reductionism is inflected with the values 
of ‘the medical profession, governed by the Hippocratic oath, which obliges reverence of life, 
in a uniform and impersonal sense.’485 Yet again, we see a disavowal of the personal as an 
appropriate means for formulating the social and the political. 
This reverence for life that obliges the fortunate to ease the passage of the doomed 
through life, an impersonal, universal, objective recognition of a shared, observable 
materiality, transcends any cultural, historical or even species boundaries, as there are: 
scores of polymodal nociceptor sites just like ours in the head and neck of rainbow 
trout . . . This is the growing complication of the modern condition, the expanding 
circle of moral sympathy. Not only distant peoples are our brothers and sisters, but 
foxes too, and laboratory mice, and now the fish.486  
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At this point Perowne’s reverence for life hits its limit as it encounters the pragmatic 
limitations of an ethics based in materiality. To accept that possessing the same polymodal 
nociceptor sites, means pain will be experienced in the same way in any living body, and to 
base one’s universalism in such sites is to accept a moral obligation to the animals we eat to 
survive. Thus Perowne, standing in a fishmongers purchasing that night’s dinner, pulls a 
Darwinian sleight-of-hand; 
The trick, as always, the key to human success and domination, is to be selective in 
your mercies. For all the discerning talk, it’s the close at hand, the visible that exerts 
the overpowering force. And what you don’t see . . . That’s why in gentle Marylebone 
the world seems to be entirely at peace.487 
 
Human success relies on a selective understanding of the universal, one that makes use of the 
immediate surroundings. While Perowne’s awareness of shared neuronal matter means he 
turns away from the still-living crabs and lobsters to the ‘bloodless white flesh’, there is an 
element of chagrin to his tone as he ponders the growing list of those to whom we have a 
moral obligation. It is no wonder, then, that he finds consolation in the logic of natural 
selection. Reverence for life, it seems, is limited by evolutionary protocol. Such a recognition 
undermines the ethical potential of Perowne’s approach, particularly in his contemporary 
context, for it suggests that even recognising a shared physicality is not enough to secure the 
ethical relation when those who pull the epistemic strings are able to decide where the 
evolutionary lines are drawn. The turn to the genetic still leaves the dominant forces in the 
world able to inscribe meaning and value on the lives of others. 
 Portraying this preparedness to adapt apparently unquestionable truths and universal 
values supposedly grounded in them, McEwan begins to excoriate the apparently smooth 
surface of Perowne’s reductionist ethics. The consolation that self-interest is part of 
humanity’s evolutionary success does not fit easily with Perowne’s reliance on the same values 
to establish our moral obligation to one another. The malleability of Perowne’s genetic ethics 
suggests the empirical ground he seeks to rest them on is not as stable as he “knows” it to be. 
As Catherine Malabou, among others, notes, there is an innate connection between the 
modelling of the brain and the historical context in which a model is produced, as they are 
inflected with terms specific to the technological and social organisations of that moment. 
Malabou tells us: 
It is because in each individual the brain constitutes the controlling authority par 
excellence that all the descriptions we can give of it always participate, in one way or 
another, in political analysis. We can thus affirm that there is no scientific study of the 
modalities of cerebral power that does not by the same token – implicitly and usually 
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unconsciously – adopt a stance with respect to the contemporary power of the very 
study within which it operates.488 
 
Perowne has no doubt that if the correct institutions remain in place, science will produce a 
final, incontrovertible truth about human consciousness, which will subsequently provide the 
bedrock for a universal morality. What Perowne fails to acknowledge is that in extrapolating 
such codes from empirical evidence, one is necessarily entering into a process of ‘reading’ and 
‘interpretation,’ in which material “truth” is translated into a broader lesson. In other words, 
because the brain is presumed to be the body’s master, the empirical evidence about the brain 
will always be read in terms provided by the conceptual framework that supports 
contemporary notions of governance and power in such a way that the apparent coincidence 
between the biological and cultural will reify society’s current form. Thus to draw upon the 
conclusions of neuroscience and genetics for moral and ethical mores is to risk simply 
solidifying the status quo, propping up the very institutions that produced the evidence. This is 
made manifest as Perowne’s career in neuroscience secures a comfortable and prosperous life 
for his family at the top of the social chain, while simultaneously providing an ethical approach 
that justifies such prosperity in a world of increasingly stark contrasts. Genetic reductionism 
not only demands Perowne console others, it simultaneously consoles. 
 Consolation is an intriguing figuring of responsibility. To quote the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED), consolation is a specific form of care, the ‘comfort received by someone 
after a loss or disappointment.’489 In Perowne’s reading, consolation enters into evolutionary 
thinking from its very beginnings, as Darwin decides to ‘soften the message’ of On The Origin 
of Species by including a Creator in later editions, but nonetheless only offering ‘a bracing kind 
of consolation in the brief privilege of consciousness.’490 For Perowne, Darwin realises that his 
discoveries bring both wonder and loss into the world; as we lose the transcendental creator 
who bestowed meaning on our lives, we gain wonder at the ‘endless and beautiful forms of 
life’ that the brutalities of life have produced. Perowne thus shares Irigaray’s sense that the 
removal of the transcendental Other leaves us in a state of immanence, without a means of 
differentiating ourselves from the material world. We are left to wonder at how the material 
world can produce our subjectivity. Yet rather than using this wonder to cultivate a sensible 
transcendental relation, in which we embrace our immanence and develop an embodied 
culture, Perowne substitutes wonder for the transcendental Other by equating it with that 
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which emerges as science dissects and explains the world. Wonder is an expression of 
science’s continued doubt and surprise at the material’s capacity to shape us, rather than 
recognition of our immanence. This means Perowne’s turn to the body does not cultivate a 
sensible transcendental, but instead reduces the other to terms established by scientific 
investigation. Hence, to be humane is to help ease the pain of those whose suffering, be it 
physical or social, science reads as being inscribed in their very bones. But if Perowne too is 
seeking consolation, what is it that he has lost? Indeed, if we accept Head’s argument that 
‘Saturday represents a significant risk for McEwan in that it opts for consolation in the face of 
contemporary uncertainty,’491 what exactly is the loss McEwan suggests we have suffered at 
this particular historical moment? 
 
Violence, Loss, and Masculinity 
Perowne’s two violent encounters with Baxter shake his scientific assurance, for while 
he begins the novel by stating ‘there is grandeur in this view of life’, by the close of the day, all 
he can offer is the somewhat impotent recognition that at best, all that can be offered to the 
unfortunate is to minimise their miseries ‘Somehow! He’s no social theorist . . . ’492 Indeed, this 
shift is carried in Perowne’s very physicality, as the pre-dawn Perowne who opens the novel 
provides a sharp contrast to the pre-dawn Perowne that closes it. Early on Saturday morning, a 
naked Perowne finds himself getting out of bed: 
[M]ovement is easy, and pleasurable in his limbs, and his back and legs feel unusually 
strong. He stands there, naked by the bed – he always sleeps naked – feeling his full 
height, aware of his wife’s patient breathing and of the wintry bedroom air on his skin. 
That too is a pleasurable sensation . . . he’s alert and empty-headed and inexplicably 
elated.493 
 
Yet by the end of the novel, this same man ‘draws his dressing gown more closely around him’, 
‘has to put his hand on the sill to steady himself’494 and ‘feels skinny and frail in his dressing 
gown’495 in the pre-dawn hours. This latter state, brought on by his encounters with Baxter, is 
the one in which Perowne seeks consolation as much for himself as for others. Perowne has 
lost something in the unfolding of his Saturday, lost something as violence enters his life and 
his home, and as a result is left with a heightened awareness of his physical vulnerability. 
In her analysis of the post- September 11th climate, Judith Butler brings together the 
concepts of loss, violence and vulnerability to demonstrate how the representations of these 
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elements within a society work to produce a particular kind of normative subject, be it an 
individual subject or subject-as-nation-state. For Butler, representations of loss have the 
potential to make a ‘tenuous “we” of us all,’496 not simply by virtue of a generalised sympathy 
based on the fact that ‘all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody,’ but 
rather that the experience of loss contains within it a reminder of the fundamental 
vulnerability of the human condition. To lose somebody is to face the unavoidable fragility and 
mortality inherent in the living body, and in doing so, to gain a sense, if not a full awareness, of 
the absolute sociability of the body. As Butler puts it: 
The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to 
the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk of 
becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well. Although we struggle for 
rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever 
only our own. The body has its invariably public dimension.497 
 
For Butler, this public dimension begins at birth, as the absolute dependency of the infant on 
others for its survival means that our bodies are always already ‘given over’ to ‘the world of 
others,’ even if this ‘giving over’ is into a hostile world. To not be given over is to not survive.498 
For Butler, the physicality of the body means we are always already social and are constituted 
by the world around us. Loss of another, grief, becomes an experience that ‘contains the 
possibility of apprehending a mode of dispossession that is fundamental to who I am,’499 a 
mode in which we recognise that our physicality means that we never fully coincide just with 
ourselves, that our material vulnerability means ‘we are social; we are comported toward a 
“you”; we are outside ourselves, constituted in cultural norms that precede and exceed us, 
given over to a set of cultural norms and a field of power that condition us fundamentally.’500 
Grief is a moment in which our innate physical vulnerability can be understood, a sensation 
that opens up the possibility of apprehending how our embodied vulnerability shapes us as 
social beings. 
 Despite both turning to our materiality and exploring its fragility to articulate what it is 
to be human, Butler and Perowne produce radically different conclusions. For Perowne, the 
fact of our physical existence means we become expressions of our genetic inheritance, with 
the genotype becoming ‘the modern variant of a soul.’501 For Butler, our physical presence is 
that which determines that we are socially-constituted, producing a subject who is neither 
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entirely autonomous, nor entirely at the mercy of the world around them. The crucial 
difference between these two readings of the material subject is the location of the body as a 
whole. In her discussion, Butler not only explicitly posits that the skin and the flesh become the 
media through which we enter the social, she argues that the vulnerability of the whole body 
is what produces our social bond and subjectivity. Moreover, the specificity of this fleshly body 
will influence how those constitutive social bonds are formed, as normative notions come up 
against specific morphologies.502 While Butler places the body in its entirety at the nexus of the 
social and the individual, Perowne moves past the surface of the body into the microscopic, 
extracting an ethics and concept of subjectivity from neuronal activity and connectivity, the 
interactions of amino acids and enzymes at a molecular level, and translating the evolutionary 
logic inscribed in the genome’s code into a history and social theory for humanity. Perowne’s 
embodied subjectivity is one that, in Irigaray’s terms, uses the body ‘in a manner irrelevant to 
the economy of our flesh,’ 503 replicating culture’s severance of symbolic and material as it 
overwrites the lived experience of the body with a metaphysics of dissection and atomisation. 
Embodiment and its consequences are skipped over in favour of an abstract materialism, one 
that requires technology and specialism to be experienced. The body in Perowne’s 
conceptualisation becomes a container for the wonder that is the wet stuff of consciousness, a 
container whose functions are controlled by that wonder and whose presence requires the 
illusion of instantaneous present. In his turn to the foundational elements of materiality, 
Perowne unwittingly rearticulates established conceptual norms that underpin some of the 
very supernatural, religious and irrational thinking that his empiricism aims to discredit. To 
move through the surface of the flesh and into the minutia of matter, and to isolate the brain 
as a master organ even as one embraces its material nature is to simultaneously apply the 
methods of a phallically-informed science to the body and to reinstall the conceptualisation of 
the body, of matter, as a ‘home’; the body ‘houses’ the brain, which in turn ‘contains’ the 
secret of consciousness, just as our genes ‘contain’ the code of life.  
It is here that we find the crucial difference between the scientifically-informed 
materialism encapsulated in Perowne’s thought and the turn to the body for ethical and 
ontological understanding in the work of people like Butler and Irigaray. Placing the logic used 
by Perowne in a broader historical and philosophical context not only demonstrates that 
Perowne’s modelling of the brain continues in a tradition of political and technological 
reification, but also illustrates precisely how invested such methodologies and conceptual 
frameworks are in a particular symbolic, a symbolic that in its current formation is designed to 
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‘house’ the ideal phallic subject. This turn to body for confirmation of the phallic ideal may 
seem contradictory, particularly as Irigaray tells us that it is the transcendental that is 
simultaneously the goal and the source of that ideal. Yet Perowne’s substitution of 
scientifically-inspired wonder for God allows him to maintain his sense of the transcendental. 
He gazes down at society’s unfortunates from his bedroom window,504 while his work at the 
hospital leads him to ‘experience a super-human capacity,’505 to come ‘down from the 
operating room like a god, an angel with the glad tidings – life, not death.’506 The discoveries of 
neuroscience not only give Perowne a privileged insight in the behaviours of those around him, 
as well as providing him with a material wealth that places him physically and socially ‘above’ 
the less fortunate, the wonder that results from his understanding of the essential materiality 
of human nature gives him access to a god-like transcendental position. What’s more, it’s a 
position that his son, his male progeny, seems destined to inherit, as we are told his musical 
talent means he ‘might even one day walk with the gods, the British gods . . . Someone has 
written somewhere that Theo Perowne plays like an angel.’507 It seems that the genetically-
determined subject still has access to the heights of the transcendental, despite turning away 
from God. 
Immediately after claiming that our materiality demands an ethics of consolation, 
Perowne has another vertiginous moment: 
He feels himself turning on a giant wheel, like the Eye on the south bank of the 
Thames, just about to arrive at the highest point – he’s poised on a hinge of 
perception, before the drop, and he can see ahead calmly. Or it’s the eastward turn of 
the earth he imagines, delivering him towards the dawn at a stately one thousand 
miles an hour. If he counts on sleep rather than the clock to divide the days, then this 
is still his Saturday, dropping far below him, as deep as a lifetime. And from here, from 
the top of his day, he can see far ahead, before the descent begins.508 
 
Perowne is carried out of the temporality of ticking clocks and rises, above his life, above the 
city even, into existence on a cosmic scale in which he is aware of the turn of the earth. From 
this apex, he can survey what is to come with a calm detachment. For an instant, the 
professional reductionist attains a god’s eye view of existence. Yet from this transcendental 
position, what Perowne sees is a future dictated by the fragility of human flesh. The death of 
his mother and John Grammaticus; the arrival of Daisy and Gulio’s child signifying an end of 
Perowne and Rosalind’s parenthood; the giving up of sport and moving away from London as 
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they enter their fifties.509 The same knowledge that gives rise to wonder, then, also brings 
Perowne’s thinking into a melancholic proximity to death. Moreover, listed alongside these 
private inevitabilities is a London which: 
lies wide open, impossible to defend, waiting for its bomb, like a hundred other cities. 
Rush hour will be a convenient time. It might resemble the Paddington crash – twisted 
rails, buckled, upraised commuter coaches, stretchers handed out through broken 
windows, the hospital’s Emergency Plan in action. Berlin, Paris, Lisbon. The authorities 
agree, an attack’s inevitable. He lives in different times – because the newspapers say 
so doesn’t mean it isn’t true. But from the top of his day, this is a future that’s harder 
to read, a horizon indistinct with possibilities.510 
 
It is in this instant that we see Perowne’s materialism played out to its final consequences. On 
the one hand, the turn away from the transcendental to find a concrete foundation for the 
definition of the subject and a biological ethics permits Perowne to approach something like 
the ideal phallic subjectivity. To know matter as Perowne does is to find a rational, logical and 
evolutionary source for existence. Furthermore, to have Perowne’s privileged access to matter 
allows him to know the subject in a manner that terrorism discourses can only strive for, as he 
is to be able to read individuals’ destinies, to understand exactly what motivates behaviour, to 
offer consolation to the unfortunate, and ultimately, as Perowne realises after operating on 
Baxter, to mete out punishment: ‘[b]y saving his life in the operating theatre, Henry also 
committed Baxter to his torture. Revenge enough.’511 Rather than abolishing the 
transcendental with a return to the body, Perowne’s ‘faith’ that the institutions of science will 
uncover the secret ‘contained’ within the body means that he is once more making use of the 
body to establish an ideal, disembodied subject. The microscopic becomes the sublime mirror 
to which man looks for a reflection of himself; the scientist, with his privileged knowledge and 
control over matter comes to occupy the very same space once reserved for God. The body is 
passed through and rendered invisible and silent once again.  
 Yet in the instant Perowne reaches this pinnacle of phallic thought, his vision is 
clouded by the spectre of violence. While his medical knowledge allows him to accurately 
foresee how the lives of his family and patients will develop, the possibility of another terrorist 
attack throws a shroud across the future, challenging any attempts at certainty. Previously, 
Perowne resisted media claims of ‘different times,’ seeing in his city instead a ‘commercial 
wellbeing [that] is robust and will defend itself to the last,’512and displacing the possibility his 
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society may ‘fail’ into an unspecified but distant future.513 Now, Perowne willingly accepts that 
he lives in different times, thanks to his own experience of violence and vulnerability. His initial 
encounter with Baxter leaves him questioning his behaviour, and with a heightened awareness 
of his bodily limits as he joins his colleague Strauss on the squash court: 
Perowne suddenly feels his own life as fragile and precious. His limbs appear to him as 
neglected old friends, absurdly long and breakable. Is he in mild shock? His heart will 
be all the more vulnerable after that punch. His chest still aches. He has a duty to 
survive, and he mustn’t endanger his own life for a mere game, smacking a ball against 
a wall.514 
 
Already, Perowne detects in his vulnerability his connection to others, albeit in terms of duty 
to them. It is not until Baxter brings violence into the Perowne household that Perowne comes 
to understand that material vulnerability is not simply a question of duty, but a stake in how 
we are constituted as individuals. The moment his family’s fragile flesh is under threat, all 
Perowne’s certainties disappear. As Baxter punches Grammaticus and leaves him nursing a 
broken nose, ‘Perowne can’t convince himself that molecules and faulty genes alone are 
terrorising his family . . . Perowne himself is responsible.’515 In marked contrast to the rational 
diagnostic approach he adopts in his first run-in with Baxter, this time ‘Henry’s self-cancelling 
thoughts drift and turn, impossible to marshal.’516 The vulnerability of his family unravels his 
sense of self, leaving him unable to act: 
The proper thing would be to hit Baxter hard in the face with a clenched fist . . . But 
when Henry imagines himself about to act, and sees a ghostly warrior version of 
himself leap out of his body at Baxter, his heart rate accelerates so swiftly that he feels 
giddy, weak, unreliable.517 
 
When faced with the vulnerability of his family, Perowne’s sense of being a distinct individual 
dissolves. The final blow comes as Perowne attempts to re-enact his previous victory, turning 
to scientific discourse and the promise of help to undo Baxter once again: 
He’s cut off abruptly by Theo. ‘Stop it Dad! Stop talking. Fucking shut up or he’ll do it’. 
 And he’s right. Baxter has pushed the blade flat against the side of Rosalind’s 
neck. She sits upright on the sofa, hands clasping her knees, face empty of expression, 
her gaze still fixed ahead. Only a tremor in her shoulders shows her terror.518 
 
Baxter’s violence in the novel thus serves not only to expose Perowne’s own vulnerability, but 
to demonstrate the extent to which our connections to those around us constitute us and thus 
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leave us vulnerable in the very fact of the their vulnerability. In the wake of their ordeal, the 
Perownes find reassurance in reaffirming their bodily presence: ‘[w]hat meets their needs is 
touch – they sit close, hold hands, embrace,’ as they are ‘delivered from private nightmare, 
and returned to the web of kindly social and familial relations, without which they’re 
nothing.’519In the face of such material vulnerability, a symbolic that claims to have a 
controlling stake in the material world is undermined, as the body it claims to transcend and 
master becomes an irreducible presence. 
 The epistemological access to the violent Other that terrorism discourses attempts to 
replicate is hence not enough to secure the subject in the face of violence. Such a realisation 
inextricably involves a loss for Perowne. As violent action makes him feel his own physical 
vulnerability and how profoundly his sense of self rests on equally vulnerable others, the 
phallic ideal of the rational, discrete, transcendent individual becomes unobtainable. For 
Perowne, to be a man, in this city, at this time, is to have lost the certainty that relied on the 
repression of the reality of a vulnerable fleshly body. But rather than ‘tarry’ with the grief of 
such a loss like Butler, Perowne finds consolation in the very bodily existence that has asserted 
itself so traumatically, turning to the female body for comfort in his insecurity. As Perowne 
curls up against his sleeping wife in the novel’s closing lines: 
He fits himself around her, her silk pyjamas, her scent, her warmth, her beloved form, 
and draws closer to her. Blindly, he kisses her nape. There’s always this, is one of his 
remaining thoughts. And then: there’s only this. 520 
 
When confronted with vulnerability of our embodied nature, Perowne’s scientifically-informed 
wonder is no longer enough to provide consolation, for it is constituted by the same space 
between knowing and seeing that gives rise to terror. Deprived of even this transcendental 
guarantor, Perowne finds consolation in the female body, fitting himself to her silent, 
somnolent form, a shaken phallic masculine finding its form once again in the quiet ground of 
the maternal-feminine. 
 McEwan shows Perowne’s turn to neuroscience as failing to stabilise the boundary 
between wonder and terror, suggesting that Perowne’s reductionist approach is not enough to 
secure a sense of identity in a world where terrorism and its representations permeate global 
politics and media. But by portraying the limitations and failings of Perowne’s approach, 
McEwan simultaneously sets up an alternative means of drawing a distinction between terror 
and wonder, terrorist Other and legitimate self. He does so by turning to the mind, rather than 
simply the wet matter of the brain, a turn which leads McEwan to develop an understanding of 
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language that allows him to disavow the common ground between rational, moral, Western 
masculinities and irrational, immoral, terrorist masculinity. By constructing the mind as 
constituted by both narrative and matter, McEwan imbues language a moral obligation to 
differentiate between “us” and the Other, as we shall now explore. 
 
The Duty of Language 
If in Perowne’s account the physical material of the body acts as counter-argument to 
any attempts to articulate a form of social construction,521 Butler’s reading posits that the 
body’s vulnerability creates the need for representation to generate and mediate the social, 
and in turn, the social comes to delineate ‘human norms’ in the representations it offers. For 
Butler ‘there is a limit to discourse that establishes the limits of human intelligibility,’522 but 
what remains beyond the realm of discourse is dehumanised. As such ‘the kinds of public 
grieving that are available to me make clear the norms by which the “human” is constituted for 
me’.523 What it is to be human is thus established by the limits of discourse and the narrative 
representation of the grievable life: 
I am as much constituted by those I do grieve for as by those whose deaths I disavow, 
whose nameless and faceless deaths form the melancholic background for my social 
world, if not my First Worldism.524 
 
For Butler, discourse defines what it is to be human by making some lives present, while 
leaving others unrecognised. Put alongside Blanchot’s reading of language, while language at 
least marks the absence of a living-flesh, those that remain beyond language are denied even 
the possibility of death and with it, the recognition that is mourning. For Butler, then, 
discourse, representation, narrative, are not merely human creations; they constitute our very 
identities by rendering certain forms of subjectivity present, and others profoundly absent. 
 Turning from Perowne’s material reductionism to the model of the mind that the text 
itself offers us, we discover Saturday is not simply the literary “equivalent” of a CT scan. The 
text does not strain to replicate the scan’s ability to map activity and locate responses in 
particular neuronal clusters. Rather, McEwan gives us ‘the mind’ as language. To argue, as 
Head does, that the novel attempts to ‘engage’ with human consciousness is to ignore the 
unchallenged acceptance of the appropriateness of language for portraying this consciousness. 
At no point does McEwan draw into question the appropriateness of narrative as a means to 
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represent the mind and, in fact, even asserts the aptness of the form for representing the mind 
by frequently undermining Perowne’s dismissal of narrative as a key to understanding 
humanity. As Perowne claims ‘[t]his notion of Daisy’s, that people can’t ‘live’ without stories, is 
simply not true. He is living proof,’ he is rendered ridiculous twice over, as he eagerly seeks for 
news of the plane – or ‘his own story’ – in the newspaper an instant later, but more profoundly 
by the fact that he is oblivious to his own existence as a fictional character.525 Perowne only 
exists because of a story. He is living proof of the absolute necessity of the narrative for the 
subject. Similarly, we know that it is not just seeing Professor Taleb’s torture scars, but having 
‘listened to his stories’526 that leaves Perowne ambivalent about the pending invasion and the 
West’s assertive role in global politics. Above all, Perowne’s observations of Lily’s decline 
demonstrates how profoundly language and narrative are entwined with identity and human 
existence. As long as Lily has a sense of grammar, she has a sense of herself. Not only this, but 
as Salisbury observes in her reading of McEwan’s portrayal of the fragility of the brain:  
 [F]or McEwan, narrative, in bearing witness to life, tells a different kind of truth . . . 
fiction-making . . . becomes a form of kindness, something that affirms the reality of 
human bonds against the authentically sublime indifference of cerebral matter and a 
material finitude in which personality and memory are finally swallowed up.527 
 
The damaged brain, be it wounded or diseased, is a reminder that our very materiality carries 
with it the ‘capacity for subjective identity to be utterly reconfigured at any moment, to be 
forced to make its neuronal connections anew.’ 528 In the face of such incredible and 
potentially catastrophic vulnerability, narrative becomes crucial, for ‘although the brain wound 
denudes the subject of his or her narratives of connection and self-legibility, these can be 
preserved and contained in the minds and representations of those who do remember, or can 
empathically imagine and join themselves to, the complexity of who the person once was.’529 
Lily’s fraying neuronal networks may be taking away her access to language, and with it any 
‘notion of a continuous, autobiographical subject with an individual narrative of itself,’530 but 
narrative works against the vulnerability of matter by ensuring that something of the subject’s 
narrative is retained in those who remember, or at least hear the story. Lily’s ability to narrate 
herself may have slipped beyond legibility, but Perowne can still communicate to the reader 
something of who she was as his own narrative in turn captures something of hers. 
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 Narrative, then, is more than just a means of representing the mind; it constitutes the 
mind and communicates our subjectivity to others, in such a way as to inscribe ourselves in the 
minds of others as they have in ours. Much as Butler has argued, in Saturday ‘the shaping and 
sharing of narratives becomes part of what it means to be human at all.’531 This creates an 
interesting tension between the explicit content of Perowne’s thought and the shape his 
thoughts take. Groes argues that this tension serves to make ‘clear to the reader that 
Perowne’s experience is at the mercy of the narrator’s locutions, which constantly deride him 
by pointing out the limits of his frame of reference.’532 Not only do the derisory moments 
emphasize the power of the narrator, in Groes’ view this apparent ‘disparagement 
foregrounds the role of the reader, who is forced to collude with the curious voice . . . 
narrating Perowne’s consciousness from the inside while incessantly offering a commentary 
upon him.’533 While Groes reads this collusion and narrative contradiction as a ‘loss of 
narrational authority’ on Perowne’s part, that prevents ‘any comfortable or simple reading of 
the novel, while capturing the post-9/11 climate of anxiety,’534 it also has the effect of situating 
Perowne between the narrator and the reader, while at the same time, differentiating 
Perowne from the narrative. Just as the The Good Terrorist’s commentaries on Alice 
complicate the assumption that a subject always knows their own mind, so Saturday’s 
narrative voice leaves Perowne’s ideas problematic in order to reveal something that escapes 
him. Perowne’s loss of narrative authority unveils narrative as that which simultaneously 
connects us and shapes us, but against which it is possible to stake a degree of autonomy. 
Perowne exists in the narrative exchange between the narrator and the reader, yet does not 
coincide precisely with the form of the narrative that shapes him. In Butler’s description of the 
inherent connectedness of human subjectivity, such moments become the markers of 
autonomy, an autonomy that is paradoxically made apparent precisely because of the 
relationships that constitute it. In stressing the significance of narrative in the construction of 
subjectivity, McEwan is substituting one form of autonomy for another. Instead of the phallic 
understanding of autonomy, in which the autonomous subject achieves singularity, authority, 
completeness, we see an autonomy articulated in terms that recognise that we are always 
given over to the other. 
 If narrative is central to the constitution of the subject, we are all in effect put at risk 
by literature’s capacity to appropriate language for its own purposes. Moreover, if words have 
the monstrous ability to mean more than what we intend, it becomes impossible to secure a 
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dividing line between ourselves and the terrorist Other. It is precisely to resist what Blanchot 
identifies as the terroristic possibilities of literature that Saturday enacts a rethinking of 
language through this tension between Perowne and the narrator. Early in his day, Perowne 
questions the impulse of the literary genius towards fiction, as ‘it interests him less to have the 
world reinvented; he wants it explained. The times are strange enough. Why make things 
up?’535 The irony of a fictional creation questioning the value of fiction is clear, yet this is not 
simply another instance of McEwan undermining Perowne’s argument, as Perowne swiftly 
turns the tables by ridiculing McEwan himself. Having decided the ‘workmanlike’ novels 
Madame Bovary and Anna Karenina ‘had the virtue, at least, of representing a recognisable 
physical reality,’ Perowne turns his critical eye on ‘the so-called magical realists’: 
What were these authors of reputation doing – grown men and women of the 
twentieth century – granting supernatural powers to their characters? He never made 
it all the way through a single one of those irksome confections. And written for adults, 
not children. In more than one, heroes and heroines were born with or sprouted wings 
. . . Others were granted a magical sense of smell, or tumbled unharmed out of high-
flying aircraft. One visionary saw through a pub window his parents as they had been 
some weeks after his conception, discussing the possibility of aborting him.536 
 
In this scathing summary of the works by stars of the British literary canon Angela Carter and 
Salman Rushdie, McEwan’s The Child in Time is the last text in Perowne’s irksome bibliography. 
Head reads this ‘self-referential play’ as ‘an implicit complaint about the way in which The 
Child in Time is sometimes wrongly categorised,’ as magical realism, for unlike the other texts 
implicated by Perowne’s list, McEwan’s novel makes ‘references to theoretical physics, giving it 
the kind of quasi-plausibility that is never attempted in magic realism proper.’537 This may 
indeed be the case, but for all its attempts to ground itself in scientific discourses, according to 
Perowne, McEwan’s previous work is nevertheless guilty of the same child-like lack of realism. 
One could read this tension between author and protagonist as the latest in McEwan’s ‘fictive 
relationships that dramatise the differences between literature and science,’538 such as Joe 
Rose and Clarissa Mellon in Enduring Love. But if the novel sets out to explore what it is to be a 
man in this cultural moment, what does McEwan’s self-reflexive critique mean? Further, why is 
it that Perowne’s bad bibliography is made up of British authors? 
As Perowne’s literary criticism continues, the boundary between Perowne’s thought 
and McEwan’s writing collapses momentarily, as Perowne becomes ‘a man’: 
A man who attempts to ease the miseries of failing minds by repairing brains is bound 
to respect the material world, its limits, and what it can sustain – consciousness, no 
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less. It isn’t an article of faith with him, he knows it for a quotidian fact, the mind is 
what the brain, mere matter, performs. If that’s worthy of awe, it also deserves 
curiosity; the actual, not the magical, should be the challenge.539 
 
Whereas once the transcendental Other allowed language to maintain its umbilical tie to the 
world, now wonder at the brain’s ability to generate consciousness has taken its place. This 
substitution makes a particular demand of language, insisting that its representations 
simultaneously respect the constraints of the material world and convey the wonder inscribed 
in matter and unveiled by science. To simply remain in the realm of the possible, as the 
detailed descriptions of the realist canon do, may be ‘convincing enough, but surely not so 
very difficult to marshal if you were halfway observant and had the patience to write them all 
down.’540 In place of uninspired observation, the demand here is for an acceptance of the 
actual that recognises the wonder of that actual, and is thus inspired to explore and explain 
what it is to exist in the material world. Perowne’s profession has taught him that there is 
magic enough in matter, and this for him becomes the proper material for fiction. Indeed, 
literary fiction has a duty to the material world; 
This reading list persuaded Perowne that the supernatural was the recourse of an 
insufficient imagination, a dereliction of duty, a childish evasion of the difficulties and 
wonders of the real, of the demanding re-enactment of the plausible.541 
 
In abandoning the material world, modern fiction, or postmodern fiction as exemplified by 
magical realism, does nothing to further the understanding of what it is to be human for 
Perowne: ‘fiction is too humanly flawed, too sprawling and hit-and-miss to inspire 
uncomplicated wonder at the magnificence of human ingenuity, of the impossible dazzlingly 
achieved.’542 For the man who has encountered the awe-inspiring mere matter of the brain, 
literary fiction’s lack of curiosity about the material world means it has failed to achieve what 
scientific discourses, along with other artistic disciplines, have: to instil a sense of wonder at 
the material world in the audience, whilst at the same time being an awe-inspiring example of 
what ‘mere matter’ is capable of producing, ‘[w]ork that you cannot begin to imagine 
achieving yourself, that displays a ruthless, nearly inhuman element of self-enclosed perfection 
– this is his idea of genius.’543 
 If literary fiction has a duty to material reality and, at the same time, a duty to 
exemplify what the brain is capable of producing, is McEwan thus not attempting to produce a 
novel that fulfils his protagonist’s demands? Perowne’s literary criticism forms the parameters 
                                                          
539
 McEwan, Saturday, 67. 
540
 Ibid. 
541
 Ibid., 67–68. 
542
 Ibid., 68. 
543
 Ibid. 
154 
 
for McEwan’s text, just as McEwan’s narrative creates Perowne. McEwan is attempting to 
represent the experience of consciousness for a specific man, over a set period of time, in a 
very specific socio-historical context. Childs observes Saturday is unusual in McEwan’s oeuvre, 
as his first novel to be set entirely in an identifiable contemporary moment. The text’s 
engagement with identifiable “reality” extends to the geographical specificity of the novel; it is 
not hard to trace Perowne’s movement across a map of London, while McEwan has let it be 
known that the Fitzrovia house the Perownes live in is based on his own.544 Even that the fish 
stew Perowne prepares follows McEwan’s own recipe.545 These ‘personal’ touches are only 
revealed outside of the novel, but the fact McEwan is keen to make these connections public 
demonstrates a desire to ensure his novel is recognised as being grounded in the real world. 
Within the text itself, it is the language of neuroscience that most strenuously tries to connect 
fiction to the physical reality of the body, continually underscoring the plausibility of Perowne 
as a character and anchoring the text in the contemporary understanding of the brain. But if 
the scientific rhetoric attempts to tie the literary text to solid ground, the intense 
intertextuality of Saturday also serves as a form of literary anchor. To borrow Groes’s 
comprehensive list, the novel either cites, makes reference to or echoes at least the following, 
as well as others not mentioned here: Sophocles, Thomas Wyatt, Shakespeare, Milton, William 
Blake, Mary Shelley, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, Didus, Darwin, Tolstoy, George Eliot, 
Robert Browning, Matthew Arnold, Gustave Flaubert, Joseph Conrad, Franz Kafka, Henry 
James, Saul Bellow, Philip Larkin, James Fenton, Ted Hughes, Craig Raine, Andrew Motion, 
Wagner, Beethoven, Schubert, Bach, Eric Clapton, Marsalis, Ry Cooder, Coltrane, Johnny Lee 
Hooker, Mondrain, Cezanne, Howard Hodgkin, Cornelia Parker, Fred Halliday, and Paul 
Elkman.546 Such prolific referencing suggests that McEwan is even more anxious than Gordimer 
to explicitly hook his novel into the cultural and social reality in which it was formed. Just as 
Perowne reads the subject as being an expression of a genome, so too McEwan makes plain 
that this novel is the expression of a whole host of specific influences, breaking down the 
artifice of the sublimely-inspired work and instead laying bare its heritage, its evolution from 
the narratives that make up our world. Moreover, this suggests McEwan sees Saturday as a 
text very much constituted by its specific position in a particular historical moment. 
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 Arguably, McEwan and Perowne are of one mind when it comes to the relationship 
literature should have to reality. McEwan attempts to create a seamless connection between 
the text and the world, pinning down the potential frivolity of literature with the reality-claims 
of science and the weight of social, historical, and cultural reference. In light of this, the 
critique of The Child in Time becomes an assertion that there is a different ethic at work in 
Saturday, one in which literature has a duty to the material world and, as such, should be 
shaped by the possibilities and wonders science makes apparent, rather than freedom to 
interpret scientific discovery for its own ends. For Head, Saturday articulates a reconfiguring of 
the relationship between literature and science that firmly establishes science as the proper 
arbiter of ethical understanding, for if ‘the precious gift of consciousness’ becomes the 
‘impulse behind the ethical imperative’, this imperative is ‘partly generated by wonder at the 
biological marvel that science has revealed. In the absence of any other moral system, 
cognition of the science of the mind, as well as that branch of science itself, becomes, in an 
ethical sense, the superior form of imagination.’547Arguably it is not just the access to the 
workings of the mind available to neuroscience that grants science its privileged position 
within the text. We have two models of the mind present in the text, Perowne’s materialist 
reductionist description, and the narrative model performed by the text itself. In narrating the 
consciousness of a material reductionist, McEwan effectively collapses the possibility of 
distinguishing between the biologically-determined and socially-constructed. The mind in this 
model cannot be adequately described by either model and thus becomes a matter of ‘at least’ 
both. The mind is undeniably the ‘mere wet stuff’ of the brain, but as suggested by Butler, the 
very fact of this ‘stuff’ ensures that the mind is also inherently social, and as such is necessarily 
shaped by the narratives that mediate this fundamental sociability. The mind is matter and 
language, neurons and narrative, genetics and expression; the mind is where the material 
world and language meet in such a manner as to make it impossible to discern a division 
between the two. Arguably, it is in this radical coming together of language and matter in the 
make-up of the mind that Saturday locates the moral authority of scientific discourse. As the 
discourse that places the biggest premium on language’s purchase on the material, science 
becomes that which replicates most faithfully the model of the mind McEwan produces. The 
mind becomes the guarantor of the connection between language and matter, and thus it is 
the discourse that respects this connection, albeit in the form of the assumptions that 
structure its usage, that gains authority in an ethical system that takes the mind as its 
cornerstone.  
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 The intertwining of language and matter in McEwan’s figuring of the mind turns the 
‘wet stuff’ of the brain into the ground upon which the symbolic rests. In McEwan’s 
formulation, the realisation that narratives are pivotal in the formation of consciousness places 
language under a specific obligation, unlike other forms of representation, for as Wall notes, 
while Perowne ‘admires the abstract purity of non-representational painting and Bach and the 
blues,’ he demands something else from literature:  
He wants it to be referential, but holds it to an absurd kind of ‘honesty’ to actual 
events. His critique of the novel pays no attention to the medium of language, yet he 
often finds himself wishing for better language to articulate his experience . . . he 
tends to see literature as almost simplistically referential . . . ’548 
 
Wall attributes this apparently contradictory application of aesthetic values and desires to the 
fact that literature’s ‘medium is language, not paint or notes – the same medium that 
constitutes our social lives.’549 The figuring of consciousness in Saturday suggests that 
literature is an art form whose primary material is also a foundational component of 
consciousness and thus literature cannot be allowed the same freedom to play with the 
relationship between material and reality permitted to other art forms. In short, because 
narrative, and by extension, language, is central in structuring our subjectivity and society, it 
becomes irresponsible to draw the relation between reality and language into question. In this 
context, the irresponsible use of language becomes more than a matter of aesthetics. As the 
Perownes are confronted by Baxter in their own home, McEwan suggests it becomes a matter 
of life and death. 
This comes to the fore when Baxter threatens Perowne’s pregnant daughter with rape. 
Upon forcing her to undress and thereby unveiling her secret pregnancy, Baxter demands that 
she reads from her poetry collection, ‘your dirtiest one. Something really filthy.’550 We already 
know that her collection, My Saucy Bark, has made her father uncomfortable with its frank 
representation of his daughter’s sexuality. Faced with reading such a poem to her would-be 
rapist, Daisy panics. A gentle prompt from her grandfather leads Daisy to recite Matthew 
Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’ instead, all the while pretending it is her own work, a pretence that 
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fools both Baxter and Perowne himself. Having read her work before, Perowne finds ‘[t]he 
lines surprise him – clearly he hasn’t been reading closely enough . . . he feels himself slipping 
through the words into the things they describe.’551 Arnold’s words, ‘unusually meditative, 
mellifluous and wilfully archaic’ to Perowne’s ear, have a dramatic impact on Baxter, much to 
Perowne’s disbelief: ‘[c]ould it happen, is it within the bounds of the real, that a mere poem of 
Daisy’s could precipitate a mood swing?’552 Poetry, it seems, challenges even the authority of 
the genetic code. Again, in a moment that collapses the distance between author and 
protagonist, the reader is asked almost directly if such a thing is possible, how far we should 
trust the reality claims of a novel that includes such a moment of transformation, for it is more 
than a mood swing Baxter undergoes. On hearing the poem a second time, all thoughts of 
violence dissipate from Baxter’s mind. The fact that ‘Dover Beach’ reminds Baxter of where he 
grew up is enough to induce ‘the transformation of his role, from lord of terror to amazed 
admirer.’553 Whereas Perowne’s attempts to mollify Baxter with scientific rhetoric have failed, 
Arnold’s poem has utterly transformed his intentions, undone his resolve and opened him up 
to the possibility of participating in Perowne’s fictional drug trials. Indeed, Baxter decides he 
only wants Daisy’s collection as the spoils of his break-in. 
Poetic language, in its potential to mean many things, has the power to undo and 
remake us, much like Butler’s argument about our relation to other and loss. We are made and 
unmade by the other, and narrative, language, as the tool that facilitates our communication 
with the other, carries within it the seeds of our unmaking and transformation. The manner in 
which we use language thus has a direct link to how we manage our material relations: the 
incorrect use of language leads directly to physical violence. Hence it becomes imperative that 
literature’s revolutionary appropriation of the world is contained. It is words that let one ‘slip 
through into the things they describe’ that are of value, that permit the kind of transformation 
Baxter undergoes, words that make beautiful but uncomplicated claim to the territory they 
represent. Arnold’s poetic language provokes vivid scenes in Perowne’s mind; the first reading 
sees Daisy standing with her lover on a terrace, looking out to sea at sunset, while the second 
sees Baxter at a window, contemplating the sea and the bleak fate that awaits him and armies 
further afield. Arnold’s language thus eschews the kind of transparent relation to the world 
assumed by discourses such as science, for the language is loose enough that in each reading, 
Perowne envisions a different collection of elements, albeit in a similar setting. What does 
remain the same however, is that which the language lets one slip through into: in each case, 
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Perowne feels what it is to be someone else in this moment. Perowne’s narrated thoughts 
merge with his perception of Daisy as she reads ‘Dover Beach’ the first time, as Perowne’s 
train of thought reflects his understanding of hers: ‘[s]he thinks there was another time, even 
further back, when the earth was new, and the sea was consoling, and nothing came between 
man and God.’554 On the second reading, Perowne realises ‘it’s through Baxter’s ears that he 
hears’ Arnold’s description of the sea’s melancholy. The crucial connection the poem makes is 
thus not based in the ability of individual words to accurately describe a particular object, not 
in the stabilising of the relationship between language and what it claims to represent, but in 
the manner in which poetic language allows one to slip into the experience of another. 
Although we are not told directly how Baxter ‘hears’ the poem, his astonishment that Daisy 
has written it seems to be precisely that which distracts him from his violent intent towards 
her. She becomes real to him in a manner that she was not before; she is no longer ‘Little Miss 
Nothing.’555 Although even her pregnancy did not serve as powerful enough indicator of her 
materiality and vulnerability to deter Baxter, the poem’s ability to let one slip into the mind of 
the other acts as guarantor of Daisy’s safety. 
Salisbury tells us that Lily’s loss of identity is counteracted by the preservation of her 
identity in the memories and narratives of her son, as Perowne’s narrative of his mother 
becomes all that preserves her identity beyond her physical deterioration. Baxter, on the other 
hand, is undone by language, made aware of the other in such a way that his violent bent is 
defused as he develops an attachment, awareness, admiration for the other. Narrative 
language thus becomes both that which preserves our identity beyond the limits of our own 
material vulnerability, and a means through which we can find ourselves undone and 
transformed by the other. It is this power to preserve and undo the subject that means literary 
language has an obligation to communicate something of reality, to anchor itself in the 
confines of world and narrate that world. To permit literature the Blanchotian freedom of 
appropriating for itself the negation of the world in order to make everything available to it is 
to make ourselves as vulnerable in language as we are in our flesh. Suddenly, everything that 
makes up our subjectivity is put at risk, not just our physical existence. More than this, poetry’s 
diversion of Baxter from his violent purpose opens up the possibility that the opposite 
movement is equally likely; that the failure to communicate something of the reality of one’s 
subjectivity in one’s language puts oneself at physical risk. In this context, Perowne’s prognosis 
of contemporary literature as suffering from ‘insufficient imagination, a dereliction of duty’ 
takes on much greater significance. In turning away from literature that engages with and 
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remains within the limits of the “real”, contemporary literature enacts Blanchot’s negation, 
and in doing so, erases the possibility of the subject. This not only produces works that fail to 
embody the wonder that is the human brain in the texture of their text, but also means such 
novels fail to communicate anything of ‘what it means to be a man. In a city. In a century. In 
transition.’ As Daisy’s encounter with Baxter suggests, such a failure to communicate becomes 
dangerous. While many critics have emphasized the power of Arnold’s words in bringing about 
the transformation in Baxter, this is to underplay the significance of Baxter’s assumption that 
the words come from Daisy herself. His repetition of the refrain ‘You wrote that. You wrote 
that,’556 indicates that the fact the words are presumed to emanate from Daisy is just as 
significant in Baxter’s change of heart as the poem itself. Baxter assumes the words 
communicate something of Daisy; her naked presence acts as a guarantor of the poem’s 
message. The poem’s ability to communicate something of the wonder of the other protects 
Daisy’s vulnerable flesh. Any suggestion of disconnection between the words and the speaker 
would once again put Daisy at risk. How we read Daisy’s inability to read her own words in this 
context is thus potentially significant, as we shall see. 
 It is perhaps no coincidence then that Perowne’s condemnation of modern literature 
echoes McEwan’s own claim that it was ‘a failure of the imagination’ that permitted the 
perpetrators of the September 11th attacks to carry out their crimes.557 The connection 
between being able to imagine what it is to be the other and the ability to commit violence 
against that other is clear to McEwan: 
If the hijackers had been able to imagine themselves into the thoughts and feelings of 
the passengers, they would have been unable to proceed. It is hard to be cruel once 
you permit yourself to enter the mind of your victim. Imagining what it is like to be 
someone other than yourself is at the core of our humanity. It is the essence of 
compassion, and it is the beginning of morality.’558 
 
If narrative is that which forms human bonds, McEwan’s claim implies that the inability to 
imagine the other as subject is just as much a failure of narrative as it is a failure of 
imagination. Indeed, McEwan elsewhere states that the installation of a stronger narrative 
framework has the potential to blot out the possibility of empathetic imagination: ‘It’s a 
human universal . . . being able to think our way into the minds of others . . . you have to bring 
into line some sort of powerful ideology or some crazed religious certainty in order to blot out 
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that human instinct.’559 Narrative may be a human universal that mediates our sociality and 
structures our subjectivity, but that does not by any means guarantee the prevalence of 
empathetic narrative. Violence, as Perowne’s encounters with Baxter demonstrate, is the 
consequence of a failure of narrative as much as it is a failure of the imagination. The stark 
analysis is that there is a direct link between the Western concern with ‘problems of reference’ 
and the violence unleashed upon America and Europe from 2001 onwards. The West, in other 
words, has failed to provide a sufficiently powerful narrative of what it is to be a subject, and 
in doing so has left itself vulnerable, as other narratives come to shape how the West is 
perceived. This would seem paradoxical in the face of the apparent global permeation of 
Western media, but as Perowne’s experience of televisual media suggests, such a permeation 
does not necessarily mean that any sense of what it is to be a Western subject is 
communicated. Rather, the media acts as a means of shutting down narrative in favour of 
stereotype, of reducing the lived to the prefigured. Ferguson draws a striking parallel between 
television news and dementia, arguing that: 
the news prompts Henry to participate in an emotion of attention even when he’s not 
certain what his views are. Full as it is of names, numbers, events and eventfulness, 
the news in fact strangely resembles the conversation Henry has with his demented 
mother . . . Henry’s mother participates in affection without understanding, as do the 
other residents of her home . . . not recognising him but, in their incapacity to 
recognize particular faces and names, recognizing that he might be someone they 
love.560 
 
What are the consequences of the claim that ‘the cycling of the news yields attention without 
content’ when the audience is not in some way predisposed to empathy, if not affection, by 
the narratives that shape their lives? If one’s only access to the other is mediated in such a 
way, or in other forms of representation that similarly reduce narrative possibilities to a few 
prevalent forms, the implication is that one is being asked to pay attention to the other 
without gaining any sense of what it is to be the other. One is already supposed to understand 
the narrative that shapes that other, just as the residents of the nursing home know to 
anticipate a face they love without recognising that face. For those not immersed in these 
narrative structures, what the media ends up communicating is lack of content, the absence of 
the other.  
 The Western media’s global communication of absence leads McEwan to place the 
moral imperative on literature to shut down its Blanchotian terrorism. In this light, Saturday is 
a text that makes much larger claims for itself than are suggested by the accessibility of the 
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prose and narrative form. It is a text that simultaneously enacts what it is advocating, an 
accurate narration of what it is to be a particular kind of subject in a particular socio-historical 
context, in order that others can ‘imagine’ what it is like to be this person. The fact that 
reviewers such as Banville found Henry Perowne unpalatable and smug is perhaps beside the 
point,561 for to make Perowne a more sympathetic character would again be a failure of 
narrative, a disingenuous attempt to put a particular audience at ease that betrays the ethical 
formulations of the text. Saturday becomes a text that attempts to shut down the possibility of 
violence by narrating the life of an individual to give others access to his subjectivity. As an art 
form that makes use of the same materials that structure us, literature has a particular duty to 
make sure that it ‘communicates,’ that it ‘means’ something. This ‘something’ needs an 
understanding of language that permits language the ability to apprehend the real world, that 
allows a transparent, if not entirely rigid, connection between the word and that which it 
represents. For McEwan, the mind is the guarantor of this connection, taking up a position 
once reserved for God in its capacity to inspire wonder thanks to scientific revelation. By 
insisting on language’s grounding the material in the form of the mind, McEwan arrests 
literature’s potentially dangerous assumption of the movement of language formation for 
itself. In contrast to Irigaray’s cultivation of difference and embodied culture, in Saturday it is 
only by reaffirming the umbilical connection of language to the material world that we can 
securely represent who we are to the other, as well as maintaining a sense of ourselves as 
subjects, and in doing so, protect ourselves from material violence. For by maintaining this 
connection, we populate the space between knowing the other and seeing the other, between 
knowledge in absence and knowledge gleaned by direct experience with wonder rather than 
terror. For McEwan, in a century so far shaped by narratives of global terrorism, literature has 
a duty to counteract the terror opened up by relativist language and thought, by vacuous 
representation, and so must anchor narratives in the wonder of reality. To do otherwise is to 
risk allowing alternative narratives to populate that gap and sculpt the interpretation. To do 
otherwise is to risk existing as little more than wet matter in the eyes of the other. 
 
The New Bodily Guarantor 
 McEwan’s literary ethics simultaneously approaches and eschews something 
resembling Irigaray’s embodied culture. He argues literature must communicate something of 
the reality of what it is to be subject, but at the same time, he locates that subject in the mind, 
not in the body as a whole. As such, McEwan remains within the conventions of a phallic 
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economy, overwriting the flesh of the body with narratives that mirror the scientific 
classification of genes into alphabetical symbols. Nowhere does this forgetting of the body 
become more apparent than in Daisy’s recitation of Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach.’ For if Saturday is a 
manifesto for the reconnection of the literary work with the human narrative in order to 
establish ethical relations with the other, how do we read the paradoxical moment in which 
Daisy recites the poetry of another and is saved from violence as she is mistaken for that 
other?  
Hillard offers two readings of the scene: the initial one in which ‘the “Dover Beach” 
episode appears to elaborately establish male authority in order to disavow feminine 
influence,’ an interpretation which if correct creates ‘a scene of richly layered chauvinism, in 
which the nation – rendered concomitantly as the female body shielded by male literary 
heritage – deflects an attack by forces rendered simultaneously as philistine, anarchist, and 
terrorist.’562 In her second reading, Hillard uses the intertextuality of the novel, as well as the 
literary history of ‘Dover Beach’ to suggest an alternative, drawing attention to Woolf’s 
apparent echoing of ‘Dover Beach’ in Mrs Dalloway, as Clarissa repairs her dress.563 In this 
reading: 
“Dover Beach” in Saturday becomes an intertext of Mrs. Dalloway through the very act 
of Victorian intertextuality. Saturday, then, is a novel by a man in which a woman 
recites a poem by a man that reflects a novel by woman in which a woman recites a 
poem by a man.564 
 
For Hillard, enacting a re-reading of Saturday suggested by the repeated reading of ‘Dover 
Beach’ changes Daisy’s ventriloquism into an explicit recognition of ‘the novel as largely 
dependent on its feminine predecessors.’565 Without disputing the significance of this 
observation, Hillard’s re-reading is a generous one, not least because it ignores the specificity 
of the figure of Daisy in two important respects. Firstly, unlike Mrs Dalloway, Daisy is herself a 
poet and has her own text available to read, although Daisy’s sexually evocative lines are 
actually those of another male poet, Craig Raine.566 Thus, the voice of the female poet is 
doubly silenced, both within the text by her turn to Arnold and beyond the text by the 
selection of a male poet’s work to express female sexual desire. Secondly, the chain of 
associations Hillard draws on to counter claims of ‘chauvinism’ brushes over the specificity of 
the fictional figures used in such recitations. Of particular significance here is the strikingly 
specific figure of a naked, pregnant poet under threat of rape. Hillard’s re-reading seems to 
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place this extraordinary figuring of the female poet alongside the domesticity of Clarissa 
Dalloway repairing a dress, without acknowledging the possibility that in writing such a scene, 
McEwan makes very specific choices, not least that of introducing the “extraordinary” into his 
“day-in-the-life-of” narrative. While Baxter’s invasion of the Perowne household may not be a 
reflection of daily life, it does remain within the narrative of “normal” criminal violence. The 
prospect of raping a pregnant woman moves the scene past the more familiar figuring of 
criminal violence into the “extraordinary,” the psychotic, as signalled by Nigel’s immediate 
rejection of rape and Baxter’s apparent unease when Daisy’s pregnancy is revealed.567 The 
apparent abandonment of the everyday narrative, alongside the deliberate use of an image as 
evocative as the vulnerable, naked, pregnant woman are clear indicators that to forget or pass 
over Daisy’s body within this scene is to perhaps miss a vital connection McEwan wants us to 
make. Indeed, the presence of Daisy’s body propels Baxter’s intentions into the exceptional 
status accorded to terrorism, an “illegitimate” illegitimate crime. 
 In a striking manifestation of Irigaray’s figuring of the phallic symbolic, it is around the 
presence of the maternal body that Saturday’s theme coalesce: the rhetoric of science 
confronts the poetic and the literary; the protective fraternal and paternal masculinities of 
Theo and Perowne confront the deviant, violent masculinity of Baxter. Morrison suggests such 
use of gender is nothing new in McEwan’s work, as he repeatedly use gender ‘as the structural 
focus for a broader spiral of temporal and historical concerns,’568 not least in McEwan’s 
continual revisiting of the opposition between rational and intuitive modes of thought, modes 
embodied by male and female characters respectively. In his critique of Black Dogs and 
Enduring Love, Morrison argues that ‘[c]haracteristically for McEwan’s fiction, a male narrator 
becomes the focus of the text’s attempt to negotiate a new understanding of personal and 
social time by mediating between these feminine-and masculine-identified modes of seeing 
and remembering.’569 Morrison is not alone in arguing that what these oppositional 
relationships repeatedly serve to do is draw narrative into question, to undermine ‘the ease 
and potency of narrative as a guarantor of memory or knowledge’ in a way that leaves us with 
a sense that narrative ‘is barely adequate for this task.’570 If narratives are always in the hands 
of a male protagonist, the implication is that the presence of the feminine works to undermine 
and expose the inadequacies of the easy and potent rational narrative. In doing so, however, 
the feminine opens up that narrative to new possibilities that ultimately lead to a more 
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comprehensive articulation of the experience, history, or moment that the rational masculine 
narrative is attempting to describe. In essence, the combination of feminine and masculine 
modes produces the most “adequate” narrative, one that connects the facts of the situation to 
human experience. Daisy has been such a troubling presence throughout the text, arguing 
literature’s corner in the face of her father’s scientifically-grounded rationality, but it is not her 
own words she uses to disrupt the brutal masculinity represented by Baxter and his 
accomplice. It is Daisy’s voice reciting Arnold’s words that dissipates Baxter’s violent intent. 
The insinuation is that her pregnant body may have had the power to defer the moment, but it 
is the communication of a humanity that transcends sexuate boundaries that overturns the 
possibility of violence altogether. The insinuation is that the body becomes ‘meaningless’ in 
the face of the universal humanity narration permits us to communicate. The ability to convey 
one’s interiority to the other protects the flesh, not the exposure of the mutual vulnerability of 
that flesh, or what it is to be that flesh. Daisy’s fragility and the dependency of her unborn 
child on her body are not enough to protect her from violence. Rather, she is protected by the 
wonder of Arnold’s words, by the merging of her identity with that of another, masculine 
subject, to produce a narrative that appears to transcend sexuate identity and thus convey an 
uninflected ‘humanness’.  
 Literary language is thus saved from Perowne’s condemnation in the form of a poem. 
If narrative’s primary aim is to communicate what it is to be a particular subject in order that 
the other can imagine the subject, McEwan seems to come perilously close to advocating the 
abandonment of literary works altogether in favour of biography and autobiography. Yet 
selecting a poem as the catalyst for the transformative communication of self to the other, 
McEwan is demonstrating that the literary, the poetic, need not be sacrificed in the demand 
for dutiful literature. ‘Dover Beach’ is not a poem that sets out to trouble the connection 
between language and the world; rather it relies on that connection to bring the scene to life, 
and to establish an image located in space and time that then reverberates back into the 
language he has chosen. Furthermore, the text is designed to appeal to the listener or reader, 
appealing to them directly as ‘you’, enfolding them into the poem with ‘love’, ‘we’ and ‘us’. 
The language brings the scene to the audience, as well as including the audience in the scene. 
The need to convey the thoughts and feelings upon witnessing the waves rolling across 
England’s shoreline is paramount. Literary language, poetic language, is thus permissible as 
long as it used to ‘let us be true/ To one another,’571 rather than to co-opt for itself the 
negation of the world that precedes meaning. Saturday suggests that when language is used to 
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narrate a moment of existence, the humanity apprehended within that narrative will 
transcend not only cultural difference, but any difference inscribed on or by the body. An 
unmarried, pregnant English woman in a modern middle-class home can recite the words of a 
long-dead, Victorian man, and be recognised as a subject in doing so.  
 Hillard, then, is perhaps both correct in stating that the ‘Dover Beach’ recital is not a 
straightforward chauvinistic moment, and also overly generous in asserting this moment is an 
acknowledgement of feminine literary forebears. It is in fact a disavowal of the validity of such 
distinctions as relevant in the face of a universal humanity, a humanity so universal, so 
inscribed in our natures, that the effect is the same no matter who communicates it to whom. 
This universalism immediately runs into problems if we consider that the imperative McEwan 
seems to be positing is that literature conveys within it something of what it is to be a 
particular subject. If literature is under an ethical obligation to help us ‘be true to one another,’ 
how does this square with the apparent idea that communicating something of our universal 
humanity is what makes us present to the other? And how do we read Daisy’s recital of the 
words of another in order to be recognised as a subject in Baxter’s eyes? After all, it is Daisy’s 
use of ‘Dover Beach’ to answer Baxter’s demand for poetry that leads to Perowne and Theo 
assaulting Baxter. 
 In her analysis of the role of narrative in Saturday and Atonement, Salisbury argues 
that McEwan’s turn to science, neuroscience in particular, in search of a model of subjectivity 
has led to a consequent scorn for the psychoanalytic models used in many of the Humanities, 
not least literary departments. According to Salisbury, whilst psychoanalysis could only get into 
the mind via what came out of the mouth, the advances in neuroscience mean there is no 
longer a need to rely on such interpretations in McEwan’s view. Crucially, Salisbury tells us that 
McEwan replaces the mother and child bond, recognised as pivotal in a variety of ways across 
the psychoanalytic spectrum, with narrative: 
[F]or McEwan, in place of a literal mother and child, it is the sympathetic 
understanding forged by particular kinds of narrative that uses, supports, and 
articulates that ‘more-or-less automatic understanding of what it means to be 
someone else’ . . . 572 
 
The formative contact between the mother and infant, or in Butler’s case, between the infants 
and the bodies that sustain them in their state of greatest dependency on the other, is 
dismissed as a formative presence. If narrative is to be considered foundational to subjectivity, 
it seems it must be at the expense of any recognition of the mother/infant bond. Touch, the 
lived relation, the complexity of flesh and nourishment between the infant and the mother 
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comes to be only that which sustains life, not that which shapes it. Right from the outset, the 
body becomes little more than the container for a mind that will be primarily sculpted by the 
interaction of genes, neurons and social narratives. Just as the turn to the body for an ethics 
moves past the flesh when informed by a particular scientific methodology, so too McEwan’s 
understanding of narrative as foundational to human identity becomes curiously skinless, 
despite the desire to keep language from straying too far from its material roots. In taking the 
mind to be the guarantor of the connection between language and the material world, 
McEwan has equated the subject with the wet stuff of the brain, removing the maternal body 
from any role in the formation of the subject, and thus any concept of subjectivity that relies 
on the lived relation rather than the purely narratively-constituted one. It is only by performing 
such a sublimation of the maternal body that one can validate the universality of narrative, as 
the possibility of embodied difference, sexuate difference, disappears with the dismissal of the 
lived relation as forming the subject. Indeed, in modelling the subject as being situated inside 
the body, narrative and language in general must become a means of facilitating relations 
between inside and out, in place of the disavowed flesh. Salisbury describes McEwan’s fiction 
as attempting to facilitate ‘the penetration of another consciousness’ in order to produce ‘an 
empathetic act of meeting, a connection with another that is recognised as outside the self, 
but who shares its concerns and demonstrates, in McEwan’s own terms, ‘not how exotically 
different we are from one another, but how exotically similar we are.’’573 Knowledge of the 
other in McEwan’s model requires a penetration of the other, gaining access to their interior 
life, moving past the surface of their skin. It is only by placing oneself in the mind of the other 
that one gains a sense of a shared bond, a bond that then acts to ensure the flesh is no longer 
at risk from the other. Empathy is dependent on narrative, and narrative is penetrative. Given 
the position to which the material, maternal-feminine is relegated in McEwan’s model of 
subjectivity, it is no surprise to see his concept of narrative follows a phallically-informed logic. 
Narrative, and by extension, language become a means of penetrating the other to 
guard against the exploitation of one’s own material vulnerability, a materiality that is 
disavowed in the very process of becoming a subject precisely because of its inherent threat to 
the subject’s completeness. The analogy here is plain: language becomes a means through 
which the subject obfuscates its existence as mere wet stuff in order to preserve itself. It 
becomes a tool used to access the other, and to cloak one’s own vulnerability from the other 
by appealing to that other. It becomes the guarantor of sameness, transcending difference of 
all kinds, not least the difference that creates the very wet stuff that we all are, and thus 
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makes us always already vulnerable to one another. The danger comes in this appeal to the 
other, in the two-way nature of the process of narration. For in McEwan’s fleshless 
formulation, allowing oneself to be penetrated by the other is to come perilously close to 
adopting the position of the feminine, to risk becoming like Perowne’s London: open, 
vulnerable, passively waiting for the other to make use of us. It is no surprise, then, that 
McEwan chooses Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’ as representative of language’s ability to arouse 
awareness of our subjectivity in the other. For as Hillard and others note,574 it is a poem that 
reflects on the solidity of England as its empire is in turmoil, finding a melancholy comfort in 
the permanence of England’s cliffs even as ‘we are here as on a darkling plain/ Swept with 
confused alarms of struggle and flight,/ Where ignorant armies clash by night.’575 In times of 
turmoil, when we must reach out to the other and lay ourselves open to them, it is more 
important than ever to have a sense of one’s solid identity, to clearly define one’s place in the 
world. For McEwan, as for those who proclaimed the death of feminism in the U.S., after 
September 11th, 2001, it is more important than ever to know who we are and to assert the 
unambiguously what we represent. In the face of a globalised world that facilitates the 
transmission of terror, Saturday suggests that British literature has a duty to communicate to 
the world what it is to be British; and what it is to be British in McEwan’s formulation is to 
value a universal humanity above all else. If Gordimer and Lessing figure the body as a place 
that resists narrative definitions, for McEwan, the body becomes the potential guarantor of 
British literature’s moral high-ground as it generates an ethics that holds the potential for all 
humanity to be heard. McEwan’s approach thus constructs the phallic British male as the 
arbiter of the ethical. 
McEwan’s turn to the materiality of the body thus reinstalls the notions of mastery 
that permeate the epistemology of terrorism. Given that we have seen that McEwan’s notion 
of the body rests on the same conceptual ground as terrorism discourses, this is not surprising. 
What is perhaps more concerning is McEwan’s willingness to accept terrorism discourses’ 
rejection of ambiguity, an ambiguity that proved vital in providing a critical space in Gordimer 
and Lessing. Moreover, in foreclosing the possibility that the line between self and terrorist 
Other is never distinct, McEwan has reinstalled conservative notions of masculine and 
feminine, as manifested in Daisy’s need for protection and inability to speak for herself. 
Whereas in Gordimer and Lessing, the possibility of sexuate difference created room for 
critical reflection, by the time we reach Saturday, sexuate difference is precisely that which 
must be forgotten in the name of a universal humanity. So has the emergence of terrorism 
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discourses as a global narrative in the wake of September 11th, 2001, fundamentally colonised 
our symbolic spaces to such an extent that it is impossible to turn to our embodied experience 
as a means to formulate an incarnate ethics? If McEwan is writing in response to terrorism’s 
infiltration of the global sphere, Don DeLillo’s Falling Man is set in Manhattan, before, during, 
and after the attacks. Perhaps by turning to a novel that takes the September 11th attacks as its 
physical context that we can find something resembling Irigaray’s sensible transcendental. 
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Chapter 4: Embodying Terror and Figuring Response-ability in Don DeLillo’s Falling Man 
 
If McEwan shares Baudrillard’s pessimism about the media’s impact on the individual’s 
capacity to respond spontaneously to the world around them, Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007) 
is concerned with complicating this bleak hypothesis. Unlike McEwan’s Saturday, DeLillo’s 
novel centres on the Tuesday of the September 11th attacks, focusing on the site of the most 
spectacular atrocity committed that morning, Manhattan. To do so, DeLillo brings together the 
narratives of Keith Neudecker, a man working in the World Trade Center’s North Tower on the 
day of the attack, his wife Lianne, who watches the events unfold on television in her 
Manhattan apartment, and Hammad, one of the perpetrators of the attacks. Through the 
interaction of these narrative strands, DeLillo draws into question the possibility that the 
terrorist attack can induce a uniform reaction in the media’s global audience. Moreover, just as 
it is an overwriting of embodied difference that facilitates McEwan and Baudrillard’s notion of 
a mass audience, in Falling Man it is the specificity of each individual’s body that works to 
problematize the presumed efficacy of the media’s ability to transmit a universal experience of 
terror. In doing so, DeLillo echoes Gordimer and Lessing, as he figures the body as a site of 
resistance, as the differences between Keith, Lianne, and Hammad’s experiences pose a direct 
challenge to the ease with which September 11th was inserted into global narratives and 
colonised by Bush’s rhetoric of “us” and “them”. By dismantling the assumption that they 
constituted a coherent, identifiable “event”, DeLillo’s turn to the individual’s experience thus 
coincides with Derrida and Žižek’s responses to the rhetoric around the attacks. As such, 
Falling Man both shares Baudrillard’s sense that representation – particularly the image – has 
the potential to foreclose the possibility of response, yet at the same time suggests that 
cultivating an embodied perception can articulate a response that has not been pre-figured by 
representation. In essence, DeLillo suggests that it is a particular ‘mode of seeing’ that has 
allowed the September 11th attacks to be appropriated into the wider narratives that dictated 
the US response, and thus turns to the body to explore the potential for alternative modes of 
perception in order to open up the possibility of a spontaneous response. Perhaps most 
strikingly, as DeLillo rethinks the perception of terrorism through the body, he brings sexual 
difference to the fore, not simply by using the husband and wife relation to draw gendered 
comparisons, but by exposing the shared ground between the masculinities of the victim and 
the terrorist. As we shall see, the vertical and horizontal natures of both the relations between 
the characters and their individual connection to the world play a vital role in these 
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configurations. Perhaps it is in Falling Man, a novel that directly resists the power of abstract 
representation in favour of embodied perception and that is permeated with notions of 
vertical and horizontal relations, that we will find a means to articulate how Irigaray’s sensible 
transcendental can help us cultivate an ethical relation when we are faced with the terrorist 
Other. 
Looking at September 11th, 2001 
 Like Gordimer and Lessing before him, DeLillo’s novelistic engagement with the 
context surrounding real terrorist violence received a mixed and often scornful critical 
reception upon publication. Falling Man begins and ends with Keith emerging from the World 
Trade Center just as the South Tower collapses, with the narratives in-between tracing both 
Keith and Lianne’s experiences in the days, months, and eventually years after the attacks, 
intercut with brief sections of narrative that follow Hammad’s progress towards terrorism, 
ending as the plane he has hijacked crashes in Keith’s building. As Keith and Lianne absorb the 
impact of the attacks, and try to return to something like a normal life, they momentarily 
repair their broken marriage before once again going their separate ways. Three years after 
the attacks, Keith has become a full-time gambler, living an anonymous life passing through 
casinos and hotels, while Lianne and the couple’s son Justin have re-established their pre-
September 11th routine. Crucial to both Keith and Lianne’s attempts to come to terms with 
what unfolded in Manhattan on that day are bodily experiences, encounters with others’ 
bodies, and interaction with images, be they media or artistic representations. For Lianne in 
particular, these elements come together in the form of David Janiak, a performance artist 
whose act Lianne witnesses twice in the text. Appearing at random sites across Manhattan in 
the months after the attacks, Janiak suspends himself from architectural elements with a 
harness and adopts a pose that all those watching would not fail to recognise: ‘A man was 
dangling there, above the street, upside down. He wore a business suit, one leg bent up, arms 
at his sides.’576 In his performances, Janiak becomes a living embodiment of Richard Drew’s 
now infamous photograph of a man plunging from the World Trade Center towers after the 
attacks, which has become known as ‘The Falling Man’, ‘A Falling Man’ or simply ‘Falling 
Man.’577 
 For many, the figure of Janiak became emblematic of the overall failure of Falling Man 
as a response to the September 11th atrocities. For example, O’Hagan argues: 
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There appear to be few writers in America now who could bring us to know what 
might have been going through the minds of those people as they fell from the 
building – or going through the minds of those hijackers as they met their targets – but 
there is no shortage of those who would do what DeLillo does, which is to show us an 
anxious, educated woman watching a performance artist hanging upside down from a 
metal beam in Pershing Square. It is a form of intellectual escapism.578 
 
O’Hagan’s ire is shared by many, including Tim Junod, the journalist whose 2003 article ‘The 
Falling Man’ in Esquire attempted to identify the man in Drew’s image.579 Junod’s piece 
protested against the taboo that almost instantaneously sprang up around the images of those 
falling from the Towers, arguing that marking these images as off-limits signalled Americans 
taking it ‘upon ourselves to deem their deaths unworthy of witness – because we have 
somehow deemed the act of witness, in this one regard, unworthy of us.’580 For Junod, 
DeLillo’s decision to figure Drew’s image as a performance is yet another failure to bear 
witness to the lives of those who died in such a horrific manner: 
I have a pretty good idea who the Falling Man was, and he was neither a performance 
artist nor a totem of severed human connections. He was a man, and his tragedy was 
not that he made it possible for people not to love their families; his tragedy was that 
he loved his family, and was loved in return, and that his connection to them continues 
in the afterlife of Drew’s indelible image, and is unbearable.581 
 
For both Junod and O’Hagan, Janiak represents Falling Man’s eschewal of duty, suggesting that 
both critics follow McEwan’s sense that in the wake of September 11th, literature has a moral 
obligation to shrug off aesthetic flights on fancy in favour of representing reality. O’Hagan 
makes this patently clear when he insists that in Janiak, DeLillo represses the fact that Junod’s 
investigations revealed it was very likely that Drew’s ‘Falling Man’ was Jonathan Briley: 
Jonathan Briley . . . was flesh and blood, not just an idea. He was born on March 5, 
1968. He was six feet five. His father was a preacher. He suffered from asthma and had 
a wife called Hilary. He died sixty-five minutes twenty seconds after Mohamed Atta, 
and is currently awaiting a writer sufficiently uncoerced by the politics of art to tell his 
story.582 
 
Echoing McEwan, O’Hagan argues that literature addressing the attacks has a duty to pay 
tribute to the lives of those who perished by articulating the truth of their existence. As such, 
O’Hagan posits that ‘September 11 offered a few hours when American novelists could only sit 
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at home while journalism taught them fierce lessons . . . Actuality showed its own naked art 
that day.’583 Similarly, Junod insists that: 
[W]hen the planes hit and the buildings went down we entered the “age of 
nonfiction,” when journalism, even journalism as modest in means as one of those 
Portraits of Grief, is able to grasp what’s happened – and, more to the point, what’s 
happening – to us more than fiction can, even fiction by our most accomplished and 
ambitious writers.584 
 
Journalism, then, not literature, was the mode of writing that could fittingly memorialise the 
suffering and the loss brought about the attacks. With its concern for the brute details and the 
facts of each individual victim’s life, journalism grounded its representations of the fallen in 
reality and attempted to convey a fitting sense of what had been lost. By contrast, literature’s 
concern with aesthetics and willingness to stray from the factual rendered it both ineffectual 
and potentially amoral when faced with such brutal reality. For Junod and O’Hagan, DeLillo’s 
failure to embrace the journalistic aesthetic that so eloquently captured the meaning of the 
attacks meant Falling Man did little more than appropriate the lives of the dead for the 
purposes of aesthetic navel-gazing. 
 In accusing DeLillo of aesthetic amorality, Junod and O’Hagan capture a wider sense 
that journalistic or realist approaches are the appropriate means for both representing and 
understanding September 11th. Eric Fischl’s sculpture, ‘Tumbling Woman’ was originally 
displayed outside the Rockerfeller Center in New York to commemorate the dead, but was 
quickly covered over, before being screened from view and subsequently removed, as it 
produced widespread offense as people felt it was disrespectful to those who had died falling 
from the Towers.585 Similarly, the composer Karlheinz Stockhausen was reviled worldwide as 
he responded to journalistic prompting at a press conference on September 16th, 2001, and 
described the attacks of five days before as ‘the greatest work of art that is possible’.586 
Tommasini spoke for many as he condemned Stockhausen’s claim: 
Art may be hard to define, but whatever art is, it’s a step removed from reality. A 
theatrical depiction of suffering may be art; real suffering is not. Because the art of 
photography often blurs this distinction, it can make us uncomfortable. Real people, 
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sometimes suffering people, have been photography’s unwitting subjects. That’s why 
we have photojournalism, to keep things clear.587 
 
Here Tommasini neatly captures the understanding that circulates beneath the condemnation 
of DeLillo and Fischl’s artistic responses and underpins McEwan’s concept of literary duty. 
There is a necessity to maintain a distinction between reality and artistic interpretation, 
particularly when the photography that makes us aware of the brutality of the real carries with 
it aesthetic overtones. When presented with such a blurring of the boundary between the 
aesthetic and the real, Tommasini implies that we, as viewers, have a duty to remember into 
which category the image in front of us falls. We have a duty to see things in the correct mode, 
in this instance, the mode of photojournalism, regardless of the temptation to stray into the 
aesthetic. To do otherwise is to prove oneself so immoral or disconnected from reality that 
one merits a stay in a mental institution; Tommasini recommends Stockhausen should ‘be 
confined to a psychiatric clinic.’588 
  O’Hagan, Junod, and indeed McEwan, therefore arguably posit that in the wake of 
terrorist violence, literature should replicate photojournalism’s gesture, testifying to the reality 
that has passed before our eyes, rather than blurring the boundaries between the aesthetic 
and the real. Not only does this echo the insistence of terrorism discourses on the realism of 
its prose, it also suggests that photography has the capacity to transparently represent reality. 
Such an understanding of photojournalism relies on what Roland Barthes’ describes as the 
photograph’s ability to act as ‘a certificate of presence.’589 For Barthes, the photograph ‘flows 
back from presentation to retention,’590 for as an image that is constituted by the reality it 
comes to represent, the photograph makes a persistent claim for the ‘former existence’ of its 
referent. 591 Unlike other forms of representation, the photograph haunts the present with the 
‘that-has-been,’592 insisting on the fact that what it represents took place in actuality even if it 
has now passed into history. Moreover, because the photograph is constituted by the reality it 
represents, it achieves a ‘[t]otality-of-Image; not only because it is already an image in itself, 
but because this very special image gives itself out as complete . . .The photographic image is 
full, crammed: no room, nothing can be added to it.’593 In contrast to the cinematic image, 
whose referent shifts as the image moves, the photograph’s silent, stubborn assertion of one 
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particular truth means it resists narrative flow, ‘it is without future (this is its pathos, its 
melancholy; in it, no protensity).’594 Even when surrounded by words, given a caption, or 
placed in a series, the photograph will inevitably slip the bonds of narration and stand alone, 
outside the press of narrative, linear time. The insistance that literature must remain faithful 
to the facts surrounding September 11th thus suggests that the literary response should 
emulate the photographic precisely because nothing more can be added to the images that 
emerged from Manhattan that day. The images of the attacks, Drew’s image among them, 
resolutely foreclose the possibility of aesthetic response, for they say it all. To insert these 
images into a literary narrative or to overwrite the reality they testify to with fictional creations 
is to fail to remain faithful to the truth they present. 
 But if this understanding of photojournalism echoes Barthes’ figuring of the 
photograph as the ‘that-has-been,’ Barthes’ own thinking on the experience of looking at the 
photograph overturns the notion that we can make a definitive distinction between the 
photojournalistic and the aesthetic, for he argues that the photograph facilitates two specific 
experiences of perception. The ability to distinguish between the photojournalistic and 
aesthetic photograph corresponds to what Barthes describes as the studium, a form of looking 
in which we interpret the image in a culturally-determined framework. But Barthes also 
describes the punctum, a deeply personal and unpredictable response as something within the 
image pierces through the cultural framework and touches our consciousness in such a way as 
to take us to ‘a kind of subtle beyond – as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits 
us to see.’595 Not only does the punctum challenge the assumption that we are all capable of 
reading the photograph in a culturally-prescribed manner, its capacity to ‘launch’ the desire to 
move into the beyond corresponds with Paul de Man’s figuring of the aesthetic experience. 
Bringing together models of the aesthetic temperament put forward by Georg Lukacs, Oskar 
Becker and the psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger, de Man detects a ‘phenomenology of 
heights and depths’596 permeating these figurings of the aesthetic. Through his reading of 
these works, de Man argues aesthetic desire arises from an acute discomfort with the spatial 
and temporal confines of everyday experience, which can only be alleviated by rising above 
the ‘excessive presence of time,’ allowing the artist sufficient freedom from historical time to 
make the ‘leap’ needed for aesthetic creation.597 Artistic creation, in this figuration, is the 
result of the fall back to earth from this aesthetic height, as ‘the kind of knowledge contained 
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in art is specifically the knowledge of this fall, the transformation of the experience of falling 
into an act of knowledge.’598 But alongside the aesthetic impulse for the vertical transcendence 
of everyday temporality, de Man draws attention to Binswanger’s inclusion of the possibility of 
‘an involuntary ascent’, ‘an upward fall.’599 For Binswanger, just as the fall implies an 
involuntary tumbling from a vertical position, so too is it possible to envision being propelled 
to aesthetic heights against one’s will. While de Man associates this experience of being 
‘carried away’ with the Romantics, if this ascent is not voluntary, there is no reason to suppose 
this movement would be confined to those already open to the aesthetic realm. If Barthes’ 
punctum launches us out of a culturally-constructed sphere of looking, can we not thus read it 
as such a moment of involuntarily ascent into the aesthetic? Once again, like Blanchot’s 
language, the very means of representation that is supposed to facilitate an unambiguous 
connection to the world contains within it an invitation to move beyond the confines of that 
world. It is photography’s invitation to understand the real aesthetically that fuels the desire to 
establish an impermeable divide between the photojournalistic and the aesthetic by asserting 
that there are appropriate ways of perceiving images. Thus, can we not read the demands that 
literature replicate the realist aesthetic of journalism and pay homage to the photograph’s 
ability to capture reality as arising from the recognition that, like Blanchot’s literary language, 
the photograph in fact renders the real open to terroristic appropriation? In foreclosing the 
aesthetic capacity of the photojournalistic, the gesture is to once again colonise the symbolic 
space to secure one’s own position as the epistemological master. 
 But just as Barthes argues that our own personal experience of the photograph has the 
potential to disrupt the culturally-constituted perception of that image, so Falling Man 
repeatedly suggests that our bodies foreclose the possibility that we will able to perceive the 
world in a pre-figured way. The experiences of Lianne’s Alzheimer’s group dramatically 
illustrate the body’s capacity to destabilise even the most basic connection between what one 
“knows” and what one perceives. As the disease does ever greater damage to his brain, Benny 
T. cannot convince himself that his trousers are on correctly: 
He was in a mind and body that were not his, looking at the fit. The pants did not seem 
to fit right. He took them off and put them on. He shook them out. He began to think 
they were someone else’s pants, in his house, draped over his chair.600 
 
Carl B., another sufferer, slips into moments where he can no longer establish a connection 
between what his eyes perceive and his own body: 
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There it was, in my right hand. But the right hand could not seem to find its way to the 
left wrist. There was a spatial void, or a visual gap, a rift in his field of vision, and it took 
him some time to make the connection, hand to wrist, pointed end of wristband into 
buckle. To Curtis this was a moral flaw, a sin of self-betrayal.601 
 
Echoing the logic of those advocating a literary turn to journalism, Carl B. feels the rift between 
the visual and the body is somehow morally wrong. Alzheimer’s erosion of the brain’s wet 
matter strips away the capability to secure the connection between the acts of seeing and 
knowing to such an extent that Carl B. and Benny T. are left unable to operate in even the 
most familiar setting. But just as McEwan turns to dementia to give us a model of the “normal” 
mind, so DeLillo suggests that these experiences of flawed perception are extreme realisations 
of a failure between seeing and knowing that pervade everyday life, thanks to our embodied 
nature. For instance, as Keith is confronted by a horse and rider emerging from stable near 
Central Park, he is initially unable to consolidate what he sees with his understanding of his 
surroundings: 
[I]t was strange, what he was seeing down by the community garden a woman in the 
middle of the street, on horseback, wearing a yellow hard hat and carrying a riding 
crop, bobbing above the traffic, and it took him a long moment to understand . . . It 
was something that belonged to another landscape, something inserted, a conjuring 
that resembled for the briefest second some half-seen image only half believed in the 
seeing, when the witness wonders what has happened to the meaning of things, to 
tree, stone, wind, simple words lost in the falling ash.602 
 
Keith’s understanding of what is appropriate to the city leaves him momentarily unable to 
comprehend the presence of something that is culturally-constructed as belonging to another 
landscape. His sense of the studium leaves him unable to interpret what passes before his 
eyes. Moreover, this moment of perceptual discombobulation stirs a memory of another such 
instance, a moment shrouded in ash where the witness was unable to discern the meaning of 
things. As we learn towards the end of the novel, this moment is in fact where the ‘Falling 
Man’ enters the text.  
 For although Falling Man begins as Keith walks away as the South Tower collapses, the 
novel enters the Tower in its final scene. As the plane plunges into the building, the everyday 
experience of a synchronicity between perception and understanding vanishes as Keith’s office 
suddenly becomes an unfamiliar landscape: 
He thought he saw the ceiling begin to ripple, lift and ripple. He put his arms over his 
head and sat knees up, face wedged between them. He was aware of vast movement 
and other things, smaller, unseen, objects drifting and skidding, and sounds that 
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weren’t one thing or another but only sound, a shift in the basic arrangement of parts 
and elements. 
The movement was beneath him and then all around him, massive, something 
undreamed. It was the tower lurching. He understood this now.603 
 
Keith is no longer sure of what he sees and hears. He only thinks he saw the ceiling ripple, ‘he 
thought he saw a man on his knees in the first pale wave of smoke and dust,’604 and he is 
unable to distinguish sounds from simple noise. Propelled into a landscape so unfamiliar as to 
be ‘undreamed’, Keith, like the Alzheimer’s group, has to concentrate in order to get his body 
to perform the most basic tasks: ‘[h]e tried to be absolutely still and tried to breathe and tried 
to listen.’605 Yet even in this strange world, Keith is able to begin to read meaning into the 
movement of tower, to recognise the smell of jet fuel, and to understand that his colleague 
Rumsey’s mutilated form resembles a quadriplegic.606 The absolute break-down between 
seeing and comprehension takes places a moment later as: 
Things began to fall, one thing and then another, things singly at first, coming down 
and out of gaps in the ceiling, and he tried lifting Rumsey out of the chair. Then 
something outside, going past the window. Something went past the window, then he 
saw it. First it went and was gone and then he saw it and had to stand a moment 
staring out at nothing, holding Rumsey under the arms.607 
 
What Keith witnesses is so outside the bounds of experience as to leave him unable to “see” it. 
The arrival of understanding is delayed, postponed, exposing a gap between visual perception 
and the ability to interpret that perception into meaningful information. This disjunction leaves 
Keith unable to move, floored by what he has witnessed. An instant later: 
He could not stop seeing it, twenty feet away, an instant of something sideways, going 
past the window, white shirt, hand up, falling before he saw it. Debris in clusters came 
down now. There were echoes sounding down the floors and wires snapping at his 
face and white powder everywhere. He stood through it, holding Rumsey. The glass 
partition shattered. Something came down and there was a noise and then the glass 
shivered and broke and then the wall gave way behind him.608 
 
Precisely what Keith has seen still eludes him, a hand and a shirt escaping his vision before he 
has been able to inscribe significance on their presence. Rather than a clear picture of what 
Keith has witnesses, we are left with a sense of movement, a simultaneous falling and 
sideways motion that passes beyond the text before its meaning arrives. The falling and the 
shirt hints to the reader that Keith has witnessed a person falling from the tower. Yet the 
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sideways whiteness and raised arm echo the hue and shape of the second plane entering the 
South Tower. Both of these inferences emerge from a point of time outside of the moment, a 
knowledge brought in from the future. In the moment, the ‘rift’ in Keith’s perceptual field 
renders him blind to what he has witnessed. Unable to use his everyday understanding of his 
context to imbue what has flashed before him with meaning, Keith is left with raw perception, 
leaving both him and the reader bombarded by sensation as the text’s structure breaks down 
into a relentless list of movement and noise. 
 While O’Hagan posits that Falling Man fails as a novel, as it does not allow us into ‘the 
minds of the people as they fell,’ in providing us with an embodied experience of what it is to 
witness such a falling, DeLillo suggests that such an imaginative attempt would be futile, if not 
unethical, for he opens up the possibility that witnessing such brutality first-hand renders the 
subject unable to instil meaning in their own experiences. In such a violently altered landscape, 
conventional understanding is rendered useless and so to venture into the mind of those who 
fell would be to reduce the unthinkable to terms that arise from the stable ground of the 
everyday. Instead of using the image of the ‘Falling Man’ as a vehicle for colonising that 
individual’s mind with meaning external to the moment, DeLillo instead figures the body as 
acting like a camera, for as Hirsch reflects on the vast canon of photographs of September 11th, 
she argues, ‘[t]o photograph is to look in a different way – to look without understanding. 
Understanding is deferred until we see the developed image.’609 Given that we do not enter 
the World Trade Center until Keith has constructed a life for himself three years after the 
attacks, Falling Man not only suggests that the meaning of what Keith has witnessed takes 
years to develop within him, it also defers the arrival of meaning for the reader too. The 
possibility of understanding Keith’s actions in the narrative through his experiences in the 
Tower is suspended until the novel’s closing moments, thus the reader must revisit the text if 
one wants to insert Keith’s behaviour into the narrative of September 11th. Rather than 
reading the plethora of images of the attacks as testifying to the death of non-fiction in the 
face of the image’s profound ability to convey reality, by entering the materiality of the instant 
in which the ‘Falling Man’ passes through the text, DeLillo is in accord with Lentricchia and 
McAuliffe in suggesting that September 11th disrupted the studium in such a way as to leave all 
established frameworks for reading the world incapable of installing meaning upon that world; 
in other words, it did indeed propel us into an potentially aesthetic transcendence of the 
everyday insofar as it replicated: 
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what the Romantic poet Shelley meant when he said that art “strips the film of 
familiarity” from the world as we know it – the evil of familiarity; a stripping – like an 
altering of a skyline? – which is a deep cleansing of perception and a prelude to the 
establishment of new consciousness; in Stockhausen’s words, an act of imagination 
with spiritual impact on us – a jump out of security, the self-evident, out of everyday 
life.610 
 
But as Lentricchia and McAuliffe’s description of the moment that instigates such a perceptual 
cleansing as an ‘enabling destruction’611 implies, recognising the opening into the aesthetic 
such terroristic moments produce risks appropriating the suffering of others in the name of 
new understanding. Yet again, the bodies of others are left vulnerable to the gesture that 
facilitates terrorism, bringing the artist, the novelist, into close proximity with the terrorist 
Other. But if DeLillo turns to embodied experience to figure this stripping away of the film of 
reality, can we also not read Falling Man as navigating this perilous ethical boundary between 
the aesthetic and the body of the other by remaining faithful to the physicality of the 
photograph its title invokes? For if the photograph always testifies to the ‘that-has-been,’ 
would an aesthetics grounded in that image not also remain faithful to the reality that imbued 
the photograph with artistic qualities?  
In this light, it is no coincidence that out of the myriad images that emerged from 
Manhattan that on September 11th, 2001, DeLillo’s text responds to Drew’s photograph for as 
Junod’s description of ‘Falling Man’ notes, this photograph was particularly troubling for those 
wishing to make a distinction between the photojournalistic and the artistic: 
The man in the picture . . . is perfectly vertical, and so is in accord with the lines of the 
building behind him. He splits them, bisects them . . . Some people who look at the 
picture see stoicism, willpower, a portrait of resignation; others see something else – 
something discordant and therefore terrible: freedom. There is something almost 
rebellious in the man’s posture, as though once faced with the inevitability of death, 
he decided to get on with it; as though he were a missile, a spear, bent on attaining his 
own end . . . He will soon be travelling at upwards of 150 miles per hour, and he is 
upside down. In the picture, he is frozen; in his life outside the frame, he drops and 
keeps dropping until he disappears.’612  
 
‘Falling Man’ brings together the aesthetic and ‘real life’ in a way that disrupts accepted modes 
of seeing. It is not an exaggeration to say, as Junod does, that this photograph enacts an 
indefinite suspension, a limitless pause that allows the viewer as much time as they want to 
contemplate what is before their eyes, the chance to return again and again to an unchanged 
moment, a suspension that becomes all the more haunting as it seems to coincide with the 
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content of the photograph. There have been other famous images of the seconds before, or 
even of, the moment of death that similarly blurred the distinction between journalistic 
photography and aesthetic appeal in troubling ways, with images such as Eddie Adam’s ‘Street 
Execution of a Vietcong Prisoner’ (1968) and perhaps to a greater extent Robert Capa’s much -
disputed ‘Death of a Loyalist Soldier’ (1936).613 But while both of these images capture the 
instant before the dead or dying man completes his fall to the ground, (indeed, Capa’s image is 
also widely known as the ‘Falling Soldier’), neither image contains within it a suspension as 
powerful as ‘Falling Man’. With Adam’s photograph, the executed man (Van Lem) has yet to 
begin his inevitable tumble to the ground, while Capa’s soldier, Federico Borrell, topples 
backwards, his feet losing their purchase on the ground beneath him, torso and head 
suspended above the ground, arm flung backwards, looking almost like a man who has missed 
his seat. It is only in ‘Falling Man’ that the complete suspension of time enacted by 
photography is mirrored by the complete suspension of the figure in the image. Alive but 
facing certain death, alive but certainly dead, with no contact with the world around him, in 
absolute free-fall, the man is suspended by the photograph, his passage downwards, his 
passage from life into death, halted by the camera. There has perhaps never been such an 
eloquent and poignant coincidence between the temporality of the photograph and its subject 
matter. As Susan Lurie, among many others, has observed ‘[c]ontemplating this image, one 
wishes that the camera’s ability to freeze the moment might have made a magical intervention 
in the fall itself.’614 Perhaps the desire ‘that seeing could translate into saving’ that Lurie 
identifies goes some way to explaining the huge photographic record of the events that 
unfolded in New York, both in public and private collections.615 We could not reach them with 
our hands and so we captured them with our cameras instead. 
 If Lurie suggests that the photographs of the falling encapsulate a desire to rescue 
them from their horrific fate, Falling Man explores the possibility that it is in the photograph’s 
profound figuring of suspension that we find a means of formulating an ethics from the 
aesthetic qualities of Drew’s image. Abel draws our attention to DeLillo’s interest in the ethical 
possibilities of suspension in his reading of DeLillo’s ‘In the Ruins of the Future: Reflections on 
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Terror and Loss in the Shadow of September.’616 Published barely three months after the 
attacks, DeLillo’s article is comprised of eight textual fragments, placed alongside haunting 
photographs from James Fee’s ‘Photographs of America’ series.617 Each fragment situates the 
attacks in a different narrative context, from a discussion of global politics and economics, 
through to DeLillo recounting his nephew’s personal experience. While Kauffman reads this 
fragmented article as attempting to do battle against the failure of language in the presence of 
the ‘absence, emptiness, the howling space of the void’ left by the attacks,618 Abel argues that 
in: 
[r]esisting the demand to speak with moral clarity and declare what the event means, 
[DeLillo’s] essay instead shows that response is always a question of response-ability, 
or the ethical how. DeLillo stylistically configures response-ability as always and 
necessarily a question of how rather than what; (e)valuation rather than 
representation; the power of the false rather than the regime of truth.619 
 
Reading ‘In the Ruins’ as replicating the aesthetic conventions of André Bazin’s neorealist 
cinema, Abel suggests that in producing a fragmented rather than coherent narrative in 
response to the attacks, DeLillo forces the reader to participate in constructing the significance 
of the attacks. The ‘event’ becomes that which emerges in the interchange between different 
narratives and different perspectives, rather than being inserted into an external pre-figured 
idea of what constitutes an event. Thus, Abel suggests: 
DeLillo’s image events resonate aesthetically and ethically with those of neorealist 
cinema: faced with the impossibility yet necessity of responding to events that exceed 
immediate explanation, both kinds enact their response-ability to show how intensely 
inhabiting – suspending – an event can bring ethical responsibility to it.620 
 
Suspension, therefore, holds ethical potential as it opens up the possibility of response. 
Echoing both Irigaray and Spivak’s demand that we suspend our epistemological frameworks 
in order to avoid appropriating the other with our own terms, so Abel figures DeLillo’s 
suspension of narrative mastery as sowing the seeds of response-ability. 
 Highlighting the coincidences in narrative structure, theme, and even the recurrence 
phrases such as “I’m standing here,” 621 Kauffman convincingly argues that Falling Man 
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develops the thinking that initially appeared in ‘In the Ruins.’ This renders Abel’s turn to 
neorealist cinema for establishing DeLillo’s ethics of suspension problematic, for it is a 
photograph, not a moving image, that the novel’s title invokes. Indeed, in focusing on Bazin’s 
cinematic critique, Abel does not take into account that Bazin himself argues that temporality 
of the cinematic image acts as a record of change as ‘the image of things is likewise the image 
of their duration, change mummified as it were.’622 For Bazin, a more fundamental suspension 
takes place through the creation of the photograph. In describing the family photo album, 
Bazin detects: 
the disturbing presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration, freed from 
their destiny; not, however, by the prestige of art but by the power of an impassive 
mechanical process: for photography does not create eternity, as art does, it embalms 
time, rescuing it simply from its proper corruption.623 
 
In Bazin’s formulation then, ‘cinema is objectivity in time,’ whereas the photograph enacts a 
permanent suspension reminiscent of amber’s preservation of pre-historic insects.624 Yet just 
as the body of the ‘Falling Man’ strips away Keith’s capacity to insert his surroundings into a 
pre-figured model of the world, so the images of the attacks in Manhattan work to disrupt the 
distinctions between the filmic and the photographic as they enter the text. As Lianne watches 
the news footage in the days after the attack, we are told: 
Every time she saw a videotape of the planes she moved a finger toward the power 
button on the remote. Then she kept on watching. The second plane coming out of 
that ice blue sky, this was the footage that entered the body, that seemed to run 
beneath her skin, the fleeting sprint that carried lives and histories, theirs and hers, 
everyone’s, into some other distance, out beyond the towers.625 
 
Lianne has had access to the seventeen minutes of footage from that particular Tuesday 
morning so often that she has already formed the habit of reaching for the remote ‘every time’ 
they appear. Moreover, she is compelled to keep on watching. Through Lianne, DeLillo 
suggests that in obsessively replaying the same footage, by continually revisiting the same 
instant in time, the media and the audience began to treat this series of moving images like a 
photograph. The repeated looping of the video images acted as a means to counteract the 
inevitable movement beyond the moment, in order that we could look again, for longer, trying 
to absorb what was before us. The repetition of this visual material suggested that the 
swiftness of the action and the concurrent brevity of the film did not permit us the time we 
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need, or desire, to look at such images. In other words, the footage demanded the kind of 
spectatorship evoked by the photographic image.  
 Thus, DeLillo suggests that neither existing models of photographic nor filmic 
spectatorship were sufficient to help us interpret the material brutality that unfolded before 
us. This dismantling of pre-existing ‘modes of perception’, to paraphrase Bazin, permeates 
Falling Man. This emerges as Lianne and Keith watch the footage of the attacks together for 
the first time: 
He watched with her. Every helpless desperation set against the sky, human voices 
crying to God and how awful to imagine this, God’s name on the tongues of the killers 
and victims both, first one plane and then the other, the one that was nearly cartoon 
human, with flashing eyes and teeth, the second plane, the south tower.626  
 
The actual soundtrack of the footage is absent, replaced by the cries to God that they know 
will have been uttered in those final moments. Yet there is a very distinct soundtrack from that 
day, first of low flying planes, the sounds of the impacts, the increasingly alarmed responses 
from the people in Manhattan, the myriad sirens, the appalling thuds of bodies hitting glass 
and ground, the roar of the towers collapsing. In separating sight from sound, DeLillo leaves 
the film operating in the purely visual manner reminiscent of the photograph, and it is the 
disruption of the distinction between photographic and filmic modes that enacts a suspension 
of pre-figuration that allows the spectators’ imaginations to interact with what they are 
witnessing. This motif is continually revisited in Falling Man, as soundtracks and moving 
images are peeled away from one another. In contrast to the blaring presence of television in 
DeLillo’s White Noise (1985), television does not make itself felt as a frenetic outpouring of 
visual and audio information in Falling Man. For example as the Neudeckers watch a poker 
game, Lianne is drawn in by the players’ ‘faces in close-up,’ leading her to ‘imagin[e] a 
northern bleakness, faces misplaced in the desert.’627 As the silent, relatively motionless 
images allow Lianne’s imagination to wander, in the same instant the television screen leads 
Keith to contemplate Lianne: ‘[h]e saw her face reflected in a corner of the screen. He was 
watching the cardplayers and noting the details of move and countermove but also watching 
her and feeling this, the sense of being here with them.’628 Deprived of sound, the visual image 
loses is capacity to engulf consciousness.  
Moreover, the movement of the narrative itself resists either purely filmic or 
photographic modes of perception. At the end of the novel, Falling Man enacts the temporal 
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suspension of a photograph in its return to the opening scene, creating a temporal join so 
seamless it is possible to read the closing paragraph as preceding the novel’s opening lines: 
 He went past a line of fire trucks and they stood empty now, headlights 
flashing. He could not find himself in the things he saw and heard. Two men ran by 
with a stretcher, someone face-down, smoke seeping out of his hair and clothes. He 
watched them move into the stunned distance. That’s where everything was, all 
around him, falling away, street signs, people, things he could not name. 
 Then he saw a shirt come down out of the sky. He walked and saw it fall, arms 
waving like nothing in this life.629 
 It was not a street anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and 
near night. He was walking north through rubble and mud and there were people 
running past holding towels to their faces or jackets over their heads.630 
 
Yet just as returning to the text with knowledge of Keith’s experience in the Tower changes the 
manner in which we read his narrative, so the text’s perpetual movement away from and 
return to particular scenes complicates the perceived differences in photographic and filmic 
temporality. If for both Bazin and Barthes, cinematic or filmic temporality is distinguished from 
photographic time by its ‘protensive’ reproduction of the liner progression of past-present-
future,631 such temporal distinctions are blurred as we repeatedly return to a kind of tableau 
vivant in which Lianne visits her mother Nina in the novel’s first 150 pages.632 Although the 
scene is framed by the arrival and departure of Nina’s lover Martin, each time we return to the 
apartment, only a matter of minutes have passed in contrast to the overall progression of the 
novel. For example, at the close of the first scene, we hear the apartment’s buzzer announce 
that “[t]his would be Martin on the way up,’633 and when we return twenty-eight pages later, 
we find Lianne only just opening the door to him: ‘Martin embraced her in the doorway, 
gravely,’634 while in the final revisiting of the apartment over one-hundred pages later, we told 
‘[i]t was only five minutes ago that Martin had walked out the door.’635 The frequent return to 
this scene and its relatively sparse narrative progression invokes something of the suspended 
temporality of the photograph. But at the same time, each time we return to Nina, Martin, and 
Lianne, the previous visit has provided us with knowledge exterior to the moment, which in 
turn inflects the scene with different meaning. We learn about the relationships between 
Lianne, Keith, Nina and Martin, both past and present. We are given an array of responses to 
the recent attacks, from personal awe at Keith’s survival to an angry exchange of views that 
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apparently echo the wider responses of the U.S. as opposed to Europe. Finally, we learn that 
Martin is in fact Ernst Hechinger, a one-time member of Kommune One and potentially the 
Red Brigade, but whose activities on behalf of these groups remains unclear. Thus, by 
repeatedly returning to this relatively still moment of narrative action despite of the 
surrounding narrative progress of the novel, DeLillo sets up a tension between the 
photograph’s refusal to let a moment slip into the past and the moving image’s narrative 
motion. For each time we return to the scene, our understanding of it has changed, imbuing it 
with narrative progress in spite of its stillness. 
 Suspending the moment in Nina’s apartment across the novel rather than collapsing it 
into one complete scene allows us to develop a new understanding of what it is we are 
witnessing each time the text enters the room. Moreover, such a suspension only becomes 
possible by rejecting both photographic and filmic temporalities, turning instead to a 
specifically literary form of narrative. It is significant, then, that it is in this extended scene that 
DeLillo explicitly places the violence of September 11th attacks alongside the aesthetic. For as 
Martin and Nina attempt to insert the attacks into narratives of socio-economic or an 
expression of ‘violent need’636 respectively, the presence of ‘two beautiful Morandi still lifes’637 
in the apartment  works to undercut the possibility that there is one correct way to “see” the 
attacks. For as Martin pauses in front of the paintings, he confesses his confusion to Nina and 
Lianne: 
“I’m looking at these objects, kitchen objects but removed from the kitchen, free of 
the kitchen, the house, everything practical and functioning. And I must be back in 
another time zone. I must be even more disoriented than usual after a long flight,” he 
said, pausing. “Because I keep seeing the towers in this still life.” 
Lianne joined him at the wall . . . . 
She saw what he saw. She saw the towers.638 
 
If Martin locates his confusion in the physical disorientation brought on by jet-lag, the fact that 
Lianne shares his altered perception of Morandi’s painting implies that there is something else 
at work. What unites Lianne and Martin is their mutual experience of watching the attacks on 
Manhattan unfold on television. Hence, in this moment, DeLillo suggests this experience has 
inflected their visual perception, leading them to detect the presence of the towers amid 
Morandi’s collection of household objects. Moreover, this experience has collapsed the ability 
to draw a clear distinction between the painting and the photographic and filmic images 
generated by the attacks. The possibility of adopting a correct mode of perception, of inserting 
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these contrasting images into a studium, is undermined by each viewer’s individual experience 
of witnessing those images. Yet despite both experiencing a similar transformation in their 
perceptual fields, Lianne and Martin are not homogenised by their experience; they do not 
merge into a group mind as terrorism discourses presume. Their perception is rather 
simultaneously inflected with their personal experiences in such a way as to bring them into 
discord. As a European and one-time activist, Martin views the attacks through different eyes 
to Lianne, who watched the destruction of the towers as New Yorker, as a woman who knew 
her estranged husband was supposed to be in the buildings. The contrast in their views leaves 
Lianne wondering years later why ‘she’d stayed in touch with him. The disincentives were 
strong . . . It was guilt by association, his, when the towers fell.’639  
 For Baudrillard and Žižek, perceiving the profusion of images that recorded the 
atrocity as it unfolded was a matter of adjusting the spectatorship reserved for Hollywood 
disaster films to allow for the fact that these images are reporting reality: ‘[r]ather than the 
violence of the real being there first, and the frisson of the image being added to it, the image 
is there first, and the frisson of the real is added.’640 Indeed, as Lianne and Keith watch the 
footage of the attacks together, Keith’s response demonstrates how rapidly such an 
adjustment can be made: 
He said, “It still looks like an accident, the first one. Even from this distance, way 
outside the thing, how many days later, I’m standing here thinking it’s an accident.” 
“Because it has to be.” 
“It has to be,” he said. 
“The way the camera sort of shows surprise.” 
“But only the first one.” 
“Only the first one,” she said. 
“The second plane, by the time the second plane appears,” he said, “we’re all a little 
older and wiser.”641 
 
But by embodying the perception of terror, DeLillo renders Keith’s ‘all’ quietly ironic. For as we 
see, Keith’s proximity to the violence that others only watched on television induces such a 
profound rupture in his perceptual field that he is unable to comprehend what he sees. 
Furthermore, as he escapes the North Tower, he has yet to understand what has happened, 
left in a world that resembles ‘nothing in this life.’642 Similarly, Lianne and Martin’s personal 
experience and history differentiate their altered perception so as to challenge the possibility 
that a uniform wisdom arose as the second plane struck. In Falling Man, then, the body works 
to frustrate the notion of a formless audience upon which terrorism discourses rely.  
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Having said this, DeLillo’s turn to the body also suggests he is in accord with Lentricchia 
and McAuliffe’s view that this terroristic moment stripped away the ‘film of familiarity’ that 
enables us to perceive the world through culturally-constructed ways of seeing. But rather 
than figuring this stripping away of the familiar as producing universal effects, DeLillo suggests 
that it is the rush to wisdom, the speed with which we are presumed to install or adjust 
another mode of perception, in place of that which has been so violently torn asunder, that 
allows us to figure the experience of terror as universal. Such a rapid reinstallation of a 
perceptive mode forecloses the possibility of responding to the attacks in a manner that 
remains faithful to what took place, as we instead acquiesce to the pre-figured in accordance 
with Baudrillard. As we shall see, DeLillo’s implication is that the speed with which September 
11th was understood entirely through established photographic and filmic modes of looking 
has specific ethical consequences. But at the same time, Falling Man suggests that in tarrying 
with the experience of the attacks, in suspending the rush to narrative explanation and 
development, it is possible to produce a response not pre-figured by existing modes of 
perceiving the world. By suspending the text between Keith’s experience in the Tower, DeLillo 
gives us narratives that interweave, move slowly forwards, but at the same, reflect on the past, 
but that always return the initial moment. As such, Falling Man’s suspended temporality 
allows the experiences and impact of September 11th to be felt in a manner that does not 
reduce them to an overarching march of narrative. In other words, in remaining faithful to the 
materiality of the ‘Falling Man’ image, DeLillo simultaneously produces an ethical approach 
that remains faithful to the materiality of the man it portrays. By adopting the aesthetics of 
suspension accidentally formulated by the interaction of the man’s fall and the action of the 
camera’s shutter, DeLillo creates a text that resists the appropriation of this individual’s life 
and death via insertion into a concrete narrative exterior to his suffering. Thus, while 
Thurschwell suggests ‘that the aesthetics of falling, the beauty of falls, the narrative arc and 
coherence of falls, seem to lead inevitably to an aestheticising of, a making sense of, others’ 
suffering’,643 Falling Man refigures the aesthetic qualities of the fall to produce an ethical 
resistance to such narrative coherence. 
If for McEwan, and for terrorism discourses, the literary represents a potentially 
terroristic space, it is through the interaction of the aesthetic and the material in embodied 
perception that Falling Man posits we can find an ethical way in which to honour those people, 
dressed for a day at work, who became such haunting falling figures, those people whose 
deaths were so far beyond the cultural imagination that we still have no word, no phrase, to 
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describe the helplessness and hopelessness of murder by forced suicide. Most significantly, 
Falling Man echoes Irigaray’s argument that it is by recognising our own bodily experience that 
we can respect the lives of those who slipped passed the grasp of existing language in the 
nature of their death. As we turn to the presence of the horizontal and vertical in the novel, we 
see DeLillo recognising that sexuate identity plays a crucial role in shaping our experience and 
that a failure to pay attention to difference results in a perpetuation of violence. Perhaps it is 
in Falling Man, then, that we find a means of bringing Irigaray’s ethical sensible transcendental 
to bear on terrorism discourses. 
  
Vertical Masculinities and Aesthetic Falls 
 While several critics concur with Kauffman in arguing that Keith is ‘the falling man who 
has lost his moorings,’644 his fall is largely read in terms of a form of social fall from grace as he 
eventually turns his back on his family and immerses himself in ‘the aleatory world of 
professional poker.’645 Yet reading Keith’s descent as a purely social fall not only presumes that 
his actions represent a form of moral decline, it also fails to recognise that his descent begins 
with an involuntary ascent, an ascent instigated by the sight of a falling man peeling away the 
film of familiarity. As Keith begins to descend from his office, he increasingly fails to inhabit the 
environment as his mind works to make sense of what he has just witnessed: 
Someone took his arm and led him forward for a few steps and then he walked on his 
own, in his sleep, and for an instant he saw it again, going past the window, and this 
time he thought it was Rumsey. He confused it with Rumsey, the man falling sideways, 
arm out and up, like pointed up, like why am I here instead of there.646 
 
Now able to identify the falling figure as a man, Keith is still unable to give the image a 
coherence that prevents interpretive slippages, leaving it open and ambiguous, allowing Keith 
to confuse Rumsey with the falling figure. He becomes a sleepwalker existing in an undreamed 
landscape, with his mind making phantasmatic connections. Returning again to the moment he 
emerges into the outside world, we see: 
[h]e could not find himself in the things he saw and heard. Two men ran by with a 
stretcher, someone face-down, smoke seeping out of his hair and clothes. He watched 
them move into the stunned silence. That’s where everything was, all around him, 
falling away, street signs, people, things he could not name. 
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 Then he saw a shirt come down out of the sky. He walked and saw it fall, arms 
waving like nothing in this life.647 
 
As Keith’s world physically collapses around him, so too does his ability to make use of that 
world to ‘find himself’ in it. Without the perceptual filters that allow him to read his 
environment in order to constitute himself, Keith finds himself propelled out of the world, as it 
falls away from him. Unable to coordinate his bodily senses and his understanding, Keith 
becomes curiously absent, guided by others out of the tower and transcending the street to 
enter into an ethereal ‘world, a time and space of falling ash and near night.’648 His 
disconnection from the physical becomes pronounced in the days after his escape, for he does 
not interact with the physical world. Rather, others push him through the world as he enters a 
passive state; Lianne ties his hospital gown, an ‘orderly put him in a wheelchair and pushed 
him,’649 doctors ‘tested him’ and ‘took the glass out of his face.’650 Keith merely sits or lies, 
watching and listening to what is going on around him as people ‘told him things he could not 
absorb.’651 Returning to his own apartment, Keith is unable to associate himself with ‘the man 
who used to live here,’ before pausing to say to himself “I’m standing here,” and then, louder, 
“I’m standing here.”652 It is as if, for Keith as for the Alzheimer’s patients, the most 
fundamental assumption of a connection between the mind and body has been erased. Keith 
can see the world around him, but is unable to locate himself within it. He has to resort to 
language in order to situate himself. His missing sense of physicality is noticed by others too, 
as Lianne realises that ‘He was a hovering presence now . . . He was not quite returned to his 
body yet.’653 Witnessing another’s fall without a means of comprehending it, then, has 
launched Keith into a disembodied state, hovering above the world. 
 Significantly, as Keith resorts to speaking out loud in order to situate himself in his 
apartment, he also attempts to insert his surroundings in a filmic narrative: 
In the movie version, someone would be in the building, an emotionally damaged 
woman or a homeless old man, and there would be dialogue and close-ups.654 
 
Similarly, in the days after the attacks, Florence plays music ‘”like movie music in those old 
movies when the man and the woman run through the heather,”’ as she needs this soundtrack 
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‘“to make [the attacks] go away.”’655 Yet she herself admits she only likes the music ‘“when it’s 
playing in the movie,”’ suggesting that in choosing to play the music without the film, she is 
trying to substitute herself into such a movie in the wake of her experiences in the North 
Tower.656 As Florence recounts these experiences to Keith, it becomes apparent that such 
attempts to situate oneself in filmic narratives work against the profound physicality of the 
close proximity to the attacks, as her narrative resorts to spatial rather than temporal 
description: 
This is where bottles of water were passed up the line from somewhere below . . . This 
is where the firemen went racing past, going up the stairs, into it, and people got out 
of the way.  
This is also where she saw someone she knew, going up, a maintenance man, a 
guy she joked with whenever she saw him . . .657 
 
If the experience within the towers transforms narrative time into a series of situational 
conjunctions, this suggests that the recourse to abstract, filmic narrative will not aid the return 
to earth from a state of involuntary transcendence. Indeed, it is as Keith runs through the 
physiotherapy for his injured wrist that we see the beginnings of his return to his body: 
He found these sessions restorative, four times a day, the wrist extensions, the ulnar 
deviations. These were the true countermeasures to the damage he’d suffered in the 
towers, in the descending chaos. It was not the MRI and not the surgery that brought 
him closer to well-being. It was this modest home program, the counting of seconds, 
the counting of repetitions, the times of day he reserved to the exercises, the ice he 
applied following each set of exercises.658 
 
As much as the interventions of the medical world have helped to repair the physical damage 
Keith suffered in the attacks, it is something in these minute, regular movements of his body 
that work to ‘restore’ his sense of self. The routine of repetition, the synchronisation of body 
and time through the counting of seconds, the simplicity of a ‘home program’; these elements 
help realign Keith’s body, mind, and environment, in the wake of the ‘descending chaos.’ There 
is a connection here between verticality and the disruption of the familiar, highlighted again as 
the passage continues:  
There were the dead and maimed. His injury was slight but it wasn’t the torn cartilage 
that was the subject of this effort. It was the chaos, the levitation of ceilings and floors, 
the voices choking in smoke. He sat in deep concentration, working on the hand 
shapes, the bend of the wrist toward the floor, the bend of the wrist toward the 
ceiling, the forearm flat on the table.659 
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Keith’s physiotherapy is a means of fighting against the disorder of levitating floors and 
ceilings, of descending wires, buildings, planes and people. Becoming absorbed in the most 
simple of wrist movements, a movement anchored by a horizontal arm in which the oscillation 
between floor and ceiling is small and controlled, this is how Keith begins to put together a 
sense of reality having had his so violently stripped away. 
 Keith’s fall, then, is not simply a descent into the debauched world of gambling. It is 
first and foremost a return to the body from a transcendental exteriority. As he returns to 
domestic life with Lianne and Justin, he is acutely alert to his immanence within the 
apartment: 
He began to think into the day, into the minute. It was being here, alone in time, that 
made this happen, being away from routine stimulus, all the streaming forms of office 
discourse. Things seemed still, they seemed clearer to the eye, oddly, in ways he didn’t 
understand. He began to see what he was doing. He noticed things, all the small lost 
strokes of a day or a minute, how he licked his thumb and used it to lift a bread crumb 
off the place and put it idly in his mouth. Only it wasn’t so idle anymore.660 
 
Counteracting the chaotic verticality of his experience of terror becomes a process of working 
his way back into the everyday through paying attention to his interactions with the world, not 
letting an alternative film of familiarity construct his perception. Lianne senses this move back 
into the flesh fifteen days after the attacks, as Keith makes love to Lianne in ‘the tenderest sex 
she’s known with him,’ in such a way that it was ‘a laying open of bodies but also of time, the 
only interval she’d known in these days and nights that was not forced or distorted, hemmed 
in by the press of events.’661 In the wake of this, Lianne feels she can sense the shape Keith’s 
gradual gathering of himself is taking, finally believing he is ‘growing into’ the term husband, a 
term ‘she’d never felt easy with’ before.662 Keith, too, seems to feel that his return to his body 
constitutes a coincidence with the domestic identity, as he announces to Lianne that ‘“We’re 
ready to sink into our little lives.”’663  
 Is there a suggestion here that Keith’s return to the body leads him into a sensible 
transcendental state, as his vertical decline coincides with the verticality of every existence? 
His awareness of himself as an embodied subject and his sexual tenderness towards the body 
of another would seem to imply this is the case. If this is so, it is deeply problematic for 
Irigaray’s ethical approach, for DeLillo figures such an awareness emerging from the violent 
exploitation of our fleshly vulnerability. But DeLillo himself complicates the notion that Keith’s 
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experiences can open a new ethical horizon by placing Keith’s involuntarily movement on a 
vertical axis in parallel with the terrorist Other’s voluntary ascent. In the few sections that 
focus on Hammad and his fellow perpetrators, DeLillo shows these men striving ‘against the 
need to be normal’664 in order to facilitate a transcendence of the everyday that will allow 
them to act in the name of God. In the figure of Hammad, DeLillo gives us a terrorist who starts 
out as a ‘bulky man, clumsy’ with ‘some unnamed energy . . . sealed in his body, too tight to be 
released.’665 This bulky presence indulges the appetites of his body. He eats twice in four 
pages,666 while his sexual appetites see him stepping ‘over the prone form of a brother in 
prayer as he made his way to the toilet to jerk off,’667 lusting after his girlfriend’s roommate, 
and making love to this girlfriend so enthusiastically that ‘they did damage to the cot.’668 Yet 
when we next encounter him, after his training in Afghanistan, Hammad’s bodily needs are 
disappearing from the text. He has lost weight, but this appears to be more of a spiritual feat 
than as a result of physical training, for we are told in Afghanistan: 
the landscape consumed him, waterfalls frozen in space, a sky that never ended. It was 
all Islam, the rivers and streams. Pick up a stone and hold it in your fist, this is Islam. 
God’s name on every tongue throughout the countryside. There was no feeling like 
this ever in his life.669 
 
Not only does Hammad’s experience foreshadow Keith’s later sense that the attacks created a 
world that was ‘like nothing in this life,’ Keith’s own encounter with a waterfall leads him to 
reconsider the reality of his environment.670 But unlike Keith, Hammad does not move out of 
his body; rather his entire body becomes consumed by the transcendental. The instinctive, and 
in his eyes, increasingly base demands of his physical existence are being assuaged by the 
growing awareness of God being present in his very flesh. Upon seeing two women walking 
through the park: 
Hammad sat on a bench, alone, watching, and then got up and followed. This was 
something that just happened, the way a man is pulled out of his skin and then the 
body catches up.671 
 
This is not a case of his body’s sexual needs propelling him unthinkingly after the women. It is 
instead his body that ‘catches up’ and prevents him from pursuing them. His spirituality, his 
faith, is in his flesh, and it is his unthinking mind that now needs to be monitored. 
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 In Hammad, DeLillo gives us the divinely-inspired terrorist of terrorism discourses, a 
man who feels the presence of God in his flesh and is thus willing to use that flesh to act in the 
name of God. Again, this carries with it overtones of Irigaray’s claim that we need to cultivate a 
sensible transcendental in order to approach the other in an ethical way. But in stark contrast 
to Irigaray’s model, Hammad’s divinely-inspired flesh facilitates a radical negation of the other, 
for as Hammad asks about the fate of their intended victims, Amir tells him that: 
there are no others. The others exist only to the degree that they fill the role we have 
designed for them. This is their function as others. Those who will die have no claim to 
their lives outside the useful fact of their dying.672 
 
Thus, unlike Lianne’s sense that ‘[h]uman existence had to have a deeper source than our own 
dank fluids’,673 DeLillo figures the terrorist Other as he who fundamentally disavow the 
existence of the other in order to make use of their materiality. The possibility of difference is 
so radically shut down that what the intended victims ‘hold so precious we see as empty 
space.’674 In reducing the other to the material against which their spiritual climax can be 
achieved, Hammad and his cohorts ground their spiritual development in the flesh and bone of 
the other and thus enter into an Irigarayan umbilical relation to that other. Yet in this case, 
thanks to the perceived presence of God in their flesh, Hammad, Atta, and the others have 
radicalised this relation. The flesh of the other is no longer simply the basis of a symbolic 
securing of subjectivity; it has become the actual clay from which they can carve their own 
transcendental, the means through which they can escape their divinely animated bodies to 
enter transcendental perfection. Thus while it may appear that Hammad’s experience in 
Afghanistan permitted him a transcendence which he has carried back into his body, the 
presence of the other as a constitutive space means this becomes a negative movement, 
carrying into his flesh a justification and a need for death and destruction. It is not the sensible 
transcendental that inspires Hammad; rather it is what Irigaray has described as the ‘insensible 
sensible transcendental,’675 a mode of existence that allows the profound appropriation of the 
other’s flesh to achieve one’s own sense of transcendence. 
 DeLillo figures Keith's movement on the vertical plane as thus instigated by Hammad’s 
profoundly negative transcendence, for as Hammad’s plane hits the North Tower, their two 
narrative strands collide into one another: 
[Hammad] fastened his seatbelt. 
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 A bottle fell off the counter in the galley, on the other side of the aisle, and he 
watched it this way and that, a water bottle, empty, making an arc one way and rolling 
back the other, and he watched it spin more quickly and then skitter across the floor 
an instant before the aircraft struck the tower, heat, then fuel, then fire, and a blast 
wave passed through the structure that sent Keith Neudecker out of his chair and into 
a wall.676 
 
If Keith is propelled out of the everyday horizon by a meeting of the symbolic and the material 
constituted by a radical negation of the other, it is little wonder that we find Keith’s descent 
figures not a transformation, but a hardening of the subjective boundaries that were under 
attack. For the attempt by the terrorist Other to exploit his flesh, to effectively place him in the 
position reserved for the maternal-feminine in a phallic economy, brings about an even 
sturdier assertion of Keith’s masculinity. For if domesticity and sensual awareness briefly 
coincide with the course of his descent, we soon see Keith turning to another kind of 
embodiment in order to locate himself in the world once more:  
Keith stood at the rear of the great open space, people everywhere in motion, blood 
pumping. They quick-walked on the treadmills or ran in place, never seeming 
regimented, never rigidly linked. It was a scene charged with purpose and a kind of 
elemental sex, rooted sex, women arched and bent, all elbows and knees, neck veins 
jutting. But there was something else as well. These were the people he knew; if he 
knew anyone. Here, together, these were the ones he could stand with in the days 
after. Maybe that’s what he was feeling, a spirit, a kinship of trust.677 
 
As Keith moves from the gentle rotations of his wrist to identifying himself with the strong, 
young bodies he sees straining ‘against weighted metal’678 in the gym, he now defines his 
physicality through its machine-like capabilities, developing a need to return again and again to 
the rowing machine despite ‘hating every stroke.’679 At the same time, as he enters the 
anonymous world of professional gambling: 
He was fitting into something that was made to his shape. He was never more himself 
than in these rooms . . .These were times when there was nothing outside, no flash of 
history or memory that he might unknowingly summon in the routine of the cards.680 
 
As Keith descends past the horizontal sphere of embodied experience, he reduces the body to 
something robotic, forgetting it once again. Moreover, he rejects the connection to others 
opened up by an embodied awareness, preferring instead an anonymous, disconnected life of 
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‘automated teller sex.’681 In falling away from his family and his job to pursue the gambling and 
exercise regimes he associated with ‘gauzy manhood’682 prior to the attacks, rather than 
undergoing a transformation, Keith becomes an more complete version of the man he was 
when he originally left Lianne, a man who ‘walked through the apartment, bent slightly to one 
side, a twisted guilt in his smile, ready to break up a table and burn it so he could take out his 
dick and piss on the flames.’683 
 In tracing Keith’s descent, DeLillo yet again offers us a reading that defies the kind of 
Hollywood logic that would seek to find a meaningful transformation emerging from Keith’s 
experiences. If Keith has involuntarily been propelled out of the everyday and into the 
aesthetic sphere by the violent disruption of the familiar, the knowledge he carries back with 
him into the world makes him more determined to consolidate himself into his notion of 
masculinity, and to do so at the risk of losing all that conventional wisdom tells him he should 
now hold dear. Moreover, if de Man tells us that the aesthetic is characterised by verticality, it 
is an experience that resembles that of mountain climber in comparison to ‘wanderer and the 
seafarer’ who remain in the horizontal, in that ‘death is present in a more radical way than in 
the experiences of active life.’684 Forced into the aesthetic by the terrorist Other’s 
appropriation of his flesh, Keith’s descent into the everyday radically inscribes the desire to 
inflict death on another in his flesh, for as Lianne realises: 
“You want to kill somebody,” she said . . . It was in his skin, maybe just a pulse at the 
side of the forehead, the faintest cadence in a small blue vein. She knew there was 
something that had to be satisfied, a matter discharged in full, and she thought this 
was at the heart of his restlessness. 
“Too bad I can’t join the army. Too old,” he said, “or I could kill without penalty and 
then come home and be a family.”685 
 
Having been forced up to aesthetic heights, what was his everyday no longer holds comfort for 
Keith. He becomes the subject who feels the excess of time, the restriction of space, and thus 
escapes to the timeless, anonymous spaces of the gambling circuit, putting everything on the 
line to make others ‘bleed. Make them spill their precious losers’ blood.’686 Attempting to 
recreate the sensation of verticality within the horizons of the everyday is the only way in 
which Keith can keep the knowledge he carries with him in his dreams alone, a knowledge of 
just what it is to exist within these horizons: 
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These were the days after and now the years, a thousand heaving dreams, the trapped 
man, fixed limbs, the dream of paralysis, the gasping man, the dream of asphyxiation, 
the dream of helplessness.687 
 
This man not only resembles de Man’s constrained artist, who feels to claustrophobic effect 
the limits of the everyday, but also recalls Keith’s friend and colleague, Rumsey, left fatally 
wounded by the attacks. As Keith tries to lift Rumsey out of their collapsing office, Keith 
realises that thanks to Rumsey’s injuries, ‘[t]he whole business of being Rumsey was in a 
shambles now.’688 Thus, it is in working to disavow his embodied subjectivity in order to 
achieve something close to an ideal phallic masculinity that Keith resists the appropriative 
violence that he saw fundamentally unravel his friend’s subjectivity. 
 In figuring Keith and Hammad’s narratives as progressing along a vertical axis, DeLillo 
not only foregrounds the possibility that both the victim’s masculinity and the deviant 
masculinity of the terrorist Other exist in a similar vertical relation to the world, but he also 
suggests that remaining in the vertical axis leads to the perpetuation of violence. It is 
significant then, that in his descent past the embodied moment in pursuit of a sensually-numb 
mode of existence, Keith reinstalls the perceptual filters that were so violently rendered 
useless. For as Keith observes, in the visual and audio hubbub of a casino ‘[y]ou have to break 
through the structure of your own stonework habit just to make yourself listen.’689 It is 
precisely because Keith ‘didn’t want to listen’690 anymore that he has turned to this highly-
structured environment to forget his body. But if Keith finds fitting himself into a cultural 
stereotype and cultivating a studium mode of perception the best means of reconstituting 
himself in the face of the terrorist’s Other appropriation, DeLillo suggests that these very 
modes of thinking lay behind the terrorists’ actions. For while Hammad scorns the ‘[w]rong-
eyed men and women laughing on TV,’691 he knows full well that his actions will place him on 
that screen, ‘and liked to imagine himself appearing on the screen, a videotaped figure walking 
through the gate-like detector on his way to the plane.’692 Indeed, the conspirators believe the 
image has the capacity to thwart their attempts, as they imagine the vast array of 
observational equipment the state has at its disposal, including ‘photo reconnaissance that 
takes a picture of a dung beetle from one hundred kilometers up.’693  
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The attackers share a faith in the significance of the image with those they wish to 
negate, to such an extent that they are aware that images are precisely that which could 
prevent their actions. Their faith in the image is such that it becomes the means through which 
they will change the world. Amir tells Hammad that ‘[t]he world changes first in the mind of 
the man who wants to change it,’694 and their means of enacting this change is by grabbing 
hold of the global narrative unfolding daily on news channels the world over. Instead of being 
‘crowded out by other cultures, other futures, the all-enfolding will of capital and foreign 
policies,’695 they will hijack control of the narrative by harnessing the power of the image for 
their own ends. Hence, DeLillo figures the terrorist Other as sharing Baudrillard’s notion that 
the image has the power to shape the perception of reality. Moreover, such a faith is grounded 
in modes of perceiving the image that coincide with photojournalist ways of looking, as they 
presume that the images their actions will produce will be read as testifying to the “fact” that 
their violence institutes a “real” change in the global narrative of power. Hence, in showing 
Keith and Hammad operating on a shared vertical plain, DeLillo suggests that to assume that 
we already had an appropriate way of “seeing” the September 11th attacks in the models of 
photojournalistic and filmic viewing is, in fact, to foreclose the possibility of responding to such 
violence. Instead, remaining within pre-established modes of looking ensured that the only 
response available to this extreme co-option of image was to become a more extreme version 
of what we were before the planes crashed into the towers. Thus, in Falling Man we see 
terrorism discourses sharing the same perceptual framework as the terrorist Other, a common 
ground that suggests counter-terrorism can never be a response, only an attempt to more fully 
assert ourselves in the face of the terrorist Other. 
 
Embodied Terror and the Sensible Transcendental 
 If the terrorist Other is figured as sharing the photojournalist mode of perception, 
DeLillo’s decision to “embody” the image of the ‘Falling Man’ in David Janiak’s performances 
becomes more than O’Hagan’s ‘intellectual escapism.’ Furthermore, if DeLillo suggests Keith 
and Hammad are united in their mutual occupation of a vertical axis, it is significant that it is 
Lianne who encounters Janiak’s tableau vivant. For if Falling Man concurs with Irigaray’s 
thought in figuring the vertical as the domain of phallic masculinity, DeLillo also implies that it 
is Lianne’s position outside of this axis that opens up the possibility of cultivating an alternative 
mode of perception, one that does not re-inscribe modes that existed prior to the vicious 
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peeling away of the film of the familiar. If DeLillo’s description of Keith’s embodied experience 
of terror complicates the terrorism discourses’ epistemological construction of the mass 
audience with the notion that proximity plays a vital role in the perception of violence, 
Lianne’s physicality implies that our bodies locate us in the world in different ways, such that 
the possibility of a universal experience of perception is foreclosed thanks to our innately 
different relations to our environment. By bringing Lianne into contact with the media, 
photography, Morandi’s still lifes, and David Janiak, DeLillo not only echoes Gordimer and 
Lessing in figuring the female body as a site that resists the epistemological assumptions that 
underwrite terrorism discourses; he suggests that women’s immanence in the material 
facilitates experiences which, if cultivated, can constitute a response to September 11th that 
does not come from pre-established frameworks. 
 In the days after the attacks, in which ‘[e]verything seemed to mean something’696 for 
Lianne, we see her turning to the newspapers in an attempt to divine the significance of what 
has happened. She scrutinises Mohammad Atta’s ‘face in the newspaper’, finding only  ‘hard 
eyes that seemed too knowing to belong to a face on a driver’s license.’697 Similarly, she reads 
the profiles of the victims published in the newspapers, as ‘[n]ot to read them, every one, was 
an offense, a violation of responsibility and trust. But she also read them because she had to, 
out of some need she did not try to interpret.’698 Lianne’s interaction with the media is imbued 
with the same sense of duty that calls for the rejection of the aesthetic in the wake of 
terrorism, a call that leaves its own motives unexamined. But if Lianne replicates this sense of 
duty, she is simultaneously aware of the reductive qualities of such representation. For as the 
media and the political rhetoric after the attacks produce stereotypes of the terrorist Other, 
something in Lianne resists the “truths” they espouse: ‘[t]hey’re the ones who think alike, talk 
alike, eat the same food at the same time. She knew this wasn’t true.’699 Just as Lianne’s 
personal experience disrupts her ability to distinguish between Morandi’s still life in Nina’s 
apartment and the images of September 11th, so too does her own awareness destabilise her 
ability to coalesce her reading of the attacks with the media’s representations. 
 Indeed, as Lianne visits an exhibition of Giorgio Morandi’s work in a Chelsea art gallery 
three years after the attacks, we see the aesthetic qualities of his drawings and paintings 
opening up an entirely new perceptual field for Lianne. In placing Morandi’s work in the text, 
DeLillo not only remains faithful to the context of his novel, for there was indeed an exhibition 
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of Morandi’s work held in New York in 2004,700 but he also makes explicit Falling Man’s 
concern with modes of perception. For as Boehm notes, Morandi’s seemingly obsessive 
representations of everyday objects found in a rural Italian kitchen means that ‘[v]ariety comes 
about not through subject-matter but through how it is observed; the imagination in the 
choice of theme is completely ruled out.’701 Morandi’s concern is not so much the meaning 
inherent in the objects he is depicting, but the process of perception, as the objects depicted 
are ‘mere armatures for the articulation of the picture plane and the play with spatial 
illusion.’702 As such, Boehm argues that in Morandi’s work: 
Objects often overlap the pictorial horizon, linking ‘above’ and ‘below.’ The lower part 
of the picture is then reinterpreted: instead of a base, it is a flat rectangle parallel to 
the picture plane on which the upper rectangle rests. Only the two together constitute 
the picture. They create an order in which plane and space interact. Space becomes 
indistinguishable from the object. Their synthesis surpasses everyday experience, 
whose perceptual model insists on keeping them separate.703 
 
Morandi, then, is an artist whose primary interest is disrupting the film of familiarity in order 
that the spectator becomes aware of how their perceptual processes construct their sense of 
the everyday. His drawings and paintings are designed to alert the viewer to the fact that our 
perception of the everyday is in fact a particular mode of looking, one that projects our pre-
figured understanding onto the world rather than a simple absorption of the sensual data that 
passes before our eyes. As Lianne stands before Morandi’s work a second time, it is precisely 
this resistance to the projection of pre-figured interpretation that alerts her to what it is to be 
a perceiving being: 
She wasn’t sure why she was looking so intently. She was passing beyond pleasure into 
some kind of assimilation. She was trying to absorb what she saw, take it home, wrap 
it around her, sleep in it. There was so much to see. Turn it into living tissue, who you 
are.704 
 
Her meditation on Morandi’s work takes her beyond a merely visual appreciation of his work, 
one informed by memory as it is, and passes to a visceral desire, or perhaps more accurately, 
an epidermic desire, a desire to wrap oneself in the experience and absorb it via a kind of 
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tactile osmosis, to allow the information to seep through into living tissue by prolonged, 
persistent contemplation. 
If Lianne shares the unarticulated desire to submit to the authority of the 
photojournalistic that resists the turn to the aesthetic, she unsurprisingly finds the disruption 
of her perceptual field disconcerting, leaving her ‘unsure’ as to what this experience means. 
Initially, it seems that Lianne equates such a destabilisation of everyday perception with the 
dementia that led her father to suicide and the Alzheimer’s that is dismantling her group’s 
ability to interact with the world, for she seeks out medical reassurance. But even as she is told 
she has ‘a normal morphology,’ Lianne ‘loved this term but couldn’t quite believe it referred to 
her.’705 It is here DeLillo suggests that the aesthetic encounter has the potential to bring about 
a profound change in our perception of the world, a transformation that constitutes a 
response to what has occurred. Moreover, it is the aesthetic encounter with a living other that 
fundamentally alters Lianne’s sense of the everyday. As Thurschwell notes, as Lianne recalls 
Drew’s photograph, DeLillo’s language collapses into ‘something clichéd and unsatisfying.’ For 
Thurschwell, Lianne’s claim that this image ‘hit her hard when she first saw it,’ and that ‘this 
picture had burned a hole in her mind and heart, dear God, he was a falling angel and his 
beauty was horrific’706 is distinctly lacklustre in a DeLillian context, indicating perhaps ‘a DeLillo 
resigned to the poverty of a discourse of falling angels in the face of falling people.’707 But 
arguably, DeLillo’s prose deliberately replicates the language which he himself finds 
dissatisfying, as it is the language adopted by the newspapers in which Lianne first encounters 
Drew’s image. In such a context, the newspaper provides Lianne with a temporal and spatial 
means within which to understand the image; an appropriate mode of seeing is suggested, 
albeit an unsatisfactory one, allowing Lianne to understand what she sees in terms of clichéd, 
hackneyed phrases. Yet when Lianne first witnesses Janiak’s performance, she is momentarily 
propelled back to what it was to see this figure without such an interpretative framework: 
Traffic was barely moving now. There were people shouting up at him, outraged at the 
spectacle, the puppetry of human desperation, a body’s last fleet breath and what it 
held. It held the gaze of the world, she thought. There was the awful openness of it, 
something we’d not seen, the single falling figure that trails a collective dread, body 
come down among us all. And now, she thought, this little theater piece, disturbing 
enough to stop traffic and send her back into the terminal.708 
 
When confronted with Janiak’s performance, Lianne, and indeed the people around her, have 
no such contextual clues to hang on to. The world comes to a standstill, people yell out the 
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anger and fear such a disorientation induces, and suddenly, midway through the passage, the 
boundary between fiction and fact disappears altogether as DeLillo makes both his authorial 
presence and the presence of the reader explicit. Lianne’s thoughts run along in the third 
person, but as the world grinds to a halt and Janiak dangles above Pershing Square, the 
unattributed thought that the awful openness was something ‘we’d not seen’ brings together 
author, reader, characters and surrounding worlds, fictional and real. It is perhaps in this 
instance we see DeLillo’s true description of horrors induced by the images of the falling, in an 
instance unstructured by mediation. To talk about the image is to have already accepted some 
form of prior interpretation, to tacitly establish an appropriate mode for reading it, and thus to 
close down the possibility of a response that comes from within the event itself. Giving the 
‘Falling Man’ a body then becomes a means of resisting the narratives and interpretative 
frameworks implicit in the very forms the media takes, replacing them instead with the 
aesthetic’s power to defamiliarise and decontextualise, to leave the audience confronted with 
the awful openness of possibility, with the responsibility of formulating their own response. 
Just as the image of the Falling Man traverses the boundaries between photojournalistic mores 
and aesthetic appreciation, so too Janiak’s performance hangs between the reality of a 
suspended man, damaged by each performance,709 and the theatrical interpretation of 
another’s suffering. As the novel pauses in a moment of photographic suspension, DeLillo 
similarly pulls down the dividing line between the novel’s world and ours. At each level, the 
models we rely on to make sense of planes of reality are swept away. 
 It is encountering the aesthetics produced by September 11th embodied by a living 
other that leads Lianne to fully comprehend the significance of her embodied perception. For 
as she learns of Janiak’s death and promptly goes on an information binge on the internet, it 
becomes clear that his performances were only captured on camera by chance, not by an 
assistant or pre-warned media. His actions were not designed to be re-inscribed in the 
photographic lexicon. Moreover, the realisation that there are no photographs of the second 
performance she witnesses transforms her understanding of what it is to perceive: 
There were no photographs of that fall. She was the photograph, the photosensitive 
surface. That nameless body coming down, this was hers to record and absorb.710 
 
If Morandi’s work instils a sense of embodied perception in Lianne, her encounters with Janiak 
leave her to formulate this perceptual awareness into an ethical moment. Not only does 
Lianne’s sense of herself as a photosensitive surface alert her to the obligation she has to 
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record what the camera has failed to capture, it also allows her to accept that she will never 
comprehend the motivations behind Janiak’s actions: 
The man eluded her. All she knew was what she’d seen that day near the schoolyard, a 
boy bouncing a basketball and a teacher with a whistle on a string. She could believe 
she knew these people, and all the others she’d seen and heard that afternoon, but 
not the man who’d stood above her, detailed and looming. 
  She went to sleep finally on her husband’s side of the bed.711 
 
By embodying the ‘Falling Man’, then, DeLillo critiques the ethical capacity of photojournalistic 
or purely visual modes of understanding. For it is encountering the living body, suspended in a 
position that recalls the aesthetics of the attacks, that alerts Lianne to the camera’s failure to 
record all the falls and leads her to realise this falling man is irreducibly other to her. As such, 
DeLillo implies that the turn to the purely visual for understanding risks forgetting all those 
whose falls were not captured on camera, a forgetting that foregrounds the lives and deaths of 
others over those who elude the photographic record. Moreover, in assuming the image gives 
us access to the subject, we overwrite the subject’s irreducible alterity in a way that allows us 
to colonise their actions with our own attempts at meaning. Falling Man’s ethical gesture, 
then, is to create a rift in the visual hegemony that ensures we remember those lives and 
deaths that eluded our gaze and to remind us that those whose falls are forever suspended in 
the photographic record should remain as elusive, unknowable, untranslatable as they initially 
were. 
 If DeLillo figures Lianne as achieving something like Irigaray’s sensible transcendental, 
it is as she achieves this awareness that he performs the novel’s final suspension. Lianne finally 
makes peace with her new sense of embodiment: 
late one night, undressing, she yanked a clean green T-shirt over her head and it 
wasn’t sweat she smelled or maybe just a faint trace but not the sour reek of the 
morning run. It was just her body and everything it carried, inside and out, identity and 
memory and human heat. It wasn’t even something she smelled so much as knew. It 
was something she’d always known.712 
 
But just as the novel suggests that Lianne has been unaware of this knowledge, of what it 
means to be an embodied subject, until this moment, so DeLillo ends Lianne’s narrative here, 
resisting the possibility of inscribing Lianne’s realisation with meaning by suspending the 
narrative. In contrast to McEwan, then, DeLillo does not give the reader a sense of what our 
response to September 11th, 2001, should be. Instead, Falling Man enacts a suspension of 
‘meaningful’ narrative precisely in order to represent the ethical limits of such attempts to 
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inscribe meaning on the suffering of others. Hence, if McEwan’s turn to the materiality of the 
body is a means for stabilising identity and securing the West’s position as moral arbiter, 
DeLillo’s attentiveness to embodied experience disrupts the epistemological appropriation of 
the other that allows such a logic to unfold by bringing difference into the horizon of terrorism 
discourses. Moreover, in his figuring of sexuate difference, DeLillo not only gives form to the 
disembodied audience of terrorism discourses, he does so in a way that unravels the very 
concept of terror itself. For terror does not have a uniform effect on those who witness it, as 
their bodies provide a layer of perception that resists undifferentiated commensuration with 
culturally-prescribed modes of seeing. Most significantly of all, it is when one forgets this 
embodied perception in favour of the culturally-constructed, one shares the perceptual mode 
of the terrorist Other. Remembering our bodies and cultivating the knowledge that we carry in 
our flesh becomes the only means of truly distinguishing ourselves from the terrorist who 
would make use of our flesh. Until we do so, DeLillo suggests, our phallically-constituted 
symbolic ensures we remain in the same axis that facilitates terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
204 
 
Conclusion: Embodying the Brutality of Spectacle 
 
Writing in the years before the prospect of global terrorism had firmly established itself in 
political sphere, Nadine Gordimer and Doris Lessing had already begun to use literature’s 
potential to re-figure the concept of terrorism in order to critique the more localised rhetoric 
around terrorism in South Africa and the U.K. They did so specifically by challenging the claims 
of such discourses to “know” the terrorist Other, destabilising the epistemological authority of 
those who would define the terrorist by establishing the flesh as marking the limit of 
knowledge. When the spectacular attacks of September 11th, 2001, launched terrorism 
discourses into the global sphere as never before, these earlier, localised interventions were 
rendered mute as the epistemology of terrorism gained a global purchase. The audience of 
terror had become global and as such, had been reduced to the homogenised mass that 
underpins the very concept of terrorism. The idea that the body is a site of irreducible 
incarnate difference that testifies to the irony of an epistemological framework’s claims to 
know the subject it studies was explicitly disavowed as we turned to the experts for a means of 
understanding and responding to what we had witnessed. For it was understood that everyone 
had watched the spectacle unfold ‘[l]ike the rest of the world,’713 and as such, had all 
experienced what we saw in the same way. To suggest otherwise was to garner censure on a 
global scale, as exemplified by the media’s response to Stockhausen’s readiness to connect the 
attacks to the aesthetic, through to the vitriolic and deeply personal attacks on Susan Sontag 
after her contribution to The New Yorker’s September 24th, 2001, issue criticised attempts by 
politicians and the media to figure the terrorists as cowards.714 To speak of difference, to 
suggest that there was more than one way of experiencing the supposedly global effects of 
terror, was to align oneself with “them” rather than with “us”. This “us”, moreover, was 
explicitly a masculine universal, as even feminism’s attempts to articulate difference were 
dismissed in the face of globalised terror. 
 In contrast to works that focus on assessing literature after the September 11th 
attacks, such as Head’s The State of the Novel or Keniston and Quinn’s Literature After 9/11,715 
by placing the literature produced after the attacks alongside Gordimer and Lessing’s earlier 
work, we gain some sense of how far the logic of “us” and “them”, of epistemological master 
and knowable, deviant Other have penetrated literature’s response to terrorism. McEwan, it 
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seems, is scornful of the reductive manner in which media representation and political rhetoric 
influence the individual’s capacity to respond. Yet he converges with terrorism discourses in 
claiming that now is the time to firmly proclaim the West’s moral authority. Grounding this 
authority in science’s ability to gain epistemological access to the subject, McEwan thus stakes 
this authority in the same forgetting of the flesh that terrorism discourses rely on. In doing so, 
McEwan not only reinstalls the conservative notions of masculine and feminine that we detect 
in terrorism studies, he gives a foretaste of the precarious position that the other is left in as 
the West increasingly relies on scientific models of embodied identity. For if the scientific 
becomes the arbiter of normal and abnormal, morally correct and deviant, the scientist is 
simultaneously allotted the status of epistemological master, a scientist who, as Irigaray 
suggests, forgets their own embodiment in order to make use of the material world. In turning 
to science to find the security once accorded to subjectivity through the presence of the 
transcendental Other, McEwan still leaves the other at our disposal, tellingly manifesting 
Freud’s observation that ‘if differences between scientific opinions could ever attain a similar 
significance [to religious ones] for groups, [war] would again be repeated with this new 
motivation.’716  
In a striking contrast to McEwan, we have an author who lives near New York 
continuing Gordimer and Lessing’s critique of the epistemological assumptions of terrorism 
discourses. Can we perhaps read this critical awareness arising from the fact that Don DeLillo, 
like Gordimer and Lessing before him, inhabits the context that has been afflicted by terror, 
while McEwan is responding to what was then only an abstract global threat?717 Thus while 
McEwan willingly embraces the logic underpinning terrorism discourses, DeLillo, like his 
predecessors, find such rhetoric problematic, if not dangerous. If Gordimer and Lessing suggest 
recognising embodied experience destabilises the distinctions between the personal and the 
political, and with it, the authority of the epistemological gaze that identifies the terrorist 
Other, DeLillo’s embodiment undercuts the possibility of a universal sensation of terror upon 
which such an epistemology depends. By embodying the experience of terror, DeLillo exposes 
the extent to which terrorism discourses are dictated by a particular understanding of 
perception that the terrorists themselves share, a photojournalistic mode of seeing that 
imbues the image with world-shaping power. In doing so, he does for the formless mass 
audience of terror what Gordimer and Lessing do for the terrorist Other, as on all sides, these 
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authors illustrate that, in forgetting the body, the epistemology of terrorism replicates an 
appropriation of the other that replicates the terrorist gesture itself. 
By accepting Spivak’s assertion that the Humanities holds the ethical in its hands, 
thanks to its ability to recognise that different discourses have contrasting relations to the 
dominant ideologies, this thesis has placed terrorism discourses in a critical dialogue with 
philosophical and literary approaches to terrorism. In doing so, I aimed to demonstrate to 
what extent such an intervention is capable of opening up a new ethical horizon. If Luce 
Irigaray’s analysis of Western culture’s dominant symbolic culture alerted us to the very 
specific threat violence characterised as terrorist posed to that culture, bringing an Irigarayan 
analysis of terrorism discourses into dialogue with literature has provided us with a means of 
applying her work to open up such an ethical horizon. If recognising embodied experience 
destabilises the epistemologically-constructed boundary between terrorist Other and subject 
in Burger’s Daughter and The Good Terrorist, in Falling Man, paying attention to our own 
incarnate experience produces an ethics of suspension, a demand that we resist the swift 
move into understanding before we have paid full attention to what our own flesh tells us in 
the violent meeting with the other. To turn Luce Irigaray’s ethics of the sensible transcendental 
into dialogue with terrorism discourses, then, is to demand that in the face of bloody 
exploitation of our materiality, we pause, suspend the rush to narrative and presumed 
understanding, and listen instead to the unarticulated experience of terror. Then, and only 
then, will our response to terror differ from what we construct as the terroristic gesture. 
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